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THE SUPREME COURT GIVETH AND THE 
SUPREME COURT TAKETH AWAY: THE 
CENTURY OF FOURTH AMENDMENT 
“SEARCH AND SEIZURE” DOCTRINE 
BY THOMAS Y. DAVIES∗ 
 
[I]ndependent tribunals of justice . . . will be an impenetrable bulwark against every 
assumption of power in the Legislative or Executive; they will be naturally led to 
resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the [Bill of Rights]. 
—James Madison** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The century during which the Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology has been published roughly matches the lifespan of Fourth 
Amendment “search and seizure” doctrine.  The Journal appeared in 1910, 
while it is generally (and correctly) accepted that the 1914 decision Weeks 
v. United States1 marks the birth of the modern Fourth Amendment.2  
 
∗ Elvin E. Overton Distinguished Professor of Law and National Alumni Association 
Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law.  B.A. 
(1969), University of Delaware; M.A., J.D. (1975), Ph.D. (political science) (1980), 
Northwestern University. 
 The author thanks Wesley M. Oliver and George C. Thomas III for comments on a draft 
of this article, and also thanks his colleague Sibyl Marshall for assistance in locating fugitive 
sources.  He remains solely responsible for all opinions or errors. 
 In addition to his academic articles on search and seizure topics, the author appeared “of 
counsel” and assisted with the defendants’ brief on reargument in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 
213 (1983), and did likewise in Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990).  He has also 
testified before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary in opposition to 
legislative proposals to curtail the operation of the exclusionary rule. 
** 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 440 (J. Gales ed. 1834) (speech by James Madison to the House 
of Representatives Proposing a Bill of Rights, June 8, 1789).  
1 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
2 See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973) (“Because the rule 
requiring exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment was first 
enunciated in Weeks v. United States . . . it is understandable that virtually all of this Court’s 
search-and-seizure law has been developed since that time.”). 
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Unsurprisingly, the Journal has published many articles on search and 
seizure issues since that time.3 
However, the two stories have now diverged.  The Journal continues 
to be a vibrant institution, but over roughly the last four decades the 
continuing conservative majority of the justices of the Supreme Court have 
reduced Fourth Amendment doctrine to little more than a rhetorical 
apparition.  Hence, it is appropriate to refer to “the” century of search and 
seizure doctrine.  Although it is unclear whether the justices will refrain 
from explicitly ending enforcement of constitutional limits on government 
arrest and search powers, they have already drained those limits of almost 
all of their practical content.  And, notwithstanding the usual clichés 
regarding historical pendulums (where does such nonsense come from?), it 
seems quite unlikely that destruction will be reversed. 
My assignment for this Symposium is to tell the story of the invention, 
development, and dismantling of Fourth Amendment search and seizure 
doctrine over the last century.  Of course, readers will likely already be 
familiar with at least the landmarks.  Hence, my ambition is to broadly 
sketch out what might be called the trajectory of search and seizure doctrine 
while at least beginning to link that story to the larger history of the 
Supreme Court itself—that is, to the shifting concerns that motivated the 
justices as the Court’s membership and the politics of criminal procedure 
changed. 
The Fourth Amendment reads: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.4 
It is fashionable to lament the maddeningly cryptic character of the 
Fourth Amendment’s text5 as well as the confused or unmoored state of 
 
3 A word search of the titles of articles and comments published in the Journal indicates 
that the first search and seizure piece appeared in 1947.  Thereafter, pieces on constitutional 
search and arrest issues began to appear more frequently, especially after the Journal 
instituted an annual review of Supreme Court decisions in the 1970s.  A large proportion of 
the cases discussed in the latter part of this article have been the subject of such commentary. 
 Authors of search and seizure articles in the Journal have included many of the leading 
commentators including, to name only a few, Francis Allen, Joseph Grano, Fred Inbau, Yale 
Kamisar, and Wayne LaFave.  
4 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
5 See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. 
REV. 349, 353-54 (1974) (characterizing the text as “brief, vague, general[, and] 
unilluminating”).  
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search and seizure doctrine.6  Indeed, those complaints may seem painfully 
obvious if one attempts to systematically set out the rationales and content 
of current search and seizure doctrine and to then relate that doctrine to the 
text.  However, such doctrinal incoherence should hardly come as a 
surprise.  If the professional pretense that the law develops through judicial 
discovery of the true meaning of a text or of the internal logic of principles 
and precedents was ever tenable, it surely no longer is. 
Instead, the basic contention advanced by the legal realists more than a 
half century ago—that textual interpretations and doctrinal conceptions are 
shaped by the outcomes that judges seek to justify far more than the other 
way around—is patently obvious.  Indeed, the realists’ insight provides a 
particularly powerful explanation of Supreme Court decisions regarding 
ideologically charged topics such as criminal procedure.7  Although the 
potential for appellate review means that lower court judges are constrained 
to hew to the legal doctrine set out by the high court to some significant 
degree, the justices of the Supreme Court are not similarly confined. 
Perhaps because no other institution has the power to review 
constitutional rulings by the Supreme Court,8 the justices’ behavior often 
resembles that of a vote-casting legislature at least as much as a court in the 
usual sense.9  Indeed, the case could be made that the history of 
constitutional law has been largely (one might be tempted to say merely) 
the story of who held the fifth swing vote when decisions were made. 
However, a realist perspective does not go so far as to claim that legal 
doctrine does not matter at all.  The public expects judicial decisions to be 
 
6 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 
757, 759 (1994) (describing Fourth Amendment doctrine as “rudderless and badly off 
course”). 
7 For a still classic example of the legal realist perspective on the Supreme Court, see 
FRED RODELL, NINE MEN: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT FROM 1790-1955 
(1955).   
8 Although the Court’s constitutional rulings are unreviewable in the short term, it has 
long been evident that the course of Supreme Court decisions ultimately follows public 
opinion, albeit with a sometimes considerable lag-time.  See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, A 
PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 105-11 (1956) (observing, with regard to judicial review, 
that the Supreme Court might delay but would not stop “a persistent law making majority”). 
9 The tendency of Supreme Court justices to distort existing doctrine to produce the 
desired results is not a recent development.  Rather, the justices have been revising the 
Constitution almost from the beginnings of the Supreme Court.  I hope to publish an article 
in the near future that will document that the Marshall Court concocted the famous claim of 
unconstitutionality in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), by deliberately evading the 
then-settled understanding that mandamus was an inherent superintending power of the 
supreme court in a country or state, and thus imposed a novel meaning on the limits on the 
Supreme Court’s “original jurisdiction” in Article III of the Constitution that the Framers 
would not have imagined. 
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justified in terms of precedent and principle, and also expects that the 
justices usually should change the law incrementally.  Thus, because the 
justices seek to provide public rationales for their rulings, the course of 
doctrinal development is shaped to a significant degree by the opportunities 
or weaknesses that the justices perceive in existing doctrine.  Hence, in 
much the same way that the course of a stream seeks out weaker strata, the 
rationales in opinions (which, of course, do not necessarily reflect the actual 
motivations for the justices’ votes) often exploit the state of the existing 
doctrinal terrain. 
The realist perspective suggests that the seeming doctrinal confusion in 
arrest and search law should be explainable enough as a historical 
concretion that reflects ongoing ideological adjustments to prior doctrine.  I 
think it is.  Indeed, the story of the century of search and seizure doctrine 
can be told largely in terms of five distinct periods that mark shifts in the 
ideological composition of the Court and in the issues the justices either 
preferred or felt obligated to address.10 
A. THE FIVE PERIODS OF THE CENTURY OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
DOCTRINE 
During the initial period of the century of search and seizure 
(discussed in Part III), the justices were primarily engaged in an ongoing 
campaign to restrain government regulation of business—and that included 
restraining government access to business records.  The justices’ anti-
regulation orientation seems to have provided the impetus for the invention 
of what we now call Fourth Amendment “search and seizure” doctrine in 
1914 in Weeks.  Although Weeks is generally described as the case that 
invented the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, that was only the final 
of several doctrinal innovations made in that ruling.  In a burst of activist 
creativity, the Weeks justices extended the Fourth Amendment’s protections 
to regulate the conduct of officers as well as legislation and court orders.  
They also reinvigorated the traditional understanding that a warrant was 
required for a lawful search of a house.  And to give the new protections 
 
10 Prior to 1925, most of the Supreme Court’s docket consisted of cases that the justices 
were obliged to decide.  In 1925, legislation expanded the Court’s certiorari docket, so that 
the Court’s docket became largely a matter of the justices’ discretion.  In 1988, further 
legislation eliminated almost all of the remainder of the mandatory docket.  See Writ of 
Certiorari, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 154 
(Kermit L. Hall ed., 2d ed. 2005).  Of course, certiorari allows the justices to choose only 
among the issues brought before them by petition.  Thus, a full history of the Supreme 
Court’s treatment of search and seizure doctrine would also address changes in the character 
of the arrest and search cases reaching the Court.  This Article does not address that 
dimension of the history. 
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operational substance, they created the Fourth Amendment exclusionary 
rule.  In subsequent cases they simply ignored the historical concern with 
the protection of the house and its contents and applied the Weeks warrant 
requirement to searches of offices for business papers. 
The second period (discussed in Part IV) arose not from a change in 
the orientation of the justices but from a change in the issues the justices 
were pressed to address.  Specifically, they were confronted with the 
question of whether or how the newly reinvented Fourth Amendment 
applied to the police searches that were an inexorable part of Prohibition 
enforcement.  Prohibition involved an unprecedented extension of federal 
criminal law to a possessory offense.  That, in turn, posed novel search 
imperatives for law enforcement—especially searches of automobiles used 
to transport illegal liquor.  Because the justices had already adopted a 
generous conception of the scope of the Fourth Amendment’s protections, 
they could not accommodate the perceived needs of law enforcement by 
simply declaring that searches of automobiles fell outside of the 
Amendment’s protections.  Instead, the justices watered down the new 
warrant requirement by inventing the novel concept of “Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness.”  Specifically, in the 1925 ruling in Carroll v. United 
States,11 they adopted the view that the Fourth Amendment did not 
condemn all warrantless searches, but only those that the justices did not 
find to be “reasonable” in the circumstances.  Because automobiles 
presented an exigency, the justices concluded that warrantless searches of 
automobiles would be “reasonable” and therefore constitutional provided 
they were based on probable cause.  However, the flurry of search and 
seizure cases declined significantly when Prohibition was repealed. 
The third period (discussed in Part V) commenced after the end of 
World War II.  By then, judicial resistance to New Deal economic 
regulation had collapsed, and President Franklin D. Roosevelt had 
repopulated the Court’s bench with supporters of New Deal regulation.  
Hence, the earlier “conservative” ideological inclination to protect business 
records became moot.  Roosevelt’s appointees often possessed both strong 
personalities and views, but they were chosen for their endorsement of the 
federal government’s economic powers, not for a shared perspective on the 
civil liberties issues that began to take center stage.  Likewise, President 
Harry Truman’s appointees were chosen largely on the basis of cronyism 
rather than for their views on civil liberties or criminal justice.  Hence, the 
Roosevelt and Truman appointees divided when they addressed search and 
seizure issues. 
 
11 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
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The central issue for search doctrine during this postwar period was 
the relative importance to be assigned to the Weeks warrant requirement 
versus the Carroll reasonableness formulation.  Ultimately, the balance in 
search cases tipped toward a flexible “reasonableness” interpretation, and 
away from a rigorous search warrant requirement.  Likewise, the balance 
tipped against both the first stirrings of the “incorporation” doctrine and the 
brief attempt to use the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause as a 
surrogate for a national search and seizure regime.  But dissenting opinions 
in closely divided cases indicated that the subject was not settled.  Notably, 
the search cases decided by the Court to this point had not yet involved any 
violent crime prosecutions. 
Of course, the fourth period of the search and seizure story (discussed 
in Part VI) is the so-called due process revolution of the Warren Court.  The 
left-of-center Warren Court majority—which was, to a significant degree, 
the product of appointment missteps by the Eisenhower administration—
reversed direction and made a number of changes that strengthened search 
and seizure protections, particularly the search warrant requirement.  
However, the thrust of the Warren Court’s agenda went toward enlarging 
federal court supervision of state criminal proceedings through the 
application of the “selective incorporation” doctrine, and the Warren 
Court’s arrest and search rulings are probably best understood in that 
context.  Hence, the extension of the Fourth Amendment and its 
exclusionary rule to state proceedings in 1961 in Mapp v. Ohio12 is best 
understood as a component of a larger campaign to impose minimum 
national standards on state criminal justice.  Although the Warren Court 
majority seldom explicitly acknowledged as much, it appears that their 
primary goal was to mobilize federal court supervision to curb the racist 
tendencies of many state criminal justice institutions. 
Unsurprisingly, the extension of federal standards to state proceedings 
led to a sharp increase in the number of search and seizure cases.  
Additionally, the extension of federal constitutional protections to street 
criminals in state cases, which sometimes involved violent crimes, 
fundamentally changed the politics of criminal justice.  Indeed, although the 
Warren Court actually made a number of decisions that were quite 
accommodative of law enforcement interests, the Court nevertheless 
became a target of political attacks for being soft on criminals. 
The fifth period (discussed in Part VII) consists of the full-blown 
dismantling of earlier search and seizure doctrine during the Burger, 
Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts.  This retrenchment—which is still 
continuing—commenced in the early 1970s when President Richard Nixon 
 
12 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
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tipped the Court’s balance sharply to the right by choosing four appointees 
who were known to be opposed to the Warren Court’s criminal procedure 
rulings.  Since then the interaction of presidential elections with vacancies 
on the Court has preserved a right-of-center crime-control majority.  And 
the majority justices have pursued a multi-prong campaign to free police of 
constitutional constraints by restricting the coverage of Fourth Amendment 
protections, by weakening or even eviscerating the substance of search and 
seizure standards, and by largely eliminating the consequences of 
unconstitutional intrusions. 
Although the crime-control justices have often marched under the 
banner of “strict construction” and its more recent progeny, “originalism,”13 
for the most part they have stopped short of explicitly overruling earlier 
Fourth Amendment landmarks.  Instead, they have exploited the inherent 
flexibility of the concept of “Fourth Amendment reasonableness” to expand 
law enforcement search powers by announcing a multitude of doctrinal 
limitations and exceptions that make the earlier protections largely 
meaningless in practice.  As a result, and notwithstanding continuing public 
concerns regarding release of dangerous criminals because of supposed 
search and seizure “legal technicalities,” the reality is that there now are 
only minimal legal constraints on police intrusions.  The remaining question 
is whether the majority justices will choose to continue to maintain the 
illusion of constitutional protections, or whether they will give in to 
ideological zeal and completely kill off what is left of the warrant 
requirement (or, as it is now often called, “the warrant preference”) and the 
exclusionary rule. 
In the following pages, I add some flesh to the bones of this account.  
My sense is that the five shifts described above explain at least the big cases 
and developments quite well.14  However, the account outlined above is 
 
13 Although “originalism” is commonly understood to denote an effort to follow the 
historical meanings of constitutional provisions, that is not an accurate description of what 
the justices who purport to be originalists actually do.  Instead of reconstructing how 
provisions were actually understood at the time they were adopted, originalist justices 
engage in creative textualism by purporting to “read” the text with the use of historical 
dictionaries.  In doing so, they ignore the legal traditions that actually informed the Framers’ 
understanding of the texts and instead invent new meanings that accord with their own 
ideological predilections.  See, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, Selective Originalism: Sorting Out 
Which Aspects of Giles’s Forfeiture Exception to Confrontation Were or Were Not 
“Established at the Time of the Founding,” 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 605, 670-72 (2009). 
14 Of course, the significance of the cases is a matter of judgment.  I think it is useful to 
distinguish between those that announced or modified law to be applied in lower courts and 
those that simply corrected misinterpretations or misapplications of existing doctrine by 
lower courts or legislatures (for example, whether particular facts did or did not meet the 
then-prevailing definition of probable cause).  However, I have opted to err in the direction 
of over-inclusiveness in an attempt to avoid excessive selectivity. 
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incomplete insofar as it omits any discussion of arrest and search law from 
the framing of the Bill of Rights in 1789 to the end of the nineteenth 
century.  Although that history is beyond my assignment for this 
Symposium Article, it is nevertheless pertinent insofar as it explains how 
the Supreme Court came to be free to invent modern Fourth Amendment 
doctrine at the beginning of the Journal’s century.  Indeed, it also explains 
why the text of the Fourth Amendment now seems perversely inchoate.  
Hence, I begin with a brief detour to that earlier and now decidedly foreign 
period. 
II. BEFORE THE JUSTICES INVENTED “SEARCH AND SEIZURE” DOCTRINE 
The essential rule for recovering authentic legal history is to never take 
judicial statements about that history at face value.  Judges routinely 
innovate and change existing doctrine, but they typically cover up their 
innovations by inventing fictional accounts of precedent and history.15  
Sycophantic academics then come along and embellish the judicial fictions.  
(How else are commentators to get “cited” in Supreme Court opinions?)  To 
complete the cycle, the justices then cite the commentaries as confirmations 
of their own inventions.  The overall result is that the conventional doctrinal 
history that is derived from judicial claims often turns out to be drastically 
different from the authentic history.16 
 
15 Professor Reid has nicely summed up the typical judicial use of history: 
Today a judge writing a decision in, let us suppose, a native American land case, does not say to 
his law clerk, “What rule does history support?”  Rather, the judge tells her, “We’re going to 
adopt such-and-such rule.  Find me some history to support it.”  It will not matter to the judge or 
his colleagues on the court the quality of the historical evidence that she finds. 
John Phillip Reid, The Jurisprudence of Liberty: The Ancient Constitution in the Legal 
Historiography of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, in THE ROOTS OF LIBERTY: 
MAGNA CARTA, ANCIENT CONSTITUTION, AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN TRADITION OF RULE OF 
LAW 228 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 1993). 
16 I have been engaged in recovering historical arrest and search law for nearly two 
decades.  In a 1999 article, I initially documented that the Fourth Amendment was originally 
understood to only set warrant standards, but was not meant to create any generalized 
reasonableness standard for warrantless arrests or searches.  See Thomas Y. Davies, 
Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547 (1999) [hereinafter 
Davies, Original Fourth].  I then reconstructed the actual content of framing-era arrest law 
and contrasted it to the historical claims announced in recent Supreme Court opinions.  See 
Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional Character of Law-and-Order Originalism: A Case Study 
of the Distortions and Evasions of Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 
37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239 (2002) [hereinafter Davies, Arrest].  I next documented that 
the American state and federal Framers undertook to preserve the common law standards for 
arrest, as well as the need for a criminal warrant to lawfully “break” a house, in “law of the 
land” and “due process of law” provisions in the state declarations and federal Bill of Rights.  
See Thomas Y. Davies, Correcting Search-and-Seizure History: Now-Forgotten Common-
Law Warrantless Arrest Standards and the Original Understanding of “Due Process of 
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Indeed, the reason that the text of the Fourth Amendment now seems 
too cryptic is simply that Supreme Court justices during the last century 
have assigned it a much broader task than the Framers ever intended or 
imagined it would serve.  As explained below, the federal constitutional 
provision that was supposed to generally preserve common law criminal 
arrest and search standards was actually the “due process of law” clause of 
the Fifth Amendment; the Fourth Amendment was primarily intended to set 
minimum standards for the issuance of noncriminal revenue search 
warrants.  Hence, the story of modern Fourth Amendment search and 
seizure doctrine begins in the void left by the disappearance of the Framers’ 
understanding of criminal arrest and search doctrine as a body of seemingly 
settled common law rules. 
A. CRIMINAL ARREST AND SEARCH AUTHORITY AS “DUE PROCESS OF 
LAW” 
There was no single, unified body of legal doctrine regarding arrests 
and searches when the Bill of Rights was framed in 1789.  Instead, there 
were two different although somewhat overlapping bodies of doctrine.  
Common law defined the standards for criminal arrests and related 
searches, while legislation defined the standards for searches to enforce 
customs and excise revenue (tax) collections.17  The important point for 
present purposes is that the Fourth Amendment, like at least most of the 
earlier state provisions that banned issuance of “general warrants,” was 
formulated primarily to maintain minimum standards for revenue search 
warrant authority. 
However, it is quite unlikely that the Fourth Amendment was 
understood to have any significant bearing on criminal arrest and search 
authority and especially on warrantless arrest authority.  That is apparent 
 
Law,” 77 MISS. L.J. 1 (2007) [hereinafter Davies, Correcting Search History].  Most 
recently, I have documented how the bare “probable cause” standard in the Fourth 
Amendment was derived from English statutory authority for excise search warrants rather 
than from common-law criminal procedure.  See Thomas Y. Davies, How the Post-Framing 
Adoption of the Bare-Probable-Cause Standard Drastically Expanded Government Arrest 
and Search Power, 73 J.L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2010) [hereinafter Davies, Probable 
Cause]; see also Thomas Y. Davies, Can You Handle the Truth?  The Framers Preserved 
Common-Law Criminal Arrest and Search Rules in “Due Process of Law”—“Fourth 
Amendment Reasonableness” Is Only a Modern, Destructive Judicial Myth, 43 TEX. TECH L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2010) [hereinafter Davies, Truth] (summarizing salient points in previous 
articles on arrest and search history). 
17 One might say there were three bodies of doctrine if one also includes the use of arrest 
and “attachment” of defendants at the beginning of framing-era civil lawsuits.  However, 
because that body of doctrine did not involve search authority, it has little bearing on the 
present story, and I omit it. 
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because the American Framers actually sought to preserve the standards for 
criminal arrests and related searches in state constitutional provisions that 
guaranteed government compliance with “the law of the land” or its virtual 
synonym, “due process of law,” as well as in the federal “due process of 
law” clause in the Fifth Amendment18—not in the Fourth Amendment or its 
state antecedents.  Thus, one dimension of the prelude to modern search and 
seizure doctrine is the story of what “due process of law” originally meant 
and how nineteenth-century judges destroyed that meaning. 
1. Common Law Arrest and Search Doctrine 
During the American framing era, criminal arrest and search authority 
was still a component of common law.19  In contrast to modern doctrine, 
arrest authority was the salient topic, while criminal search authority was 
essentially an appendage of arrest authority.  Indeed, in the absence of 
forensic science or possessory offenses like modern drug laws, there was 
little physical evidence of crime to search for other than stolen property.20  
(Smuggling was dealt with through civil forfeiture proceedings rather than 
criminal prosecution.21)  Thus, while there was a settled understanding that 
it was usually unlawful to “break” a house (that is to enter a house through 
a closed door) to make an arrest without an arrest warrant, it appears that an 
arrest warrant for theft probably also conveyed implicit search authority.22  
 
18 For clarity, I depart from the usual convention and use “due process of law” to refer to 
the framing-era understanding of that term and reserve the customary “due process” label for 
the modern understanding. 
19 See Davies, Correcting Search History, supra note 16, at 80-81. 
20 See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 16, at 627. 
21 For example, when John Hancock was accused of smuggling in Boston in 1769, he 
was subjected to a civil law forfeiture proceeding in the Vice-Admiralty Court, not to 
criminal prosecution.  See Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know, and When Did 
They Know It? Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 106, 
122 n.52 (2005); see also infra note 93.  
22 Although Coke had asserted that Magna Carta’s “law of the land” provision demanded 
that “breaking a house” (that is, entering through a closed door) be justified by a valid felony 
arrest warrant, it seems likely that such an arrest warrant would also have carried the 
authority to search a house in which an arrest was made, at least if the arrest was for theft.  
That appears to have been the case because the only form of criminal search warrant 
discussed in the framing-era sources was the “search warrant for stolen goods.”  However, 
that warrant seems to have been developed to address the situation in which the victim of a 
theft had probable cause as to the location of his stolen goods, but was unable or unwilling to 
make an allegation as to the identity of the thief.  That is, the search warrant for stolen goods 
seems to have been used only when the standard for issuance of an arrest warrant could not 
be met.  Perhaps because the search warrant for stolen goods was conceived to be an 
intrusion on a potentially innocent person’s house, a search conducted under such a warrant 
was valid only if the stolen goods actually were found; otherwise the complainant who 
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Additionally, a lawful warrantless arrest carried authority to search the 
arrestee for weapons or stolen goods.  However, framing-era authorities did 
not recognize any form of warrantless criminal search other than what we 
now call a search incident to arrest.23 
Moreover, the settled common law criminal procedure standards were 
accusatory rather than investigatory in character.  In contrast to modern 
doctrine, bare probable cause that a crime might have been committed was 
never enough to justify either a warrantless felony arrest or the issuance of 
an arrest warrant.  Instead, criminal justice authority seems to have been 
conceived to arise from the “fact” that a crime had been committed.  Hence, 
a felony arrest was lawful only if a named complainant (usually a crime 
victim) could (1) prove that a felony actually had been committed “in 
fact”24 and (2) could also present evidence showing “probable cause of 
suspicion” that the arrestee was the felon.25  A person who made a 
warrantless felony arrest had to be prepared to make these showings to a 
justice of the peace immediately after the arrest.26  A person who sought 
issuance of an arrest warrant had to make these showings to a justice of the 
peace prior to the issuance of a warrant.27     
In keeping with the general ban against the use of hearsay evidence, 
which forbade the use of virtually all unsworn statements, neither 
warrantless arrests nor arrest warrants could be based on information from 
 
obtained the warrant was liable for trespass damages, though an officer who merely executed 
the warrant was not.  See Davies, Probable Cause, supra note 16, at 17.  
23 See id. at 16. 
24 See id. at 11, 13-14.  This required allegation that a crime had been committed “in 
fact” was so important that the term “fact” was often used as a synonym for a committed 
crime in framing-era sources.  See id. at 11 n.29. 
25 See id. at 11, 14. 
26 In framing-era America, Marian committal procedure (so named because it was 
required by statutes enacted during the reign of Mary Tudor) served as roughly the 
equivalent of the modern Gerstein probable cause hearing that is now required to test the 
grounds for a warrantless arrest.  Under Marian procedure, anyone who made a felony arrest 
(either with or without warrant) was required to promptly take the arrestee to a justice of the 
peace for the justice to decide whether to bail the arrestee, commit him to prison, or release 
him.  The justice was required to take and record in writing the sworn information of the 
complainant (often called the “informer”) and any additional witnesses the complainant 
could provide.  In effect, this procedure meant that a complainant had to be ready to offer 
prima facie sworn proof of the guilt of the arrestee contemporaneously with the arrest.  See 
Davies, supra note 21, at 126-29 (describing Marian committal procedure).  Thus, unlike 
modern practice, there was no delay between an arrest and the beginning of the prosecution.  
Rather, under the Marian committal procedure used in framing-era America, a person who 
made a warrantless arrest had to promptly take the arrestee before a justice of the peace and 
there make a sworn complaint that a crime had been committed and also testify as to the 
grounds for suspecting the arrestee. 
27 See Davies, Probable Cause, supra note 16, at 18-20.  
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“confidential informants.”28  Indeed, the requirement that a named and thus 
potentially accountable complainant make a sworn accusation constituted 
the salient legal protection against malicious arrests.29  Additionally, and 
unlike a modern police officer, a framing-era constable had no larger 
authority to make a warrantless felony arrest than any other person, and if 
he assisted another person in making an unlawful warrantless arrest he was 
equally at risk for forcible resistance or trespass liability.30 
Moreover, because arrest authority was structured according to 
assessments of “necessity,” warrantless arrest authority for less-than-felony 
offenses was more restricted than for felonies.31  Warrantless arrests for 
less-than-felony offenses were limited to situations involving ongoing 
breaches of the peace, such as fights in public.  Once the breach of the 
peace ended, however, a lawful arrest could be made only by a judicial 
arrest warrant.32  There usually was no arrest authority at all for petty 
offenses that did not rise to the level of breaches of the peace; those were 
simply handled with issuance of a summons.33 
 
28 The general rule at the time of the framing of the Bill of Rights was that any unsworn 
statement was “hearsay” and “hearsay is no evidence”; hence, the factual justification for an 
arrest had to be provided under oath by persons with personal knowledge of the events and 
circumstances.  See generally Thomas Y. Davies, Not “The Framers’ Design”: How the 
Framing-Era Ban Against Hearsay Evidence Refutes the Crawford-Davis “Testimonial” 
Formulation of the Scope of the Original Confrontation Clause, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 349 (2007) 
(describing the prominence of the ban against hearsay in framing-era evidence doctrine and 
the original understanding of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause). 
29 The named complainant was exposed to potential liability for false imprisonment or 
malicious prosecution, depending on the circumstances.  See Davies, Probable Cause, supra 
note 16, at 13.  
30 See, e.g., 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 80-81 (1721) 
(stating that “[a]s to the justifying of . . . arrests by the Constable’s own authority; it seems 
difficult to find any Case, wherein a Constable is impowered to arrest a Man for a Felony 
committed or attempted, in which a private Person might not as well be justified in doing 
it”).  The second volume of Hawkins’s treatise was the leading authority on criminal 
procedure and evidence during the framing era.  See, e.g., Davies, supra note 28, at 394-95. 
31 See Davies, Arrest, supra note 16, at 320-26 (discussing the different justifications and 
standards for felony and less-than-felony breach of the peace arrests). 
32 See id. at 323-24. 
33 See id. at 322.  For examples of the absence of warrantless arrest authority for less-
than-breach-of-the-peace petty offenses, see, e.g., 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
*278-80 (1769) (discussing summary proceedings before justices of the peace for “divers 
petty pecuniary mulcts [that is, fines], and corporal penalties, [and] many disorderly 
offenses” as being instances in which “it is necessary to summon the party accused”); 2 THE 
WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 689-90 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967) (reprinting Wilson’s 
lectures on law given in Philadelphia 1790-91) (“On an indictment for any crime under the 
degree of treason or felony, the process proper to be first awarded, at the common law, is a 
venire facias, which, from the very name of it, is only in the nature of a summons to require 
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2. Arrest Doctrine as an Aspect of “Due Process of Law” 
In keeping with the writings of Sir Edward Coke, these accusatory 
common law arrest standards were understood to be salient aspects of “due 
process of law.”  During the early seventeenth century, Coke had asserted 
that the common law arrest standards were components of Magna Carta’s 
guarantee that no freeman was to be “taken” or “imprisoned”—that is, 
arrested—except according to “the law of the land.”34   Indeed, Coke set out 
common law arrest standards in some detail in his discussion of that 
provision.35  Additionally, Coke followed earlier reaffirmations of Magna 
Carta in treating the term “due process of law” as a more precise label for 
the common law requisites for initiating a criminal prosecution and 
discussed arrest standards, including warrantless arrest standards, as forms 
of “process of law.”36  Notably, that was still the meaning attached to “due 
process of law” in framing-era authorities.37 
Thus, when the framers of the initial state declarations of rights 
undertook to prevent legislative relaxation of the seemingly settled common 
law arrest standards, they did so by including provisions that forbade a 
person being “taken,” “imprisoned,” or “arrested” except according to “the 
law of the land.”38  To emphasize that criminal procedure requisites were 
protected against legislative relaxation, Alexander Hamilton initiated a shift 
to Coke’s alternative “due process of law” terminology when New York 
 
the appearance of the party . . . .  On an indictment for felony or treason, a capias [that is, an 
arrest warrant] is always the first process.”). 
34 See Davies, Correcting Search History, supra note 16, at 43-50. 
35 See id. at 54-62. 
36 See id. at 47-67. 
37 See id. at 81-86.  During the framing era, “process” did not mean “procedure.”  Rather, 
“process” still referred to the source of authority, usually in writing, for initiating a legal 
proceeding.  However, Coke asserted that “process of law” for arrest included both a written 
warrant, which he called a “warrant in deed,” and the legal authority for warrantless arrest, 
which he called “warrant in law” (using “warrant” as a synonym for “authority”).  Thus 
Coke brought the various justifications for warrantless arrests into his discussion of Magna 
Carta’s ban against arrests except by “due process of law.”  See id. at 50-52.  Contrary to 
modern expectations, Coke did not address criminal trial procedure in his discussion of “due 
process of law.”  Instead, in framing-era usage, fair trial procedure was referred to as “due 
course of law,” never as “due process of law.”  See id. at 67-69, 81-82. 
38 See id. at 93-120 (setting out and discussing the initial state arrest and general warrant 
provisions).  The 1780 Massachusetts declaration is especially revealing because John 
Adams explicitly used “arrested” rather than the more traditional “taken” language when he 
drafted the “law of the land” provision in that declaration.  Because Adams had clearly dealt 
with arrests in that provision, it is patent that he was referring only to searches under general 
warrants when he first introduced the phrase “unreasonable searches and seizures” in a later 
provision that banned issuance of general warrants.  Hence, it is patent that Adams 
understood that phrase to be simply a pejorative label for searches conducted under too-loose 
warrants.  See id. at 112-18. 
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adopted an arrest protection in a statutory bill of rights in 1787.39  Two 
years later, James Madison followed Hamilton’s phrasing when he included 
the prohibition against depriving a person of “liberty” except by “due 
process of law” in the proto-Fifth Amendment.40 
The federal Framers probably did not anticipate that the new federal 
government of enumerated powers would be much involved in criminal law 
enforcement; rather, that subject was left to the plenary powers of the state 
governments.  Hence, it is possible they were less concerned with 
preserving common law arrest standards than the state framers had been.  
Nevertheless, there is no reason to think that they would have assigned a 
different meaning to “due process of law” than that found in the authorities 
of the time.41  Rather, the fact that Madison proposed putting the proto-Fifth 
Amendment at the beginning of the criminal procedure provisions in the 
Bill of Rights confirms that “due process of law” was understood to 
connote the common law legal requisites for initiating criminal 
prosecutions.42 
3. The Loss or Rejection of the Original Understanding of  
“Due Process of Law” 
The reason that the historical meaning of “due process of law” now 
sounds quite strange is that nineteenth-century American judges either 
forgot or, more likely, intentionally jettisoned the original Cokean 
understanding of “due process of law” in order to clear the way for 
enlarging the warrantless arrest powers of newly invented police officers.  
In 1827, English judges responded to a rising tide of urban property crime 
and disorder by disposing of the felony-in-fact requirement and allowing 
peace officers (but not private persons) to make warrantless felony arrests 
on mere “probable cause” that a felony had been committed.43  That change 
meant that there was no longer a need for a named complainant.  Instead, an 
 
39 See id. at 121-27. 
40 See id. at 146-47. 
41 See id. at 155-58.  It is worth noting that the early Congresses did not enact any 
statutory standards for warrantless arrests by federal officers.  That silence indicates that it 
was understood that the arrest standards of the relevant state—that is, the common law 
standards—would apply.  See id. at 157, n. 491. 
42 Indeed, the noncriminal character of the Fourth Amendment was clearer in the original 
ordering of the amendments.  As proposed and debated in the House, the ban against general 
warrants was not at the beginning of the criminal procedure protections.  Rather, they began 
with the pretrial criminal requisites, including “due process of law,” in the proto-Fifth 
Amendment, and then the ban against excessive bail in the proto-Eighth Amendment, then 
the ban against general warrants in the proto-Fourth Amendment, and then the criminal trial 
protections of the proto-Sixth Amendment.  See id. at 140-43. 
43 See id. at 187-88. 
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officer could make a warrantless felony arrest on the basis of unsworn 
hearsay information he had received.44 
American state judges, who likely shared the same concerns as their 
English counterparts, then began to import that relaxed standard for 
warrantless felony arrests around the middle of the nineteenth century.45  
However, as is usually the case with judicial innovation, the judges did not 
admit their innovation but rather pretended to be merely applying settled 
“common law.”  In effect, state judges deconstitutionalized the law of arrest 
and the related law of incident searches to permit more aggressive policing.  
Unsurprisingly, they said little about their state “law of the land” provisions 
while doing so.46 
The justices of the Supreme Court then completed the eradication of 
the original understanding of “due process of law” in the 1884 ruling in 
Hurtado v. California47 when, over the lone dissent of the first Justice 
Harlan (who still correctly invoked Coke’s writings), they effectively 
excised criminal procedure requisites from the two federal Due Process 
Clauses, and thus allowed those provisions to be used as the vehicles for the 
other meanings that they preferred to invent under that rubric.48  Thus, by 
the time the Journal began publication in 1910, framing-era criminal arrest 
and search standards as well as the original understanding of “due process 
of law” were largely (though not entirely) forgotten.49 
Two years after Hurtado, the justices also invented a new 
understanding of the Fourth Amendment in the 1886 decision Boyd v. 
United States.50  However, to appreciate Boyd’s novelty, one has to first put 
aside the modern myths that have been partly shaped by Boyd itself and 
instead recover the original understanding of the Fourth Amendment. 
 
44 See Davies, Probable Cause, supra note 16, at 46.   
45 See Davies, Arrest, supra note 16, at 188-90.  However, the restrictions on warrantless 
arrests for less than felony offenses were not relaxed.  See Davies, Probable Cause, supra 
note 16, at 54.   
46 See Davies, Correcting Search History, supra note 16, at 173-81.  For additional 
discussions of the emergence of modern policing during the nineteenth century, see Wesley 
M. Oliver, The Neglected History of Criminal Procedure, 1850-1940, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 
447 (2010).  This article is derived from material in Wesley M. Oliver, The Nineteenth and 
Early Twentieth Century Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure: A View from the New 
York Police Department (Dec. 2009) (unpublished D.S.L. dissertation, Yale University) (on 
file with author). 
47 110 U.S. 516 (1884). 
48 See Davies, Correcting Search History, supra note 16, at 197-200. 
49 When Congress finally got around to enacting statutory authority for various 
categories of federal officers to make warrantless arrests during the mid-twentieth century, it 
initially included the felony “in fact” requirement, but then deleted it and adopted a bare 
probable cause standard in 1948.  See id. at 210-12.  
50 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
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B. THE ORIGINAL FOURTH AMENDMENT AS A REGULATION OF 
REVENUE SEARCHES OF HOUSES 
The conventional history of the Fourth Amendment is correct insofar 
as it treats that Amendment, like the several state predecessors, as a 
response to a prerevolutionary colonial grievance against “general 
warrants.”51  However, the conventional account obscures the point that that 
American colonial controversy was not about criminal searches because it 
overemphasizes the significance of the English Wilkesite cases of the mid-
1760s.  In those cases, English judges had reaffirmed earlier common law 
authorities by condemning the illegality of general warrants used to search 
the houses and papers of John Wilkes, an English opposition politician, and 
several of his supporters for evidence of seditious libel.52  However, the 
important, though often overlooked, fact is that there were no comparable 
episodes to the Wilkesite cases in the American colonies. 
Instead, the colonial grievance arose from Parliament’s authorization 
of the use of unparticularized general warrants in the form of “writs of 
assistance” for customs searches of houses in the North American colonies.  
The initial episode of controversy arose in Boston in 1761 when James Otis 
unsuccessfully argued that general writs were “against common right and 
reason” because they subverted the common law “Privilege of House” by 
exposing it to the whims of petty officers.53 
However, the more widespread and important episode of controversy 
erupted when Parliament reauthorized use of general writs of assistance for 
North American customs enforcement in the 1767 Townshend Duties Act—
 
51 See, e.g., NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 43-78 (1937) (discussing the English 
Wilkesite cases of the early 1760s and the 1761 Boston litigation regarding the general writ 
of assistance); JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A 
STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 28-37 (1966) (same).  
52 In the English Wilkesite controversies of the early 1760s, the Secretary of State had 
issued general warrants that officers used to arrest, search the homes, and seize the papers of 
John Wilkes, an opposition politician, and several of his supporters.  English judges, 
especially Lord Camden, then declared such warrants to be illegal and void.  See Davies, 
Original Fourth, supra note 16, at 562-65.  Contemporaneously with the Wilkesite cases, 
Parliament also condemned general warrants—but reserved authority to itself to authorize 
issuance of general warrants.  See id. at 658.   
53 See id. at 561, 568, 580-81.  Otis argued that the general writ was so fundamentally 
contrary to “common right and reason” (a phrase he took from Coke) that even a 
Parliamentary statute could not make it legal.  Otis’s protégé, John Adams, took notes of the 
argument.  I think that Otis’s invocation of Coke’s phrase “against reason” was the most 
likely inspiration for Adams’s introduction of the phrase “unreasonable searches and 
seizures” in the 1780 Massachusetts ban against general warrants.  See id. at 689-91.  
However, Adams almost certainly would also have been aware of prior instances in which 
general warrants had been labeled “unreasonable” warrants.  See id. at 692. 
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that is, after Americans had already been angered by the Stamp Act in 1765 
and after they also had learned from brief newspaper accounts that English 
judges had confirmed the illegality of general warrants in the Wilkesite 
cases.54  Unsurprisingly, when customs officers petitioned the colonial 
courts to issue writs under that statutory authority, colonists challenged the 
legality of such writs, and a number of the colonial judges either declined to 
act or actually rejected applications for new writs of assistance on the 
ground that such writs gave discretionary search authority to customs 
officers and thus were “unconstitutional.”55  As a result, the general writs 
for customs searches of houses became an early symbol of Parliament’s 
disregard for colonists’ common law rights.56 
Although the general writ controversy was soon displaced by more 
grievous colonial complaints against the Intolerable Acts, memory of the 
still-recent grievance against general writs prompted the state framers to 
include bans against the issuance of general warrants in several of the initial 
state declarations of rights adopted prior to the framing of the Bill of Rights 
(though such provisions were not as commonly adopted as the “law of the 
land” and “due process of law” arrest provisions described above).57  
Additionally, the memory of the general writ grievance was revived during 
the ratification debates of 1787-1788 when anti-federalist agitators 
embellished fears of new federal taxes by predicting that approval of the 
new Constitution would mean that the new Congress would authorize use of 
general warrants for excise tax collection and thus expose private dwellings 
to invasion by hordes of voracious national “excisemen.”58  In response to 
 
54 Americans were familiar with the basic facts of the English general warrant 
controversies from brief newspaper accounts, but none of the case reports of the Wilkesite 
cases that are routinely cited in conventional accounts of Fourth Amendment history were 
published during the period of intense colonial controversy.  The earliest of the case reports 
was not published until 1770, and most were not published until after the outbreak of the 
Revolutionary War.  Thus, it is a historical error to treat the contents of the case reports, 
which were not available until after the period of intense colonial controversies, and even 
after the adoption of bans against general warrants in the state declarations of rights, as 
though they shaped American views.  See id. at 565; see also infra notes 89-92 and 
accompanying text. 
55 See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 16, at 566-67, 581, 601-04. 
56 See JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: 
THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS 197 (1986) (“For Americans, writs of assistance were grievous 
because they were authorized by Parliament and were yet another potential threat to rights 
posed by Parliament’s claim to legislative supremacy.”). 
57 See Davies, Correcting Search History, supra note 16, at 89-127.  
58 See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 16, at 609-11, 721-22.  Excise tax searches 
were even more objectionable than customs searches because collection of excise taxes was 
not confined to port cities, but could apply to houses throughout the country.  See Davies, 
Probable Cause, supra note 16, at 33-34, 37. 
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these dire predictions, several state ratification conventions called for 
including a ban against general warrants in a federal Bill of Rights.59 
James Madison then responded to the state proposals in 1789 when he 
included what he characterized as a ban against “general warrants” in his 
proposals for a federal Bill.60  After a committee that reviewed Madison’s 
proposals made several stylistic but largely non-substantive changes,61 the 
text of the proto-Fourth Amendment read 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
[against unreasonable searches and seizures,] shall not be violated by warrants 
issuing, without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, and not particularly 
describing the places to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.62 
Three aspects of the proto-Fourth Amendment are noteworthy.  One is 
that it innovated by using a sworn showing of bare “probable cause” as the 
standard for particularized warrants.  That standard, which had not been 
used in any of the earlier state bans against general warrants, was lower 
than the settled common law standard for criminal arrest or search warrants 
insofar as it did not require a sworn allegation of a crime in fact.  Instead, 
the bare probable cause standard appears to have been borrowed from the 
English statutory standard for issuance of an excise search warrant for a 
specific house.63  So, although the inclusion of “persons” and “papers” in 
the Fourth Amendment shows that it was written broadly enough to ban all 
uses of general warrants, the adoption of the bare “probable cause” standard 
 
59 See Davies, Correcting Search History, supra note 16, at 127-36.  
60 See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 16, at 699-700 (noting several instances in 
which Madison described the proto-Fourth Amendment as a protection against general 
warrants but noting the absence of any statements by Madison regarding warrantless 
intrusions).  
61 See id. at 710-16.  The only change of substance was that the committee replaced 
Madison’s “other property” with the somewhat narrower term “effects”; a term that usually 
connoted moveable property such as furniture and goods.  See id. at 706-14. 
62 See id. at 710 n.465.  The bracketed phrase “against unreasonable searches and 
seizures” was initially omitted from the committee report—apparently as a copying error—
but was reinserted by motion in the House.  See id. at 715.  Madison’s initial draft had 
condemned “all unreasonable searches and seizures” but the “all” was not reinserted in the 
final text.  See id. 
63 The only area of law in which bare “probable cause” of a violation could justify 
issuance of a warrant in the late eighteenth century was revenue enforcement.  See Davies, 
Original Fourth, supra note 16, at 703-04; Davies, Probable Cause, supra note 16, at 31-34.  
English excise statutes permitted issuance of an excise search warrant on the basis of an 
officer’s sworn showing of probable cause, and a 1787 Pennsylvania statute had also adopted 
that standard for a customs search warrant.  Thus, because the federal Framers were 
concerned primarily with revenue searches, they adopted the standard for revenue search 
warrants, rather than the more rigorous standard for criminal warrants.  See id. at 36-38, 40-
41; see also infra note 83. 
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reveals that the federal Framers were specifically concerned with regulating 
revenue search warrants. 
Interestingly, although it was understood that a judicially issued 
warrant was required to justify a search of a house,64 it appears that it was 
also accepted that a revenue search warrant could be issued under a less 
restrictive standard than a criminal arrest warrant.  This probably reflected a 
recognition that the crime-in-fact requirement for criminal warrants would 
have been unworkable given the absence of victim-complainants regarding 
customs violations; hence, it was necessary to rely on customs officers to 
initiate revenue searches.  As a practical matter, that meant that a judicial 
assessment of an officer’s showing of probable cause that a violation had 
occurred was as much as could realistically be demanded.65  Additionally, 
the looser standard for revenue as opposed to criminal warrants may have 
reflected a judgment that revenue collection was actually of more 
importance to the government and society than the prosecution of crimes.66 
The second noteworthy feature of Madison’s proposed provision is 
that it consisted of only a single clause and thus was obviously aimed solely 
at regulating warrant standards.67  However, a change was made in the 
House of Representatives at the last minute, and apparently accepted 
without debate, to make it clear that even issuing general warrants was 
forbidden.68  Specifically, the change consisted of replacing Madison’s “by 
warrants issuing” with “and no warrant shall issue”—a command that had 
appeared in all of the prior state provisions banning general warrants, as 
well as all of the state ratification convention proposals for a federal ban.69  
 
64 See Davies, Correcting Search History, supra note 16, at 19 (noting that the common 
law requirement of a warrant to justify breaking a house was assumed when the Fourth 
Amendment was drafted); id. at 63-64 (discussing Coke’s treatment of the requirement of a 
warrant to break a house as an aspect of Magna Carta’s “law of the land” protection). 
65 Judicial assessment of the grounds for a search was important because revenue officers 
had pecuniary interest in discovering and seizing uncustomed or untaxed goods.  However, 
the rule at the time of the framing was that a revenue officer was exposed to trespass 
damages if he made an unsuccessful search under a warrant he had procured.  See Davies, 
Probable Cause, supra note 16, at 35-36.  
66 See id. at 31 n.128 (noting that Jeremiah Gridley made that claim while representing 
the customs office during the 1761 Writ of Assistance case in Boston, and that Lord 
Mansfield later made a similar claim).  
67 Prior commentaries generally concede that Madison’s draft was aimed solely at 
banning general warrants.  See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 16, at 699 n.434. 
68 The conventional accounts of Fourth Amendment history have often claimed that the 
proposed change was initially voted down but then made surreptitiously by a later 
committee; however, the weight of the evidence is plainly that the change was approved.  
See id. at 717-19. 
69 See Davies, Correcting Search History, supra note 16, at 34-37, 167-69. 
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That final change had the side-effect of breaking the provision into a two-
clause text: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the places to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.70 
Today, judicial opinions and conventional commentaries routinely 
claim that the Framers divided the Fourth Amendment into two clauses for 
the purpose of creating an overarching “reasonableness” standard for all 
government intrusions, including warrantless arrests and searches.71  
However, that is only a prochronistic fantasy.72  There is not so much as a 
hint in the legislative record that the change was meant to have anything to 
do with creating a “reasonableness” standard for warrantless arrests or 
searches,73 and it is noteworthy that the post-framing commentaries also did 
not identify any such standard in the text.74 
Rather, even after the final change, the Fourth Amendment was still 
understood to be focused on the standards for issuing warrants; the phrase 
“unreasonable searches and seizures” (which had been borrowed from John 
Adams’s 1780 Massachusetts ban against general warrants75) was merely a 
pejorative label for the gross illegality of searches conducted under general 
 
70 See id. at 167-68 (emphasis added). 
71 See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 16, at 568-70 (identifying opinions and 
commentaries regurgitating the conventional account).  
72 A prochronism is the specific form of anachronism in which aspects of a later period 
are incorrectly imposed on an earlier period.  See, e.g., Davies, supra note 21, at 116 n.34 
(presenting examples of how prochronistic expectations based on modern doctrine can pose 
a serious obstacle to recovering accurate legal history). 
73 Indeed, the fact that there is no record that the substitution of “no warrant shall issue” 
for “by warrants issuing” prompted any debate in Congress is inconsistent with the claim 
that the change was substantive.  See Davies, Probable Cause, supra note 16, at 40 n.164.  
That is especially the case because the adoption of an overarching “reasonableness” standard 
would have constituted a drastic departure from common law that did not recognize any 
“reasonableness” standard regarding arrests or searches.  See Davies, Original Fourth, supra 
note 16, at 591-600.  Moreover, there do not seem to have been colonial complaints about 
warrantless searches or arrests during the period of the customs search controversies.  See id. 
at 600-11.  Although one complaint voiced in Boston in 1772 may appear to be about 
customs officers searching only on the basis of their “commissions,” the fact is that 
commissioned customs officers were routinely issued a standing writ of assistance in Boston 
under the authority of the 1761 ruling upholding such writs.  Hence, that complaint was 
actually about customs searches under general warrants, and the omission of any mention of 
the general writ was probably a rhetorical device for underscoring the illegitimacy of the 
writ.  See id. at 603-04.  
74 Id. at 611-19. 
75 See supra note 38. 
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warrants.76  Indeed, the initial clause in the Fourth Amendment’s text was 
probably included in the text for the purpose of setting out the “persons, 
houses, papers, and effects” definition of the scope of the Amendment’s 
protection—a formula that excluded ships, and probably even commercial 
warehouses, from the specific warrant requirement.77 
The third noteworthy feature of the proto-Fourth Amendment is that it, 
like almost all of the provisions that ultimately became the Bill of Rights 
(including the “due process of law” clause in the Fifth Amendment), was 
initially intended to be inserted in the limitations on the power of Congress 
set out in Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution.78  That intended 
placement reflects both the Framers’ fear of legislative excess and the 
traditional understanding that an unlawful act by an officer did not 
constitute government action, but only a personal trespass.  So the Fourth 
Amendment was not intended to regulate the conduct of officers directly.  
Rather, the Framers presumed that the common law would control the 
officer by providing a damages remedy for an officer’s unlawful search; the 
important constitutional task was to prevent Congress from loosening the 
standard for the issuance of warrants by courts.79 
Thus, the Fourth Amendment was originally intended and understood 
primarily to prohibit Congress from authorizing general warrants for federal 
revenue searches of houses and their contents.  However, even if the federal 
Framers were less concerned with criminal arrests than the state framers, 
there is no reason to think they intended for the Fourth Amendment to 
undercut the more rigorous requirement of an allegation of crime committed 
“in fact” for criminal arrest warrants.80  Indeed, that standard was still 
understood to be an aspect of the requirement of “due process of law” set 
 
76 See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 16, at 686-93 (discussing the significance and 
meaning of “unreasonable” in late eighteenth century legal discourse and tracing the phrase 
“unreasonable searches and seizures” to Coke’s condemnation of statutes that were contrary 
to common law and thus “against . . . reason”).  
77 See Davies, Probable Cause, supra note 16, at 30 n.127 (noting that Pennsylvania and 
Massachusetts, which used the “persons, houses, papers, and possessions” formula in state 
bans against general warrants, both enacted revenue search warrant statutes that required 
strict warrant standards only for searches of dwellings, but allowed warrantless searches of 
commercial premises or ships); see also id. at 38-38; Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 16, 
at 604-08 (noting the absence of colonial controversies over ship searches as contrasted to 
customs racketeering in the form of seizures of ships or cargo made under arbitrary 
enforcement of customs regulations). 
78 See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 16, at 700-02. 
79 See id. at 660-67 (documenting that unlawful conduct by persons holding an office 
was not viewed as government action until the early twentieth century); infra notes 108-109 
and accompanying text.  
80 See Davies, Correcting Search History, supra note 16, at 155-58. 
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out in the Fifth Amendment.81  Moreover, shortly after adopting the Bill of 
Rights, the First Congress directed federal courts to use the warrant 
procedures of the state in which the federal court sat, which meant that 
federal arrest warrants also had to comply with the state constitutional 
standards for criminal warrants.82 
Hence, the text of the Fourth Amendment was actually well-suited to 
the task for which it was intended.  Indeed—and in contrast to the Fifth 
Amendment “due process of law” clause—the Fourth Amendment 
accomplished its intended purpose because neither Congress nor the courts 
authorized general warrants.83  Moreover, because Congress did not violate 
the Amendment’s commands by authorizing general warrants, there was no 
occasion for significant litigation relating to the Amendment during roughly 
the first century after its enactment.84  Thus, there was a substantial gap 
during which the Amendment was not construed in judicial opinions, and 
its original purpose and understanding likely receded from memory.  
However, nearly a century after the framing a decidedly activist Supreme 
Court majority imposed its own gloss on the Amendment in the 1886 Boyd 
ruling, and that ruling planted the seed of modern doctrine. 
C. BOYD’S REINVENTION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AS A 
PROTECTION OF BUSINESS RECORDS 
Even during the aftermath of the Civil War, customs collections 
continued to be the primary source of federal government revenue.  The 
specific issue in Boyd involved the constitutionality of a federal statute that 
undertook to improve those collections by providing authority for customs 
 
81 See supra notes 24-27, 41 and accompanying text.  In the ordering of the amendments 
debated in Congress, the “due process of law” clause of the proto-Fifth Amendment came 
before the Fourth Amendment.  See Davies, Correcting Search History, supra note 16, at 
140-41, 169-71. 
82 Notably, the early Congresses enacted statutory authority for revenue searches (see 
infra note 83 and accompanying text), but did not enact any statutory standards for criminal 
arrest warrants.  Rather, the 1789 Judiciary Act simply directed federal courts and officers to 
use the modes of process used in the state in which they served, and “process” would have 
included warrants.  See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, sec. 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91.  Likewise, 
Congress did not create federal statutory authority for warrantless arrests by federal officers, 
which meant that such arrests were subject to state law standards.  See Davies, Correcting 
Search History, supra note 16, at 157 n.491. 
83 The 1789 Collections (Customs) Act, enacted shortly before Congress adopted the Bill 
of Rights, required “reasonable cause” for issuance of a customs search warrant for places on 
land, while the 1791 Excise Act was even more explicit in requiring judicial assessment of 
the sworn showing of “reasonable cause” for issuance of an excise search warrant.  See 
Davies, Probable Cause, supra note 16, at 41.  
84 See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 16, at 613-15.  Notably, the few cases 
typically involved legislation authorizing some form of “warrant.”  Id. 
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officials to obtain a court order requiring an importer to produce an invoice 
to prove that the claimed value of imported goods was accurate.  The statute 
also provided that an importer’s refusal to comply with the order would be 
deemed to be an admission that the government’s estimate of the value was 
correct.85  In a flourish of fictional originalism, Justice Bradley’s majority 
opinion cited a passage from one of the English Wilkesite cases as authority 
that an order to produce an invoice constituted an “unreasonable seizure” 
because it also amounted to compelled self-incrimination.86  Thus, Justice 
Bradley announced that the statute at issue violated the Fourth Amendment 
because it violated the Fifth Amendment.87  After declaring the statutory 
authority for the order to compel production to be unconstitutional, the 
Boyd opinion ordered, without further explanation, that the “seized” invoice 
not be admitted into evidence on retrial.88 
However, the radical ruling in Boyd actually had no material roots in 
history or precedent.  Justice Bradley asserted that “every American 
statesmen, during our revolutionary and formative period as a nation, was 
undoubtedly familiar” with Lord Camden’s “memorable discussion” in the 
1765 ruling in Entick v. Carrington, and thus “it may be confidently 
asserted that its propositions were in the minds of those who framed the 
Fourth Amendment.”89  He then quoted Camden to the effect that a “paper-
search” amounted to “compelling self-accusation.”90  However, that 
particular notion seems to have been rather idiosyncratic to Camden,91 and 
it did not appear in the report of Entick with which the Framers were likely 
 
85 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 619-20 (1885) (quoting “[t]he 5th section of the 
act of June 22, 1874”). 
86 Id. at 626-29 (quoting Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029 (C.P. 
1765)).  However, that edition of the State Trials case reports was not published until the 
early nineteenth century.  Justice Bradley’s analysis appears to have tracked that of an earlier 
commentary.  See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE UNITED STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 
299-304 (1st ed. 1868); id. at 365-69 (*299-304) (5th ed. 1883). 
87 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 627-30.  A concurring opinion by Justice Miller, joined by Chief 
Justice Waite, agreed with the majority that the proceeding was sufficiently “criminal” that 
the order to produce violated the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination but 
rejected the claim that the statute worked a “seizure” to which the Fourth Amendment would 
apply.  Id. at 638-41 (Waite, C.J. & Mille, J., concurring). 
88 Id. at 638.  Note that although Boyd has sometimes been cited as the initial 
announcement of the exclusionary rule, it dealt only with the evidentiary consequence of an 
unconstitutional statute rather than of the conduct of officers. 
89 Id. at 626-27. 
90 Id. at 629. 
91 See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 16, at 727 n.513 (noting that the only other 
source from the period that seems to have made a similar self-incrimination claim regarding 
a seizure of papers was a pamphlet that Camden is thought to have authored). 
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to have been familiar.92  Hence, Justice Bradley’s historical claim is almost 
certainly incorrect. 
Additionally, Justice Bradley’s expansive notion of a “seizure” of 
papers ignored the focused historical concern with house searches, as well 
as the obvious distinction between the personal letters and diaries seized in 
Entick and other Wilkesite cases and the commercial invoice at issue in 
Boyd.  Likewise, his opinion distorted the original meaning of the Fifth 
Amendment by disregarding the non-criminal character of a customs 
forfeiture proceeding.93  Notably—and in contrast to modern doctrine—
Justice Bradley’s conception of an “unreasonable” seizure did not depend 
on any assessment of the specific circumstances; rather, he used the term to 
announce a categorical condemnation of any legal process by which the 
government might obtain business documents.94 
Hence, the Boyd ruling is best understood as a component of the 
justices’ late nineteenth century campaign to create constitutional barriers 
against government regulation of business entities.  Notably, the justices 
decided Boyd shortly after they reinvented the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to confer authority on the federal courts to assess 
the “reasonableness” of government regulations of business.95  In the same 
year, they enlarged the potential reach of this new substantive due process 
doctrine by unanimously announcing—after declining to hear argument on 
 
92 It is plausible that many of the Framers would have been familiar with the earliest 
report of the 1765 Court of Common Pleas ruling in Entick, as reported in 2 Wils. 275 (1st 
ed., 1770), reprinted in 95 Eng. Rep. 807.  However, that report did not contain the passage 
treating a paper-search as a form of self-accusation.  The report of Entick that Bradley 
quoted from in Boyd was an expanded rendition of Entick that was first published in London 
in 1781 in 11 State Trials 313 (Francis Hargrave ed., 4th ed. 1781), and then reprinted in 
Howell’s later edition of State Trials.  However, it does not appear that Hargrave’s edition of 
State Trials was likely to have been imported in sufficient numbers by 1789 for the later 
version of Entick to have come to the Framers’ attention, even assuming they would have 
had reason to read that version after bans against general warrants had already been included 
in the state declarations of rights.  See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 16, at 565-66 
n.25, 727 n.512. 
93 It appears that the phrase “in any criminal case” was added to the Fifth Amendment 
protection against compelled self-incrimination for the specific purpose of making it clear 
that that provision did not relate to the oaths required in customs procedures.  See Davies, 
Original Fourth, supra note 16, at 705 n.450.  Moreover, although Boyd characterized the 
revenue statute as being “criminal” in character, 116 U.S. at 634, that characterization was a 
departure from earlier cases in which the Court had ruled that revenue statutes did not 
constitute criminal statutes.  See, e.g., Taylor v. United States, 44 U.S. 197, 210-11 (1845) 
(noting that although revenue statutes might be loosely termed “penal,” they are actually 
“remedial”). 
94 See Davies, Original Fourth, at 727-28. 
95 See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876). 
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the point—that a corporation was a “person” for purposes of applying 
Fourteenth Amendment protections.96 
However, even for its time, Boyd’s sweeping protection of business 
records plainly went too far.  In the decades that followed, federal attorneys 
seem to have adjusted by inventing the investigatory federal grand jury97 
and acquiring business records by subpoenaing executives to produce 
corporate records.  The Supreme Court eventually acquiesced in this gambit 
by declaring that although corporations were protected by the Fourth 
Amendment, they did not have a right against self-incrimination,98 and by 
also ruling that business executives did not have personal standing under 
the Fifth Amendment to decline to produce corporate papers.99  Thus, 
competing concerns regarding government review of business records 
seemed to have produced an accommodation in which the government 
could subpoena but not search for business records—an accommodation 
that effectively provided businesses with a significant degree of control 
over the disclosure of corporate records.100 
Fourth Amendment doctrine might have congealed at that point—in 
which case it would never have become a significant topic for the Journal.  
Indeed, the justices demonstrated their continuing disinterest in regulating 
criminal searches in their 1904 ruling in Adams v. New York101 when they 
adopted a rule that barred raising a “collateral issue” as to how police had 
obtained evidence during a criminal trial102—and thus seemed to preclude 
any consideration of a federal exclusionary rule.103  However, the 
 
96 See Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).  In the same year, the 
justices severely limited state power to regulate railroads.  See Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. 
R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886). 
97 Cf. Davies, Arrest, supra note 16, at 427-28. 
98 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74-75 (1906) (ruling that corporations enjoy Fourth 
Amendment but not Fifth Amendment self-incrimination protections). 
99 Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377-85 (1911) (ruling that a corporate officer 
could not invoke the Fifth Amendment right against producing corporate records, even if he 
had written them); see also Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478 (1913). 
100 Unlike a search warrant, a subpoena could be contested in advance of the government 
obtaining any documents.  Additionally, unlike a search warrant, a grand jury subpoena left 
some leeway for a recalcitrant business to withhold disclosing information, and thus, as a 
practical matter, allowed a business that was the target of an investigation to exercise a 
degree of control over disclosure of its records.  
101 192 U.S. 585 (1904). 
102 Id. at 595. 
103 The logic of exclusion was essentially the same logic of legal nullity that the Supreme 
Court announced in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)—that is, an 
unconstitutional search is void and a legal nullity so courts have no constitutional 
jurisdiction to receive evidence so obtained.  The obviousness of the logic may explain why 
Boyd had offered no explanation when it ordered the return of invoices obtained through an 
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accommodation regarding business records appears to have broken down at 
about the same date that the Journal began publication.  And that 
breakdown appears to have provided the motivation for the justices to 
invent modern search and seizure doctrine in Weeks. 
III. BUSINESS RECORDS AND THE BIRTH OF MODERN  
SEARCH AND SEIZURE DOCTRINE 
Perhaps emboldened by the ruling in Adams, in 1911, federal marshals 
in New York City, acting at the direction of a prosecutor but without any 
warrant or other form of legal process, seized all of the business records of 
an import firm suspected of customs violations.  Citing Boyd as authority, 
the firm quickly obtained an order from the local federal court commanding 
the return of the documents.104  However, the United States Attorney, 
Henry A. Wise, refused to comply.  Instead, Wise asserted that the court 
lacked authority to order the return.  The court then held Wise in contempt 
and had him jailed.  Wise then filed both an appeal and a petition for habeas 
corpus in the Supreme Court, arguing that the federal court lacked authority 
to order return of the seized records.105 
The justices dismissed Wise’s filings on procedural grounds.  
Significantly, they limited their comment on the merits to simply stating 
that the lower court’s order for returning the papers was not “so dehors the 
authority of the court as to cause it to be void” and justify Wise’s refusal to 
obey it.106  However, the justices side-stepped the issue of whether the 
seizure of the papers had violated a constitutional right.107 
The justices’ disinclination to address the merits may now seem 
puzzling, but their hesitation was probably prompted by a then-settled facet 
of traditional constitutional doctrine that has since been forgotten.  Unlike 
the situation in Boyd, which had involved the constitutionality of a statutory 
provision, the episode involving Wise involved only allegedly unlawful 
conduct by federal officers.  However, as noted above, the traditional 
 
unconstitutional statutory procedure.  See supra note 88 and accompanying text.  Moreover, 
at least one state court had begun to apply the logic of nullity to illegal searches prior to 
Adams.  See, e.g., State v. Sheridan, 96 N.W. 730 (Iowa 1903).  Those developments may 
have prompted the justices to preemptively block emergence of a federal exclusionary 
principle in Adams.  In that case, the argument for suppression had been made to the New 
York Court of Appeals, but that court had ruled against suppression.  People v. Adams, 68 
N.E. 636, 640 (N.Y. 1903).  The federal justices then affirmed that ruling. 
104 See United States v. Mills, 185 F. 318, 318-20 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911). 
105 See Wise v. Mills, 220 U.S. 549 (1911); Wise v. Henkel, 220 U.S. 556 (1911). 
106 Mills, 220 U.S. at 555. 
107 Henkel, 220 U.S. at 558 (stating that the lower court had authority to decide the 
motion for the return of the firm’s papers “irrespective of whether there was a constitutional 
right to exact the return of the books and papers”). 
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understanding was that an officer’s conduct could not violate a 
constitutional standard because unlawful conduct by an officer was not 
considered to be government action; instead the conduct of a person holding 
an office lost any official character if it was unlawful.108  Indeed, the 
justices had recently reaffirmed that traditional doctrine in their 1908 ruling 
in Ex Parte Young.109 
However, the traditional conception of the boundary of government 
action had become outmoded as the scope of government activity increased 
during the late nineteenth century and more and more discretionary 
authority was conferred on government officials and officers.  Indeed, only 
two years after the Wise rulings, the justices recognized that new reality and 
expanded the boundary of government action in their 1913 ruling in Home 
Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. City of Los Angeles,110 in which they 
enlarged their ability to review state regulation of businesses under the 
Fourteenth Amendment by ruling that even conduct by state regulators that 
allegedly violated state law constituted “state action” for purposes of 
applying federal constitutional protections.111  By analogy, that expansion 
of the boundary of government action also opened the way for the justices 
to rule that unlawful conduct by federal officials—including federal 
prosecutors and law enforcement officers—could now constitute a 
government violation of a constitutional right.112 
It may also be significant that the justices’ expansion of the boundary 
of government action in Home Telephone and Telegraph coincided with 
other developments that portended further enlargement of the federal 
government’s involvement in economic affairs.  One was the enactment in 
1913 of an income tax applicable to corporations and wealthy 
individuals.113  Another was that the Federal Trade Commission Act and 
Clayton Antitrust Act were pending in Congress in early 1914, and would 
soon be enacted. 114  Notably, each of these developments implied that the 
 
108 See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
109 209 U.S. 123 (1908).  The rule in Young is now commonly labeled a “fiction,” but 
that was not the case at the time.  Indeed, Woodrow Wilson was among those who described 
the traditional doctrine as being basic to our constitutional order.  See Davies, Original 
Fourth, supra note 16, at 661-62 n.312. 
110 227 U.S. 278 (1913). 
111 See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 16, at 666-67. 
112 For a sketch of the gradual appearance of the concept that unlawful conduct by 
officers nevertheless constituted government action, see id. at 666-67 n.323. 
113 See Tariff of 1913 (Revenue Act of 1913), Pub. L. No. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 166 (1913).  
A corporate excise tax on net profits had been enacted a few years earlier.  See Tariff of 
1909 (Corporate Excise Tax of 1909), ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112-17 (1909).   
114 See Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 717 (1914); Clayton 
Antitrust Act, Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (1914). 
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federal government would have heightened interest in obtaining business 
records. 
These developments, coupled with the unsettling Wise litigation, likely 
motivated the justices to establish a firmer protection of personal and 
corporate financial records.  Additionally, the expansion of the boundary of 
government action to include even unlawful acts by officers provided an 
opportunity to deal directly with situations such as that presented by the 
Wise litigation.  Taken together, these events and developments appear to 
have set the stage for the justices to fundamentally reinvent the Fourth 
Amendment in the seminal 1914 ruling in Weeks v. United States.115 
A. THE INVENTION OF MODERN SEARCH AND SEIZURE DOCTRINE IN 
WEEKS 
After Fremont Weeks was arrested for the offense of using the mails to 
distribute lottery tickets, a federal marshal and local police had gone to 
Weeks’s residence, without obtaining a search warrant, and had searched it 
and seized various papers for use as evidence.116  Weeks’s attorney dodged 
the Adams “collateral issue” rule by the simple expedient of making a 
motion for return of the papers prior to rather than during Weeks’s trial.117  
After the motion was denied and Weeks was convicted, he challenged the 
admission of the seized papers into evidence in an appeal to the Supreme 
Court.118 
Writing for a unanimous Court in Weeks, Justice Day made three 
important doctrinal innovations.  First, by treating the warrantless search as 
a “direct violation of the constitutional rights of the defendant,” Justice Day 
treated the common law principle that a house could not be searched 
without a warrant as an aspect of the Fourth Amendment itself.119  Second, 
he drew upon the enlarged conception of government action to announce 
that the Amendment applied to the conduct of officers as well as to 
legislation and court orders (however, he finessed this point so nicely that it 
is almost invisible to a modern reader).120  Then, having found that the 
search at issue was unconstitutional, Justice Day made a third innovation by 
 
115 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
116 Id. at 386. 
117 Id. at 387, 395-97.  The filing of the motion prior to trial by Weeks’ attorney may 
have been inspired by another Kansas City case.  In 1913, a defendant successfully obtained 
an order for return of documents seized without a warrant by making the motion prior to trial 
(and thus avoiding the Adams “collateral issue” rule) in United States v. MounDay, 208 F. 
186 (D. Kan. 1913). 
118 Weeks, 232 U.S. at 386. 
119 Id. at 398; see also Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 16, at 730 n.520. 
120 See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 16, at 729-30 n.519. 
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announcing that the denial of the defendant’s motion for return of the 
papers was “a denial of the constitutional rights of the accused”121 and 
made the exclusionary rule a feature of the Fourth Amendment’s 
protections.122 
However, Weeks still stopped short of creating the full scope of what 
we now call search and seizure doctrine.  In particular, the justices did not 
address arrest authority at all; rather, the Weeks opinion was focused on the 
need for a warrant to authorize a search.  Indeed, Justice Day explicitly 
noted that the ruling did not alter the traditional common law understanding 
that a person who was “legally arrested” could be searched without a 
warrant for incriminating evidence such as burglar tools.123  Likewise, 
Justice Day did not invoke any “reasonableness” standard beyond a general 
invocation of the prior ruling in Boyd.124  Rather, he cited “‘[t]he maxim 
that “every man’s house is his castle” while simply announcing a 
constitutional rule that a search of a house required a search warrant.125 
The Weeks ruling also had one characteristic that favored business 
interests: unlike Boyd, it did not combine the Fourth Amendment’s 
protection with the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.  
Rather, it based its holding—and the new exclusionary rule—solely on the 
Fourth Amendment.  That was significant because businesses could claim 
the protection of the Fourth Amendment, but not of the Fifth Amendment’s 
Self-Incrimination Clause.126 
Unsurprisingly, the Weeks decision, and especially the new 
exclusionary rule, provoked comment.  Northwestern’s own Dean John 
 
121 Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398. 
122 In contrast to later treatments, the rationale Justice Day offered for exclusion was 
expressed in the formalist jurisprudence of authority rather than the language of a mere 
policy of deterrence of future illegality.  Thus, in addition to describing the failure to return 
the papers as a denial of the constitutional right of the accused, he wrote “[t]hat papers 
wrongfully seized should be turned over to the accused.”  Id. at 398.  Likewise, Justice Day 
did not simply endorse what is now known as the “judicial integrity” rationale; rather, he 
stated that “[t]he effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the courts of the United States 
and Federal officials, in the exercise of their power and authority, under limitations and 
restraints as to the exercise of such power and authority.”  Id. at 391-92 (emphasis added). 
123 Id. at 392 (indicating that the Court was not disapproving “an assertion of the right on 
the part of the Government . . . to search the person of the accused when legally arrested to 
discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime . . . [n]or is it the case of burglar’s tools or 
other proofs of guilt found upon his arrest within the control of the accused”). 
124 Id. at 389-90.  
125 Id. at 390 (quoting COOLEY, supra note 86) (Justice Day cited pages “425. 426” in 
that work without identifying an edition, however the page citations appear to be erroneous; 
the passage Justice Day quoted appears at pages 299-300 in the 1868 first edition of that 
work, and on page 365 (*299-300) in the final 1883 fifth edition). 
126 See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text. 
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Henry Wigmore attacked the new exclusionary rule as dangerous nonsense 
that would “coddl[e] the criminal classes of the population.”127  However, 
other commentators endorsed the ruling.128  The Weeks ruling also 
prompted a legislative response: in 1917, Congress finally rectified a long-
standing lapse by enacting statutory authority for federal courts to issue 
criminal search warrants.129 
Admittedly, the circumstances in Weeks did not look much like a 
business records case.  Indeed, because Weeks involved a warrantless search 
of a residence for papers, it easily fell within the “houses, papers, and 
effects” formulation in the Fourth Amendment’s text.  The same was true 
when the justices applied the warrant requirement to a search of a house for 
whiskey in 1921, and ruled that the unconstitutionally seized whiskey also 
could not be admitted as evidence—but that the contraband need not be 
returned, either.130  However, the justices’ concern for business records 
soon became evident as additional Fourth Amendment cases were 
decided.131 
B. PROTECTING BUSINESS RECORDS AND OFFICES IN SILVERTHORNE 
LUMBER CO. AND GOULED 
As had been the case in the earlier ruling in Boyd, the justices ignored 
the specific reference to “houses” in the Fourth Amendment’s text when 
they extended the Weeks warrant requirement to searches of business 
offices in the 1920 decision in Silverstone Lumber Co. v. United States.132  
In that case, a federal prosecutor made a warrantless raid of the office of a 
company suspected of defrauding the government and seized all of the 
company’s records.  The prosecutor then returned the seized documents—
 
127 John H. Wigmore, Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure, 8 A.B.A. 
J. 479, 482 (1922).  This article was an enlargement of a shorter note that Wigmore had 
published shortly after Weeks was announced: Comment on Recent Cases: Evidence—Fourth 
Amendment—Documents Illegally Seized, 9 ILL. L. REV. [renamed NW. U.L. REV.] 43, 43-44 
(1915) (signed “J.H.W.”) (criticizing the Weeks Court for departing from the “sound and 
harmless doctrine that documents obtained by a search illegal under the Fourth Amendment 
are nevertheless admissible in evidence” and instead pursuing a “mechanical idea of 
justice”). 
128 See, e.g., Connor Hall, Letter to the Editor Titled “Evidence and the Fourth 
Amendment,” 8 A.B.A. J. 646 (1922). 
129 See Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, tit. XI, 40 Stat. 217, 228-30 (1917).  Notably, § 16 
required return of papers that were seized without valid warrant authority. 
130 Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921). 
131 Discussion of the early cases in this Article is necessarily limited to those that now 
seem most important.  Readers interested in a fuller treatment of the early cases should 
consult LANDYNSKI, supra note 51, at 66-117 (discussing post-Weeks search cases to 1964). 
132 251 U.S. 385 (1920). 
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but not before making copies of them.  The prosecutor then served a 
subpoena on the company officials to produce the documents that were 
deemed pertinent (a strategy meant to exploit the Court’s prior rulings that a 
business entity did not have a right against self-incrimination and that 
company officials did not have standing to object to producing company 
records).133 
In the Supreme Court, the government conceded the illegality of the 
original seizure, but it asserted that Weeks only required the return of the 
documents themselves and did not expressly prohibit the use of the 
information so obtained to further the prosecution.  However, Justice 
Holmes’s majority opinion rebuked the government for “reduc[ing] the 
Fourth Amendment to a form of words.”134  Instead, Justice Holmes 
announced what has come to be known as the “fruit of the poisonous tree” 
doctrine by declaring that “[t]he essence of a provision forbidding the 
acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so 
acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at 
all.”135  (Dicta in Holmes’s opinion also recognized the opposing principle 
that has come to be known as the “independent source” doctrine.136) 
Notably, the Court’s ruling in Silverthorne Lumber prohibited use of 
the unconstitutionally seized business records against members of the 
Silverthorne family as well as against the company itself.  Specifically, it 
condemned the use of company records “seized in violation of the parties’ 
constitutional rights.”137  Thus, the ruling rejected any notion that Fourth 
Amendment rights should be subject to a standing limitation comparable to 
that which limited enforcement of the Fifth Amendment’s right against self-
incrimination.  However, Justice Holmes’ opinion for the Court was so curt 
that that aspect of the ruling was virtually invisible. 
As a result, the Silverthorne Lumber opinion left the door open for the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals to announce the opposite rule a few 
months later in Haywood v. United States,138 a case in which union 
documents seized during an raid on the union’s office under a defective 
warrant had been introduced as evidence in a prosecution of Industrial 
Workers of the World labor organizers.  The court of appeals judges 
disregarded the collective phrasing of the Fourth Amendment as a “right of 
 
133 See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text. 
134 Silverstone Lumber, 251 U.S. at 392. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 391 (emphasis added). 
138 268 F. 795 (7th Cir. 1920).  Silverthorne Lumber was decided in January 1920; 
Haywood was decided in December 1920. 
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the people”139 and ruled that the Fourth Amendment right, like the right 
against self-incrimination, was only personal in nature.  Hence, union 
officials could not complain that a search of the union’s offices violated 
their Fourth Amendment protection.140  (One can only wonder if the ruling 
would have been the same if the defendants in Haywood had been 
businessmen.) 
Because the Supreme Court did not revisit the standing issue until 
much later, the Haywood standing rule then became the leading authority 
for a Fourth Amendment standing requirement.141  Thus, the standing 
requirement—one of the most important limitations on the enforcement of 
Fourth Amendment standards—came about essentially through poor 
communication.  For decades, the standing requirement remained the only 
limitation on the otherwise strict operation of the Weeks exclusionary rule. 
The justices also made their protection of business papers less visible, 
but not less effective, by making a doctrinal adjustment in the 1921 decision 
in Gouled v. United States.142  Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice 
Clarke’s opinion announced that papers were not due any special protection 
under the Fourth Amendment.143  However, he also harkened back to 
Boyd’s pseudo-history to announce what came to be known as the “mere 
evidence” doctrine—the bizarre rule that a search warrant could not be 
issued “solely for the purpose of making search to secure evidence to be 
used against [the defendant] in a criminal or penal proceeding.”144  Thus, 
 
139 In all likelihood, the Fourth Amendment was stated as a “right of the people” because 
the general warrants that it condemned presented a threat to the entire community.  See 
Davies, Correcting Search History, supra note 16, at 161-63.  Indeed, the phrasing of the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights as either collective protections (“the right of the people”) or 
individual protections (“person,” “the accused”) appears to have been quite deliberate.  Id.   
140 Haywood involved a conspiracy prosecution against officers of the Industrial Workers 
of the World in which documents had been seized during a raid of the I.W.W. office that was 
conducted under a patently invalid search warrant that lacked both particularity and probable 
cause.  268 F. at 801.  The union officers asserted that the union was a partnership and that 
the individual rights of the officers, as partners, had been violated.  Id. at 804.  However, the 
circuit judges rejected that argument and ruled that the seizure of union documents “did not 
impinge upon the rights of any defendant under the Fourth Amendment.”  Id. 
141 The justices did not address the standing issue until Goldstein v. United States, 316 
U.S. 114 (1942), discussed infra notes 181-182 and accompanying text. 
142 255 U.S. 298 (1921). 
143 Id. at 309.  The justices had already punctured the special protection that Boyd had 
extended to papers in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (upholding the seizure of 
an organization’s papers by search warrant and allowing the admission of the papers in a 
criminal prosecution for attempting to cause insubordination in the military). 
144 Gouled, 255 U.S. at 309.  The Court further explained that a search warrant could be 
constitutionally issued “only when a primary right to such search and seizure may be found 
in the interest which the public or the complainant may have in the property to be seized, or 
in the right to the possession of it, or when a valid exercise of the police power renders 
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the justices restricted use of warrants that satisfied the Fourth Amendment’s 
particularity and probable cause standards to searches and seizures of 
contraband or the fruits or instrumentalities of crime—categories that 
typically would not include business records.  However, the justices also 
ruled in 1921, over the dissents of Justices Holmes and Brandeis, that the 
Fourth Amendment did not bar the government from using documents 
unlawfully stolen by a private person and turned over to the government.145 
Overall, these early cases suggest that the justices who invented the 
modern Fourth Amendment did so largely in response to an ideological 
predilection to protect elite interests against the increasing intrusions of 
progressive government.  However, the characterization of a legal right 
cannot always be contained to the initially intended application.  Indeed, the 
history of legal rights may be largely the story of how doctrines that 
lawyers and judges invented for the benefit of elite interests were 
subsequently pressed into service beyond the initial setting.  Something of 
that sort occurred when Prohibition posed new questions about the 
protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment. 
IV. PROHIBITION AND THE INVENTION OF “FOURTH AMENDMENT 
REASONABLENESS” 
The political elite, like the public, had mixed attitudes toward 
enforcement of Prohibition.  There seems to have been a consensus that 
searches of residences for illegal liquor were unacceptable—indeed, 
Congress restricted such searches by statute.146  However, there was less 
sympathy for those who dealt in illegal liquor.  Moreover, the increasing 
use of automobiles presented a new difficulty for enforcing Prohibition, so 
the federal courts were soon presented with the issue of whether the Fourth 
Amendment permitted warrantless searches of automobiles suspected of 
transporting illegal liquor. 
As a practical matter the new possessory offense created by 
Prohibition was more akin to revenue enforcement than to traditional 
criminal law enforcement insofar as there usually was no complaining 
witness to initiate a prosecution.147  Instead, Prohibition enforcement 
 
possession of the property by the accused unlawful and provides that it may be taken.  Id. at 
623, 624 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1885)). 
145 Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921). 
146 Section 25 of Title II of the National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, tit. II, § 25, 41 Stat. 315 
(1919) (repealed 1935), provided that a search warrant could be issued for a dwelling house 
only if there was evidence that it was used for the sale of liquor, but not if the evidence 
indicated only that liquor was manufactured there.  See Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. 124, 
127-28 n.4 (1932). 
147 See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
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depended upon the initiative taken by law enforcement officers themselves.  
Hence, it was not surprising that the lower federal courts sought to uphold 
the validity of warrantless auto searches.  But they could not do so under 
existing doctrine. 
For one thing, searches of automobiles for liquor usually could not be 
justified under the traditional doctrine that permitted searches incident to 
lawful arrests.  The doctrinal obstacle was that American courts still looked 
to common law or statutory standards to assess the lawfulness of an arrest.  
Under those regimes, a law enforcement officer could make a warrantless 
arrest for a suspected felony on bare probable cause; however, he could not 
make a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor unless he actually observed 
the ongoing commission of the misdemeanor in his presence.148  The 
different arrest standards mattered because Prohibition violations typically 
were misdemeanors149 and the illegal liquor being transported in autos was 
rarely in plain view.  Hence, traditional arrest doctrine barred the sort of 
investigatory searches that were necessary if police were to be able to 
enforce Prohibition.  In addition, Supreme Court decisions that had already 
applied the protections of the Fourth Amendment beyond the house and its 
contents effectively foreclosed the lower courts from simply declaring that 
the Fourth Amendment did not apply to private property such as 
automobiles.150 
After advancing several alternative justifications for automobile 
searches that were plainly deficient,151 lower federal courts invented a novel 
solution when they began to construe the reference to a right against 
“unreasonable searches and seizures” in the first clause of the Fourth 
Amendment as though it created a free-standing “reasonableness” standard 
for assessing government searches.  Thus, they announced that the Fourth 
Amendment did not forbid all warrantless searches—rather, it forbade only 
 
148 See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text (discussing common law restrictions on 
warrantless arrests for less than felony offenses).  Nineteenth century judges had relaxed the 
standard for felony arrests to bare probable cause, but had not altered the restrictions on 
warrantless misdemeanor arrests.  See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text. 
149 Except for repeat offenses, the National Prohibition Act defined most violations as 
misdemeanors.  See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925) (construing section 
29, title II of the National Prohibition Act). 
150 However, the justices would rule in 1924 that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to 
searches or seizures conducted in an open field.  Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924). 
151 See, e.g., United States v. Fenton, 268 F. 221, 222-23 (D. Mont. 1920) (ruling that the 
United States was “vested with the right of property and possession” in illegal liquor, and 
thus was entitled to seize it); United States v. Bateman, 278 F. 231, 235 (S.D. Cal. 1922) 
(holding that “it is not unreasonable for a prohibition enforcement officer to stop 
automobiles upon the public highway and search them for intoxicating liquors without a 
warrant and that the finding of liquor justifies the search”). 
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“unreasonable” warrantless searches—and they further asserted that a 
warrantless search would be “reasonable,” given the exigency presented by 
the mobility of an automobile, so long as the officers had bare probable 
cause that a Prohibition violation was occurring.152  Notably, none of the 
lower courts cited any precedent for that formulation. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court adopted that novel construction of 
the Fourth Amendment’s text in the 1925 decision Carroll v. United 
States.153  Although Chief Justice Taft’s majority opinion conceded that the 
warrantless search of the auto in that case could not be justified as a search 
incident to a lawful arrest (because no lawful misdemeanor arrest could 
have been made),154 it nevertheless upheld the warrantless search on the 
basis that the officer’s bare probable cause that the vehicle was transporting 
illegal liquor made the search “reasonable” and constitutional.155  
Two features of Chief Justice Taft’s majority opinion in Carroll are 
noteworthy.  One is that there was something of a disconnect between the 
definition of “probable cause” recited in the opinion and the application of 
that definition to the facts.  On the one hand, Chief Justice Taft reiterated 
the by-then traditional formulation that the standard was satisfied if “the 
facts and circumstances within [the officers’] knowledge and of which they 
had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to 
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that [an offense has been 
or is being committed].”156 On the other hand, as Justice McReynolds 
pointed out in a pithy dissent, the facts in Carroll were such that the 
majority had found probable cause to search merely “because a man once 
agreed to deliver whisky, but did not . . . [and] thereafter he venture[d] to 
drive an automobile on the road to Detroit!”157 
 
152 See, e.g., United States v. Snyder, 278 F. 650, 658 (N.D. W.Va. 1922); Lambert v. 
United States, 282 F. 413, 416-17 (9th Cir. 1922); Green v. United States, 289 F. 236, 238 
(8th Cir. 1923). 
153 267 U.S. 132, 156-59 (1925). 
154 Id. at 156-58. 
155 Id. at 149, 159. 
156 Id. at 162.  This definition of probable cause traced back to Justice Washington’s jury 
instruction in Munns v. De Nemours, 17 F. Cas. 993, 995 (C.C. Pa. 1811).  The definition in 
Munns, in turn, was an adaptation of that given in the leading framing-era treatise on 
criminal procedure by Serjeant Hawkins, which defined probable cause of suspicion as 
information that would create a “strong” suspicion sufficient to cause a prudent man to 
suspect a person to be guilty of a crime.  2 HAWKINS, supra note 30, at 84-85.  The principal 
change that had occurred since the framing era was that American judges had elevated cause 
to “suspect” to cause to “believe.”  See Davies, Probable Cause, supra note 16, at 48-50.  
The rendering of the definition of probable cause in Carroll was subsequently repeated with 
minor changes in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949).  See infra notes 
193-195 and accompanying text. 
157 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 174. 
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The second noteworthy feature of Chief Justice Taft’s opinion was the 
purportedly originalist claim he offered to bolster the notion that 
warrantless searches of vehicles could be “reasonable” and thus 
constitutional.  Specifically, he noted that the First Congress in the 1789 
Collections Act had authorized customs officers to make warrantless 
searches of ships if the officer had “reason to suspect” a customs violation; 
and he asserted that this proved the Fourth Amendment authorized 
warrantless searches of vehicles based on bare probable cause.158  However, 
Chief Justice Taft’s claim ignored the definition of the Fourth 
Amendment’s scope as “persons, houses, papers, and effects”—a formula 
that, in keeping with common law doctrine, excluded ships and probably 
even warehouses from the warrant requirement.159  Thus, there is no reason 
to think that the Framers would have thought that the Fourth Amendment 
had any bearing on customs searches of ships—or vice versa.  And Chief 
Justice Taft surely knew that his claim was fictional because none of the 
numerous ship seizure decisions by the Supreme Court between 1789 and 
1925 had even so much as mentioned the Fourth Amendment.160  In fact, 
the Taft Court still did not mention the Fourth Amendment in two later 
cases dealing with ship searches.161  Like Justice Bradley’s opinion in Boyd, 
Chief Justice Taft did not make the decision in Carroll on the basis of 
history; rather, he distorted the history to fit the desired result. 
 
158 Id. at 150 (citing 1789 Collections Act, 1 Stat. 29, 43).  This originalist claim seems 
to have been composed by Chief Justice Taft; it does not appear in the briefs filed in Carroll. 
159 See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
160 See Davies, Probable Cause, supra note 16, at 55; Davies, Original Fourth, supra 
note 16, at 607-08. 
161 In 1926, a year after Carroll, the Taft Court upheld the condemnation of a “motor 
boat,” which police discovered was transporting illegal liquor, in Dodge v. United States, 
272 U.S. 530 (1926).  Justice Holmes’ opinion for the unanimous Court did not analyze the 
seizure of the boat under the Fourth Amendment but instead noted the inapplicability of that 
provision by curtly commenting that “[t]he exclusion of evidence obtained by an unlawful 
search and seizure stands on a different ground” than the search and seizure of the vessel at 
issue.  Id. at 532.  A year later, in 1927, the justices also extensively discussed the authority 
of the Coast Guard to board, search, and seize ships in Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501 
(1927).  However, there was no mention of the Fourth Amendment in either Justice Van 
Devanter’s opinion for the Court or in the even more detailed discussion in Justice 
Brandeis’s concurring opinion. 
 It does not appear that the Supreme Court ever applied the Fourth Amendment to a search 
or seizure involving a boat, ship, or other vessel until the 1983 decision in United States v. 
Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983) (upholding the suspicionless boarding by customs 
officers of a forty-foot sailboat for inspection of its documents during which marijuana was 
discovered).  Notably, Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion proceeded on the premise that 
the Fourth Amendment applied to that situation without citing any prior authority for that 
premise.  Id. at 584-88. 
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Carroll’s treatment of the first clause of the Fourth Amendment as a 
free-standing Reasonableness Clause also appears to have inspired the 
fabrication of the academic version of conventional Fourth Amendment 
history.  In a Ph.D. dissertation published in 1937, political scientist Nelson 
B. Lasson asserted that the last-minute change that had been made to the 
Fourth Amendment’s text in the House—the one in which Madison’s “by 
warrants issuing” had been replaced with “and no warrant shall issue”—had 
been made for the purpose of creating an overarching “reasonableness” 
standard for all government searches.162  Although Lasson did not provide a 
shred of evidence for that claim (because there was none),163 it dovetailed 
so nicely with Supreme Court’s own textual creativity that it became the 
cornerstone for the conventional academic account of Fourth Amendment 
history.164 
Prohibition continued to supply the Court with liquor search cases 
until it was repealed in 1933; indeed, nearly all of the search and seizure 
cases decided during the period 1925 to 1933 involved Prohibition 
prosecutions.165  In two cases decided in 1927, the justices recognized what 
came to be called the “silver platter doctrine”—that evidence seized by state 
officers could be admitted in federal trials even if the search or seizure 
would have violated the Fourth Amendment if conducted by federal 
officers—but in both cases the justices found that federal officers were 
sufficiently involved to deem the seizures to be federal matters.166 
 
162 See LASSON, supra note 51, at 100-03.  Lasson’s monograph was based on his 
dissertation: Nelson B. Lisansky, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment 
(1934) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Political Science, Johns Hopkins University); see 
also Davies, Correcting Search History, supra note 16, at 27 n.45. 
 Lasson also advanced a rather implausible claim that the motion to substitute “and no 
warrant shall issue” was voted down in the House, but that the proposed change was 
surreptitiously made anyway by the later committee on style.  See LASSON, supra note 51, at 
101-02.  However, although there are conflicting accounts of the House debate, including 
even the identity of the person who made the motion, the weight of available evidence 
clearly indicates that the motion for the substitution carried.  See Davies, Original Fourth, 
supra note 16, at 716-21. 
163 See supra notes 67-77 and accompanying text. 
164 See Davies, Original Fourth, supra note 16, at 568-70 (citing opinions and 
commentaries that have uncritically repeated Lasson’s claims). 
165 See WILLIAM W. GREENHALGH, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT HANDBOOK: A 
CHRONOLOGICAL SURVEY OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 23-26 (1995) (indicating that 
eighteen of the twenty-one search and seizure cases decided by the Supreme Court during 
the years 1925 through 1933 involved illegal liquor or enforcement of the National 
Prohibition Act). 
166 Byars v United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33 (1927) (recognizing “the right of the federal 
government to avail itself of evidence improperly seized by state officers operating entirely 
upon their own account” but finding involvement of federal officers in illegal search at issue 
required suppression of the evidence so seized); Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310, 
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In another of the Prohibition cases, and in a still unusual five-to-four 
split decision, the Court declined to apply Fourth Amendment protections to 
the surreptitious warrantless seizure of conversations by police in Olmstead 
v. United States,167 and thus opened the way for the police to not only use 
wiretaps, but also use undercover eavesdroppers.168  In an omen of things to 
come, one of the few non-Prohibition cases the Court decided during this 
period seems to have been the first to involve a seizure of cocaine.169  
Notably, however, none of the Fourth Amendment cases decided by the 
Supreme Court during this period involved a violent crime prosecution.170 
Because Prohibition involved both federal and state law enforcement, 
it also presented state courts with search issues.  Moreover, because the 
protections of the federal Bill of Rights did not yet apply to state 
proceedings,171 state courts faced the question of whether their state 
constitutions required a state exclusionary rule.  Virtually all of the states 
addressed the issue; slightly less than half adopted exclusion, while slightly 
more than half did not.172  New York was among the latter, and state Judge 
Benjamin Cardozo famously opined that exclusion was defective because 
“the criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered.”173  
California rejected a state rule on the formalistic ground that the 
constitutional violation was “complete” when the illegal search ended, so 
the use at trial of evidence so seized worked no additional violation.174  
 
313 (1927).  This doctrine was described as allowing state officers to present improperly 
seized evidence on “a silver platter” in a federal trial in Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 
79 (1949). 
167 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
168 Wiretapping itself was subsequently limited by § 605 of the Federal Communications 
Act, 48 Stat. 1103 (1934).  The justices ruled that this statutory provision required exclusion 
of wiretap evidence obtained by federal officers in a federal criminal trial but noted that this 
was “a question of policy for the determination of the Congress” rather than a constitutional 
requirement.  Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 381, 383 (1937). 
169 Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925). 
170 See GREENHALGH, supra note 165, at 21-26. 
171 See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833). 
172 See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33-39 app. (1949).  According to that source, 
every state but Rhode Island ruled on the merits of a state exclusionary rule after the Weeks 
decision. Although that source does not give the dates of the state rulings, virtually all of 
them occurred during prohibition.  See also Francis A. Allen, The Exclusionary Rule in the 
American Law of Search and Seizure, 52 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 246, 250 
(1961) (noting that prohibition prompted state courts to adopt exclusionary rules). 
173 People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926).  Although rejecting exclusion, 
Judge Cardozo wrote that the search at issue was unlawful and thus “[t]he officer might have 
been resisted, or sued for damages, or even prosecuted for oppression.”  Id. at 586-87. 
174 People v. Mayen, 205 P. 435, 440 (Cal. 1922).  Justice Powell would resurrect this 
analysis when he announced that exclusion was not required by the Fourth Amendment in 
1974.  See infra note 330. 
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Virginia, adhering to the earlier conception of misconduct by officers as 
private wrongdoing, ruled that exclusion was uncalled for because an 
unlawful search by a police officer did not constitute state action.175 
The flow of search cases to the federal Supreme Court was reduced to 
a trickle when Prohibition was repealed in 1933.  In fact, there were less 
than a handful of Fourth Amendment cases from 1933 to the end of the 
Second World War.  However, the justices did make two rulings that 
bolstered the warrant requirement.  In the 1932 decision Grau v. United 
States,176 they stated, in the course of invalidating a search warrant, that 
probable cause could not be based on hearsay information.  Additionally, in 
the 1933 ruling Nathanson v. United States,177 they unanimously ruled that 
mere conclusory allegations (such as that the suspect was known to be a 
criminal) were insufficient to show probable cause for issuance of a 
warrant. 
Of course, for much of this period the justices of the Supreme Court 
were primarily occupied with the issue of whether the national government 
was to play a dominant role in the nation’s economy.  That issue, however, 
was effectively settled when a majority began to uphold New Deal 
legislation in the famous 1937 “switch in time that saved nine.”178  Among 
other things, that shift effectively ended the use of the Fourth Amendment 
to shield business records.  Or to put it more broadly, that shift meant that 
justices who were ideologically aligned with elite economic interests no 
longer had any reason to be committed to a strong Fourth Amendment.  The 
ideological poles were reversing.  Unsurprisingly, Fourth Amendment 
doctrine became unsettled. 
 
175 Hall v. Commonwealth, 121 S.E. 154, 155-56 (Va. 1924) (stating that a police officer 
acting under a void search “ceases to be [the state’s] agent” and, therefore, it would be 
inappropriate “to impose an indirect penalty on the commonwealth” by excluding 
incriminating evidence).  The traditional understanding that an officer’s conduct ceased to be 
official if it was unlawful is discussed supra notes 108-112 and accompanying text. 
176 287 U.S. 124 (1932). 
177 290 U.S. 41 (1933). 
178 The phrase refers to Justice Roberts’s switch from opposing to supporting New Deal 
legislation in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), which was widely perceived 
as mooting FDR’s “Court-packing” plan.  That shift from five to four rulings striking down 
New Deal legislation to five to four rulings upholding the economic powers of the federal 
government is widely regarded as a major transformation in constitutional law.  See, e.g., 
History of the Supreme Court, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT, supra 
note 10, at 432, 454. 
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V. THE ROOSEVELT/TRUMAN JUSTICES’ DIVIDE REGARDING THE 
WARRANT REQUIREMENT AND INCORPORATION 
By the time of his death in 1945, President Franklin D. Roosevelt had 
appointed all but one of the nine Supreme Court justices.  Of course, F.D.R. 
chose nominees primarily on the basis of their favorable attitude toward 
New Deal economic regulation.  Although his nominees generally had a 
positive attitude toward government power, they did not coalesce around 
any consistent ideological attitude toward civil liberties or criminal 
procedure issues. 
Indeed the split was evident in the only two significant statements the 
justices made regarding the Fourth Amendment during World War II—
Goldstein v. United States179 and Goldman v. United States.180  In 
Goldstein, dicta in Justice Roberts’s majority opinion endorsed the 
Haywood standing doctrine as a limitation on Fourth Amendment 
enforcement,181 while Justice Murphy, in a dissent joined by Chief Justice 
Stone and Justice Frankfurter, observed that the standing limitation was 
difficult to square with the language of Justice Holmes’s opinion in 
Silverthorne Lumber Co.182 
In Goldman, the other wartime case, the majority adhered to the earlier 
ruling in Olmstead by declining to apply the Fourth Amendment to the 
police use of a “detectaphone” to surreptitiously listen in on conversations 
between the defendants.183  Here, too, Chief Justice Stone and Justices 
Frankfurter and Murphy broke from the majority and indicated that they 
favored overruling Olmstead.184  Divisions also appeared in three Fourth 
 
179 316 U.S. 114 (1942). 
180 316 U.S. 129 (1942). 
181 Goldstein, 316 U.S. at 121.  The case actually turned on the interpretation of a statute.  
Justice Roberts invoked the Fourth Amendment standing doctrine as a pertinent analogy to 
the statutory treatment, while noting that the Fourth Amendment standing requirement 
“ha[d] been applied in at least fifty cases by the Circuit Courts of Appeals in nine circuits, 
and in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, not to mention many decisions by 
District Courts.”  Id. at 121 n.12. 
182 Id. at 127 n.4.  As noted above, Justice Holmes’s opinion in Silverthorne Lumber had 
actually but implicitly rejected the government’s standing argument.  See supra note 137 and 
accompanying text. 
183 Goldman, 316 U.S. at 134-35.  The ruling in Goldman had far reaching implications 
insofar as it effectively endorsed use of eavesdropping undercover informants, and even 
“wired” undercover informants—although it appears those practices had already become 
standard investigatory techniques.  See Wesley M. Oliver, America’s First Wiretapping 
Controversy in Context and as Context, 43 HAMLINE L. REV. (forthcoming 2011). 
184 Goldman, 316 U.S. at 140-41. 
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Amendment rulings in 1946.  Although the government won all three cases, 
there was a dissenting opinion in each of them.185 
In contrast to F.D.R.’s nominees, President Truman’s selections—
some of whom seem to have been chosen largely on the basis of 
cronyism—tended to have a more consistent pro-government tilt in criminal 
procedure cases.  However, despite their presence, the Court split along 
several ideological dimensions when the justices decided several important 
search cases during the post-War period. 
A. SEARCH CASES 
Although the Supreme Court still decided relatively few search and 
seizure cases during the immediate post-War years, several of those that 
were decided addressed the degree to which the “reasonableness” approach 
articulated in Carroll had displaced the warrant requirement announced in 
Weeks.  In these cases, Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Black, Reed, and 
Burton were proponents of a reasonableness approach, while Justices 
Frankfurter, Murphy, Rutledge, and Jackson were proponents of a rigorous 
warrant requirement.  Justice Douglas seems to have initially provided the 
swing vote. 
For example, in the 1947 decision Harris v. United States,186 police 
officers had made an arrest in a residence pursuant to an arrest warrant for a 
forged check offense and had then conducted a search of the premises for 
evidence of that offense.  During that search they found and seized a stolen 
draft card.  The five-justice majority, including Justice Douglas, ruled that 
the search was valid.  The four dissenters would have required a search 
warrant. 
A year later, in Johnson v. United States,187 Justice Douglas tipped the 
vote the other way.  In that case, police officers had made a warrantless 
arrest in a dwelling and then conducted a search during which opium was 
found.  This time the justices ruled five to four that a post-arrest warrantless 
search of a residence violated the Fourth Amendment.  During the same 
 
185 See Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946) (ruling five to three, with Justices 
Frankfurter, Murphy, and Rutledge dissenting, that defendant consented to waive Fourth 
Amendment rights by signing government contract); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 
(1946) (ruling six to two, with Justices Frankfurter and Murphy dissenting, that gasoline 
rationing coupons were properly seized without warrant by consent); Oklahoma Press 
Publ’n. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946) (ruling seven to one, with Justice Murphy 
dissenting, that a subpoena regarding compliance with Fair Labor Standards Act did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment). 
186 331 U.S. 145 (1947). 
187 333 U.S. 10 (1948). 
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term, in Trupiano v. United States,188 the justices also ruled, again five to 
four, that police were required to obtain a search warrant prior to a post-
arrest search whenever it was reasonably practical to do so.189 
However, the Court changed direction again two years later in the 
1950 decision United States v. Rabinowitz.190  In that decision, the justices 
reversed Trupiano by a five-to-three vote.  The change in direction reflected 
the fact that Justice Tom Clark had replaced Justice Murphy and that Justice 
Douglas did not participate.  Justice Minton’s majority opinion in 
Rabinowitz upheld a warrantless search of a residence incident to an arrest 
made in the premises while opining that the pertinent issue was only 
whether the police search was “reasonable” in the circumstances, not 
whether the police had had an ample opportunity to obtain a search warrant 
(as had been the case).191  Thus, as of 1950, the Weeks warrant requirement 
seemed considerably weakened. 
The Roosevelt and Truman appointees also divided along much the 
same ideological fracture over the application of the “probable cause” 
standard.  In the 1948 ruling in United States v. Di Re,192 Justice Jackson’s 
opinion for a seven-to-two majority concluded that a person’s mere 
presence at the scene of an offense did not constitute probable cause to 
justify an arrest or search incident to arrest.  However, a year later Justice 
Jackson was in dissent (joined by Justices Frankfurter and Murphy) in 
Brinegar v. United States,193 when the majority upheld an automobile 
search under the Carroll automobile exception.  Justice Rutledge’s majority 
opinion repeated the traditional formulation of probable cause previously 
 
188 334 U.S. 699 (1948). 
189 There may have been a relationship between the ruling in Trupiano and some of the 
federal statutory standards for warrantless arrests by federal officers (there were different 
statutes for different agencies) that were then in effect.  In particular, some of those statutory 
provisions allowed warrantless arrests only when the officer had reasonable grounds to fear 
that the person to be arrested would escape while an arrest warrant was being obtained.  
However, that requirement was deleted in 1950.  See Davies, Correcting Search History, 
supra note 16, at 211-12. 
190 339 U.S. 56 (1950). 
191 Id. at 65-66. 
192 332 U.S. 581 (1948). 
193 338 U.S. 160 (1949). 
2010] CENTURY OF “SEARCH AND SEIZURE” DOCTRINE 975 
set out in Carroll,194 but as in Carroll, the majority found that standard was 
met by rather minimal factual allegations.195 
The majority in Brinegar also overruled Grau by endorsing the use of 
hearsay to establish probable cause.196  Of course, that allowance of hearsay 
effectively nullified the Fourth Amendment’s explicit requirement that 
probable cause for a warrant be “supported by Oath or affirmation”—an 
officer-affiant’s mere oath that he had received unsworn hearsay 
information from someone else would hardly have been recognized as 
evidence “supported by oath” during the era when the Bill of Rights was 
framed.197 
B. INCORPORATION AND DUE PROCESS 
The other important controversy that emerged during this period was 
that regarding the “incorporation doctrine”—whether the provisions of the 
federal Bill of Rights should be applied to state legal proceedings through 
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.198  Although the Supreme 
Court had begun to apply the Due Process Clause itself to intervene in 
horrendous miscarriages of justice such as that in the 1932 Scottsboro 
Case,199 a majority of the justices had declined to actually apply the more 
 
194 In his Brinegar majority opinion, Justice Rutledge followed Chief Justice Taft’s 
earlier formulation in defining probable cause as “exist[ing] where ‘the facts and 
circumstances within [the officers’] knowledge and of which they [have] reasonably 
trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution 
in the belief that’ an offense has been or is being committed.”  338 U.S. at 175-76 (quoting 
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)). 
195 In Brinegar, the defendant’s car was stopped and searched on the officers’ suspicion 
that he was transporting liquor legally purchased in Missouri to his dry home state 
Oklahoma.  The arresting officers’ suspicions were largely based on Brinegar’s reputation 
for transporting liquor.  Two lower courts had concluded that the officers lacked probable 
cause.  Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 163, 164, 171.  Nevertheless, the majority concluded that 
standard was met.  Id. at 170. 
196 Id. at 174-75 n.13.  The contrary rule in Grau is discussed supra note 176 and 
accompanying text. 
197 The framing-era understanding was that: 
tho’ a Person testify what he hath heard upon Oath, yet the Person who spake it was not upon 
Oath; . . [thus,] if the first Speech was without Oath, an Oath that there was such a speech makes 
it not more than a bare speaking, and so of no value in a Court of Justice, where all Things were 
determined under the Solemnities of an Oath.  
SIR GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 107-08 (Dublin 1754); id. at 149-50 (4th ed., 
Phila. 1788).  For a discussion of the strong ban against hearsay in framing-era criminal 
proceedings, see Davies, supra note 28, at 390-424 (2007). 
198 For a general overview of the “incorporation doctrine,” see Incorporation Doctrine, 
in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN LAW 415-16 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 2002). 
199 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (Scottsboro Case); see also Brown v. 
Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). 
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specific federal constitutional protections to state proceedings.200  
Nevertheless, in the 1949 decision in Wolf v. Colorado,201 the justices took 
up the issue of whether the Fourth Amendment should apply to the states. 
The opinions in Wolf demonstrated the multiple dimensions of the 
various justices’ views of the Fourth Amendment.  Although Justice 
Frankfurter had been a proponent of a strong construction of the Fourth 
Amendment in federal cases, he wrote a majority opinion in Wolf that not 
only declined to apply the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to the 
states, but even suggested that Congress might overrule the federal 
exclusionary rule if it so chose.202  However, Justice Frankfurter also opined 
that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause overlapped with the 
“core” of Fourth Amendment protections insofar as it forbade the states 
from affirmatively sanctioning “arbitrary” searches by state officers.203  
(Note that Frankfurter condemned “arbitrary” state searches, but used the 
Fourth Amendment terminology of “unreasonable” searches only when 
referring to federal searches.204)  Thus, the Wolf majority indicated that the 
states were forbidden to endorse arbitrary police intrusions, but left the 
formulation of the means of protecting against arbitrary searches to the 
states themselves. 
In contrast, Justice Black was a vigorous advocate for incorporation, 
although he had not endorsed a particularly strong construction of the 
federal Fourth Amendment right itself.  Thus, in Wolf Justice Black 
(mis)characterized Justice Frankfurter’s opinion as though it had applied the 
Fourth Amendment itself to the states and then concurred with the majority 
 
200 See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (ruling that the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment included only those legal rights “implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty” and declining to apply the Fifth Amendment protection against double 
jeopardy to the states on the ground that it was insufficiently fundamental); Adamson v. 
California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (applying the same analysis as Palko when declining to apply 
the Fifth Amendment protection against compelled self-incrimination to state proceedings). 
201 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
202 Id. at 33. 
203 Id. at 27 (stating that security “against arbitrary intrusion by the police—which is at 
the core of the Fourth Amendment” is an aspect of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
Clause); id. at 28 (stating the issue decided as “whether the basic right to protection against 
arbitrary intrusion by police demands the exclusion of logically relevant evidence obtained 
by unreasonable search and seizure because it would be excluded in a federal prosecution for 
a federal crime”). 
204 Perhaps because Justice Frankfurter structured his Wolf opinion to reject the extension 
of the federal exclusionary rule to the states without actually ruling on other issues—
including whether the police conduct at issue violated any federal constitutional standard—
that opinion has often been misread.  See Thomas Y. Davies, An Account of Mapp that 
Misses the Larger Exclusionary Rule Story, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 619, 626 n.24 (2007) 
(discussing common errors in descriptions of Wolf). 
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in Wolf that the states need not apply the Fourth Amendment exclusionary 
rule on the ground that the Fourth Amendment did not itself require an 
exclusionary rule.205 
Justices Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge favored both a strong federal 
right enforced by the exclusionary rule and incorporation of that right, so 
they dissented in Wolf.  Justice Murphy’s dissenting opinion innovated by 
asserting that the exclusionary rule was the only efficacious means of 
deterring future illegal searches—and thus added deterrence to the Weeks 
legality rationale for exclusion.206 
Justice Frankfurter’s suggestion that the Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process Clause forbade “arbitrary searches” by state officers was given 
content in 1952 in Rochin v. California207 when the justices confronted a 
situation in which police had obtained incriminating drugs by forcibly 
pumping a suspect’s stomach.  Justice Frankfurter’s opinion for the Court 
found the police conduct so “shock[ing to] the conscience” that it 
constituted a Due Process violation requiring dismissal of the 
prosecution.208 
However, the limitations of the Due Process approach to regulating 
police search conduct became evident two years later in Irvine v. 
California209 when the justices divided five to four while ruling that the 
warrantless planting of a microphone in a suspect’s bedroom was not 
sufficiently “shocking” to constitute a Due Process violation.210  In an 
unusual move, two of the justices who did not find a Due Process violation 
in Irvine (Justice Jackson joined by the new Chief Justice, Earl Warren) 
 
205 In his concurring opinion, Justice Black rather coyly claimed that Justice 
Frankfurter’s opinion had concluded “that the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of 
‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ is enforceable against the states.”  Wolf, 338 U.S. at 39.  
However, that was misleading insofar as Justice Frankfurter used the usual Fourth 
Amendment phrasing of “unreasonable” searches only when referring to federal searches or 
proceedings but instead referred to “arbitrary” intrusions when referring to state searches and 
proceedings.  See supra note 203 and accompanying text. 
206 Wolf, 338 U.S. at 44-46.  Note, however, that Justice Black had earlier made a similar 
statement in United States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., 336 U.S. 793, 798 (1949) (describing 
the Weeks exclusionary rule as having been “devised by this court to prevent violations of 
the Fourth Amendment”). 
207 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
208 Id. at 172.  Note that the consequence of a due process violation was not simply the 
exclusion of the evidence, as required at that time for a Fourth Amendment violation, but the 
dismissal of the prosecution. 
209 347 U.S. 128 (1954). 
210 Id. at 133-34.  The police conduct in Irvine clearly would have constituted a Fourth 
Amendment violation if performed by federal officers because, notwithstanding the 
Olmstead ruling that conversations were not protected by the Fourth Amendment, the 
planting of the microphone had involved a warrantless physical trespass into a house. 
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called for a federal criminal investigation of the California police who had 
been responsible for planting the microphone.211  However, that 
investigation concluded that criminal prosecution would be inappropriate 
because the police had acted with the full knowledge of the local district 
attorney and pursuant to local law.212  A year after Irvine, the California 
Supreme Court also confronted a comparable illegal police practice and 
concluded that creation of a state exclusionary rule was the only meaningful 
response to such persistent police illegality.213 
VI. THE WARREN COURT: CIVIL RIGHTS, INCORPORATION, AND THE 
REVITALIZATION OF THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT 
Of course, we now come to the Warren Court period, and the famed 
“due process revolution.”  At least by the late 1950s, the justices were 
beginning to divide fairly predictably along the “crime control” (now called 
“conservative”) and “due process” (now called “liberal”) ideological 
orientations that Herbert Packer described.214  The conventional wisdom 
regarding this period is that the liberal majority of the Warren Court 
produced an explosion of pro-defendant rulings.  However, at least with 
regard to search and seizure rulings, the actual story is considerably more 
complex. 
It certainly is true that the Warren Court made a fundamental 
innovation by “incorporating” federal criminal procedure protections and 
thus making federal standards applicable to state proceedings.  It is also true 
that some of the Warren Court’s search and seizure rulings seem to have 
had the aim of facilitating federal court review of state court rulings.  And it 
is definitely true that the volume of search and seizure cases, and of 
criminal procedure cases more generally, increased markedly as a result of 
the incorporation of the Fourth Amendment and of the other federal 
criminal procedure protections. 
However, the ideological balance of the Court during the sixteen years 
in which Earl Warren served as Chief Justice was not as “liberal” as is 
 
211 Irvine, 347 U.S. at 137 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
212 See LANDYNSKI, supra note 51, at 139 n.88. 
213 People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1955). 
214 See Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 
(1964) (contrasting the “crime control model” which involves substantial deference to and 
trust in law enforcement professionals to the “due process model” which arises from fears of 
errors and excesses and places strong emphasis on compliance with legality criterion).  My 
sense is these “models” of ideological orientations to criminal law and procedure capture the 
salient division of the late twentieth century quite well.  However, I think the simpler 
“conservative” and “liberal” labels are sufficient for present purposes, so I usually use those 
in this Article. 
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sometimes assumed.  As indicated below, a dependable five-vote liberal 
majority existed for only the decisions rendered during the last two years in 
that era, 1968 and 1969.  Likewise, the content of the search and seizure 
rulings was not as one-sided as the conventional wisdom would have it.  In 
fact, several Warren Court rulings expanded police power or confirmed 
expansive police power in significant ways. 
A. THE EARLY WARREN COURT 
The early Warren Court was shaped by five Eisenhower appointments.  
Three of these, Justices Harlan, Stewart, and Whittaker, were Republican 
judges who were elevated from the lower federal courts.  However, Chief 
Justice Warren was appointed at least partly as a result of an arrangement 
he had made with Eisenhower during the 1952 election.215  Additionally, 
Justice Brennan’s appointment seems to have reflected a combination of the 
Eisenhower Administration’s attempt to appeal to urban Catholic voters in 
the upcoming 1956 election and limited ideological vetting by 
Eisenhower’s Attorney General, Herbert Brownell.216  During the latter part 
of the 1950s, the justices continued to divide in search and seizure 
decisions.  However, although the number of cases was still small, 
defendants fared somewhat better, and Truman appointees Justices Clark 
and Burton were often in dissent.217  In particular, the justices continued to 
disagree about whether particular factual allegations constituted “probable 
cause.”  In the 1959 decision Draper v. United States, they ruled six to one 
that an informant’s tip was sufficiently detailed and corroborated by police 
observation to constitute probable cause,218 while in another case decided 
the same year they reiterated that suspicion alone was not enough.219 
 
215 See, e.g., Earl Warren, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE UNITED STATES SUPREME 
COURT 1067-68 (Kermit Hall et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005); see also BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT 
ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 10 (1979) (quoting Eisenhower as 
saying that appointing Chief Justice Warren was “the biggest damned-fool mistake I ever 
made”). 
216 HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS 207-08 (5th ed. 2008); cf. 
HERBERT BROWNELL, ADVISING IKE: THE MEMOIRS OF HERBERT BROWNELL 179-80 (1993). 
217 See Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957) (ruling seven to two that search of 
cabin incident to arrest was excessive); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958) (ruling 
seven to two that failure to knock prior to warrantless entry to arrest was illegal); 
Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958) (ruling six to three that arrest warrant and 
subsequent search incident to arrest were invalid); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 
(1958) (ruling seven to two that daytime search warrant could not justify nighttime execution 
of warrant). 
218 358 U.S. 307, 312-14 (1959). 
219 Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959). 
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The justices made an important innovation in Draper when they 
explicitly stated that the Fourth Amendment’s “probable cause standard” 
was also the constitutional test for assessing the legality of a warrantless 
felony arrest.220  Prior to that ruling (and perhaps because Congress had 
been exceedingly slow to enact warrantless arrest standards for federal 
officers221), the justices had assessed the lawfulness of warrantless arrests 
by applying the law of the applicable state.222  Surprising as it may now 
seem, prior to this time the justices had not actually assessed the 
constitutionality of arrests, but only the constitutionality of searches.223 
The treatment of arrest as a Fourth Amendment issue in its own right 
in Draper was significant insofar as it laid the groundwork for a later 1963 
extension of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to incriminating 
statements that police had obtained as a result of an unconstitutional 
arrest.224  However, the Warren Court’s big innovation was the extension of 
Fourth Amendment protections to state proceedings under the incorporation 
doctrine. 
 
220 Draper, 358 U.S. at 310 (equating “‘probable cause’ within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment, and ‘reasonable grounds’ within the meaning of [the pertinent federal statute 
for warrantless narcotics arrests]”). 
221 Congress finally enacted statutory warrantless felony arrest standards for specific 
categories of federal officers beginning in the 1930s, but did not settle upon probable cause 
standing alone as the standard until amendments made in 1948 and 1950.  See Davies, 
Correcting Search History, supra note 16, at 210-12. 
222 See, e.g., United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 590 (1948) (noting the absence of any 
general statutory standard for warrantless arrests by federal officers). 
223 The concept that an arrest or stop constitutes a “seizure” of a person subject to the 
Fourth Amendment is simply missing from the discussions in the earlier cases.  For example, 
there is no discussion of the legality of the police pulling over the car in the 1949 ruling in 
Brinegar.  Although Justice Rutledge wrote at one point that “[t]he crucial question is 
whether there was probable cause for Brinegar’s arrest,” that may have been a typographical 
error because he did not otherwise discuss the validity of the arrest or the search incident to 
arrest doctrine, but rather upheld the search and seizure of liquor under Carroll’s automobile 
search doctrine and discussed only the constitutionality of the search in the remainder of the 
opinion.  See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 160, 164 (1949).  Likewise, in the 
1950 ruling in Rabinowitz Justice Minton’s opinion discussed the validity of searches 
incident to arrest under the Fourth Amendment and noted that “a search without warrant 
incident to an arrest is dependent initially on a valid arrest,” but never actually assessed the 
constitutionality of the arrest.  See Rabinowitz v. United States, 339 U.S. 56, 60-61 (1950). 
224 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (ruling that statements taken 
during an illegal arrest must be suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree”); see also Fahy v. 
Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963). 
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B. THE “REVOLUTION”: INCORPORATION AND THE FEDERALIZATION 
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
The limitation of the Fourth Amendment to only federal, but not state, 
proceedings had been a source of tension since Weeks itself.225  Indeed, that 
feature of constitutional doctrine had produced the so-called silver platter 
doctrine, which permitted state officers, who had conducted searches that 
would have violated Fourth Amendment standards had they been 
committed by federal officers to nevertheless present their evidence in 
federal criminal trials.226  The Warren Court began the process of 
federalization by curtailing this doctrine. 
In the 1956 decision Rea v. United States,227 the five-to-four majority 
invoked the supervisory power of the Supreme Court to prohibit federal 
officers from presenting evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment in state cases.  A few years later in 1960, and again by a five-
to-four decision, the majority ruled in Elkins v. United States228 that 
evidence obtained by state officers could not be introduced in federal trials 
if the seizure would not have satisfied federal search and arrest standards 
had it been made by federal officers. 
However, language in Justice Stewart’s majority opinion in Elkins 
went considerably beyond the specific issue.  In particular, Justice Stewart’s 
opinion characterized (I think mischaracterized) Justice Frankfurter’s Wolf 
opinion as though it had already made the Fourth Amendment applicable to 
the states.229  Thus, Elkins effectively, though not formally, announced the 
full extension of the Fourth Amendment to the states.230 
 
225 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (noting that the Fourth Amendment 
did not apply to the local policemen who participated in the search of Weeks’s house and 
declining to address any remedies Weeks might have regarding their conduct). 
226 See supra note 166; see also Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79 (1949). 
227 350 U.S. 214 (1956). 
228 364 U.S. 206 (1960); see also Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960). 
229 Elkins, 364 U.S. at 213-14.  However, language in earlier decisions had also asserted 
that Wolf had effectively extended the substance of Fourth Amendment standards to the 
states.  See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 134 (1954) (plurality opinion) (stating that the 
Court had applied “the basic search and seizure protections of the Fourth Amendment” to the 
states in “June of 1949”—that is, in Wolf); Rea, 350 U.S. at 220 (Harlan, J., dissenting) 
(asserting that the “substance” of the constitutional commands in Wolf and Weeks were the 
same). 
230 Because Elkins was a federal case, it could not provide a vehicle for formally 
applying the Fourth Amendment to state proceedings.  The dissenting justices nevertheless 
recognized the broad implications of the decision.  In a memo written to the majority justices 
shortly after Elkins was decided in conference, but before it was announced, the four 
dissenters proposed that the justices should defer a decision on the issue of incorporation and 
instead refer it to an advisory committee on criminal rules.  See Felix Frankfurter, Tom C. 
Clark, John M. Harlan & Charles E. Whittaker, Memorandum to the Majority in the Silver 
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Justice Stewart’s opinion in Elkins also blended the legality and 
deterrence rationales for exclusion with the recognition that exclusion was 
the only feasible response to unconstitutional searches.  Thus he wrote that 
“[t]he rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair.  Its purpose is to deter—to 
compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively 
available way—by removing the incentive to disregard it.”231  
It only remained for the majority justices to find an appropriate case to 
formalize the incorporation of the Fourth Amendment into the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause.  A year later, Mapp v. Ohio232 was 
pressed into serving that purpose.  It was an odd choice, insofar as Mapp 
was briefed and argued as an obscenity prosecution.  Likewise, the winning 
coalition in Mapp was oddly composed.  The opinion was authored by 
Justice Clark, who had been a dissenter in Elkins,233 but did not include 
Justice Stewart, who objected that the Fourth Amendment issue had been 
neither briefed nor argued in Mapp.234  Instead, Justice Clark seems to have 
decided to use Mapp as the vehicle for incorporation after being assigned 
the opinion in the case, and he negotiated to obtain a concurrence from 
Justice Black (apparently without approaching Justice Stewart235), with the 
result that Mapp rested partly on Justice Black’s quixotic version of the 
Fourth Amendment (rooted in Boyd’s historical fiction).236 
 
Platter Cases, (Apr. 13, 1960) (copy on file with author).  The author is indebted to Professor 
Dennis Dorin for providing him with a copy of this memo from the files of Justice Clark. 
231 Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217. 
232 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
233 Justice Clark’s views on incorporation were complex.  As a former attorney general, 
he apparently found the divergence of state and federal standards intolerable.  Thus, in 1956 
he wrote in Irvine that he joined the majority opinion in that case in the hope of forcing a 
reconsideration of Wolf’s rejection of incorporation.  Yet, he dissented in Elkins, and 
generally favored the government in rulings on Fourth Amendment standards.  For an 
attempt to explain Clark’s views on incorporation, see Dennis D. Dorin, “Seize the Time”: 
Justice Tom Clark’s Role in Mapp v. Ohio, in LAW AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 21 (Victoria L. 
Swigert ed., 1982). 
234 367 U.S. at 672 (declining to express an opinion “as to the merits of the constitutional 
issue”).  It seems obvious that Justice Stewart would have supported full incorporation of the 
Fourth Amendment.  Indeed, he said as much in a later commentary.  See Potter Stewart, The 
Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the 
Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1379-80 (1983) 
(stating that “[i]n a way, the Elkins opinion may have made the holding in the Mapp case 
inevitable” because Elkins held “the fourth amendment’s limitations on state governments 
were coextensive with the fourth amendment’s limits on the federal government”). 
235 Justice Stewart later wrote that he was surprised when he read Justice Clark’s draft 
opinion.  See id. at 1368. 
236 Harkening back to Boyd’s formulation, Justice Black insisted that the exclusion of 
evidence seized unconstitutionally in violation of the Fourth Amendment was required by 
2010] CENTURY OF “SEARCH AND SEIZURE” DOCTRINE 983 
Why did Justice Clark seize on Mapp to finalize the incorporation of 
the Fourth Amendment’s protections?  I speculate that Monroe v. Pape237 
may be part of the explanation.238  The justices were considering Monroe in 
the same term that Mapp was decided, and the decision in Monroe was 
announced only a few weeks prior to that in Mapp.  Monroe is the case in 
which the Warren Court revived (some would say reinvented) 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 as a damages remedy for violations of federal constitutional rights 
by state officers.  However, the important point for the present story is that 
Monroe, like Mapp, involved an abusive search of black citizens by white 
police officers.  Indeed, the oppressiveness of the police search and arrest 
without charges in Monroe was considerably more extreme than that in 
Mapp itself.239  Hence, the confluence of racist police abuse in Mapp and 
Monroe may have convinced Justice Clark that it was past time to extend 
federal supervision to state criminal justice—and Mapp, as a state case 
involving an abusive warrantless search, provided the only immediately 
available vehicle for doing so.240  Of course, given the passions that had 
been unleashed by the 1954 school desegregation ruling in Brown v. Board 
of Education,241 it would have served no useful purpose for the justices to 
have presented the ruling in Mapp as a civil rights measure.  Nevertheless, 
the impetus for incorporation in Mapp surely traces back directly to the 
horrors of lynch justice in the Scottsboro Case,242 Brown v. Mississippi,243 
and far too many others.244 
 
the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination.  Mapp, 367 U.S. at 661-63, 
666. 
237 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
238 Another case decided in 1961 may have also played a role in prompting Justice Clark 
to use Mapp to announce incorporation.  In Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381 (1961), the 
justices divided six to three in affirming the dismissal of an injunction barring use of 
evidence seized by federal officers in a state proceeding, but that ruling did not preclude the 
use of an injunction in other cases.  Justice Clark may not have welcomed the prospect of 
further injunction cases. 
239 See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 169 (reciting allegations that thirteen Chicago police officers 
broke into the Monroe’s home in the early morning, routed them from bed, made them stand 
naked in the living room, ransacked every room, emptied drawers and ripped mattress 
covers, and then detained Mr. Monroe incommunicado for ten hours on “‘open’ charges” 
(that is, without any charge) before releasing him). 
240 It may also be that Clark recognized that it could be sometime before a better case 
than Mapp would become available to the justices.  In the absence of a state exclusionary 
rule, state courts would rarely make rulings on the legality of searches for the Court to 
review.  Mapp was unusual insofar as that issue had been argued in the state courts even 
though the Ohio Supreme Court had previously rejected exclusion.  See CAROLYN N. LONG, 
MAPP V. OHIO: GUARDING AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES 15-32 (2006) 
(describing the litigation in the Ohio state courts). 
241 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
242 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (Scottsboro Case). 
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Needless to say, the extension of the Fourth Amendment’s protections 
and its exclusionary rule to state criminal justice proceedings provoked an 
outpouring of academic commentary.  One of the more notable exchanges 
over Mapp occurred in a debate in the Journal, between Northwestern’s 
own Professor Fred Inbau, who opposed the decision,245 and Professor Yale 
Kamisar, who applauded it.246 
The Warren Court’s liberal wing was bolstered in 1962 when Justice 
Goldberg was appointed to the seat vacated by Justice Frankfurter’s 
retirement.  The justices then proceeded to “selectively” incorporate 
virtually all of the criminal procedure provisions of the federal Bill of 
Rights and also undertook to reinforce incorporation by pursuing a variety 
of other strategies for facilitating federal court review of state proceedings.  
The most basic was the announcement of the right to appointed counsel in 
1963 in Gideon v. Wainwright.247  Additionally, the majority enlarged 
federal habeas corpus review of state convictions in the same year in Fay v. 
Noia.248  The Warren Court also underscored that the entire Fourth 
Amendment applied to the states in the 1963 ruling in Ker v. California.249 
The Warren Court also facilitated review of state arrest and search 
warrants by elaborating the prior treatments of probable cause for a warrant 
in the 1964 ruling in Aguilar v. Texas.250  In that six-to-three decision, the 
majority required that when probable cause was to be based on information 
provided by an informant, the warrant affidavit had to provide the issuing 
magistrate with information regarding both the informant’s basis of 
knowledge and the informant’s veracity.251  Because that ruling was 
 
243 297 U.S. 278 (1936). 
244 The association of support for search and seizure restrictions on police with liberal or 
progressive political ideology during the post war period appears to represent virtually a 180 
degree shift from that at the outset of the century of search and seizure doctrine.  During the 
late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, it appears that political progressives tended to 
favor aggressive police action against criminal elements.  See Oliver, supra note 46, at 468-
93 (discussing policing in New York). 
245 Fred E. Inbau, Public Safety v. Individual Civil Liberties: The Prosecutor’s Stand, 53 
J. CRIM L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 85 (1962). 
246 Yale Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individual Liberties: Some “Facts” and “Theories,” 
53 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 171 (1962). 
247 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
248 372 U.S. 391 (1963). 
249 374 U.S. 23 (1963).  However, Ker also demonstrated that some complexities as to 
the relevance of state and federal standards remained. 
250 378 U.S. 108 (1964).  Aguilar developed the earlier warrant probable cause standard 
set out in Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958). 
251 Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114. n.5 (stating that warrant affidavit must inform the magistrate 
“of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the 
narcotics were where he claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from 
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subsequently reiterated and strengthened in 1969 in Spinelli v. United 
States,252 the combined doctrine came to be labeled the Aguilar-Spinelli  
“two-prong” standard for probable cause based on an informant’s tip. 
C. WARREN COURT RULINGS THAT STRENGTHENED OR WEAKENED 
FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS 
Despite Mapp, there still were relatively few search and seizure 
decisions during the early through mid-1960s, and the justices may have 
been more occupied with self-incrimination issues during some of those 
years.253  Moreover, although the justices’ rulings in search and seizure 
cases during this period often favored defendants, the government still won 
a substantial portion of the cases. 
The Harvard Law Review began to annually tabulate Supreme Court 
search and seizure rulings in federal criminal cases decided by opinion in 
1952 and did likewise regarding state criminal cases in 1959.254  Although 
these statistics are sometimes slightly overinclusive for present purposes 
insofar as they can include a few search cases that did not involve Fourth 
Amendment standards themselves,255 and sometimes slightly underinclusive 
insofar as they do not include constructions of Fourth Amendment 
standards in noncriminal cases such as § 1983 lawsuits, they are 
nevertheless quite instructive for present purposes insofar as they include 
all of the decisions that involved the issue of exclusion of evidence.256 
 
which the officer concluded that the [confidential informant] was ‘credible’ or his 
information ‘reliable’”). 
252 393 U.S. 410 (1969). 
253 See, e.g., Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 
1 (1964); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966). 
254 The Harvard Law Review has presented annual statistics breaking down subject 
categories and whether the government party won or lost for federal criminal cases since the 
1951 term and for state criminal cases since the 1958 term.  See the “Statistics” presented in 
the Supreme Court review in each volume.  For simplicity, I depart from the formal dating of 
cases by the “term” in which they were decided (which the Harvard Law Review uses) and 
present them instead by the calendar year in which they were decided.  That discrepancy 
occurs because, although the Supreme Court’s annual term commences in October, virtually 
all of the opinions are released (that is, “decided”) during the spring and early summer of the 
next calendar year.  Note that my choice may occasionally misdescribe a case in the odd 
situation in which a case was actually decided before December 31, but those are fairly rare. 
255 The Harvard statistics also indicate whether search cases involved a constitutional 
issue, but do not link that to the breakdown of the cases the government won or lost.  
256 The statistics reported in this Article combine the “search and seizure” cases from 
federal criminal cases, state criminal cases, and federal and state habeas corpus cases as set 
out in Table 1.  In a few instances in which the Harvard breakdown identifies “exclusionary 
rule” cases distinctly from search and seizure cases, those are also included in the statistics I 
recite. 
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As indicated in Table 1, at the end of this Article, the annual Harvard 
Law Review statistics indicate there were twenty search and seizure rulings 
in criminal cases from 1959 through 1966, of which the government won 
seven and defendants thirteen.  The number of search and seizure rulings in 
criminal cases then spiked to eleven decisions in 1967, of which the 
government won seven.  Thus, from 1959 through 1967, the government 
won fourteen of the thirty-one cases (45%), while defendants won 
seventeen. 
There was a marked change in case outcomes after Justice Thurgood 
Marshall replaced the retiring Justice Clark in October 1967 and provided a 
reliable liberal fifth vote.  Defendants won fourteen of the nineteen cases 
decided in 1968 and 1969, while the government won only five.  However, 
as noted below, that liberal surge was confined to those two final years of 
Earl Warren’s tenure as chief justice. 
1. Decisions that Strengthened Fourth Amendment Protections 
The Warren Court made a number of decisions that strengthened 
Fourth Amendment protections.  Early on, in the 1960 decision Jones v. 
United States,257 the justices unanimously adopted a fairly broad conception 
of the standing required to challenge the legality of police conduct when 
they adopted a rule of automatic standing for defendants in prosecutions for 
possessory offenses.  The justices also ruled in the same case that anyone 
who was legitimately on premises that were subjected to a police intrusion 
possessed standing to challenge the legality of the intrusion.  In the 1963 
decision in Wong Sun v. United States,258 the justices also ruled, five to 
four, that incriminating statements police obtained as a result of an illegal 
arrest were subject to exclusion from evidence as “fruit of the poisonous 
tree”—at least if they were not too attenuated from that illegal conduct.259  
Additionally, in the 1964 ruling in Stoner v. California,260 the justices 
unanimously limited the degree to which the police could rely upon consent 
by ruling that landlords and hotel keepers could not waive the Fourth 
Amendment rights of their tenants. 
The justices also made three important pronouncements in the 1967 
decision in Katz v. United States.261  First, over Justice Black’s dissent, the 
 
257 362 U.S. 257 (1960). 
258 371 U.S. 471 (1963); see also Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963) (ruling that 
the admission of statements obtained by unconstitutional arrests did not constitute harmless 
error). 
259 Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-88. 
260 376 U.S. 483 (1964). 
261 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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justices overruled the 1927 Olmstead decision and the 1942 Goldman 
decision by extending the protections of the Fourth Amendment to private 
conversations.262  Second, Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion formulated 
the revised scope of the Amendment’s protections in terms of a person’s 
“reasonable [or legitimate] expectation of privacy.”263  And, third, the 
justices reaffirmed the importance of the warrant requirement by declaring 
that all warrantless searches were “presumptively unreasonable” and thus 
unconstitutional unless they fell within one of the “few specifically 
established and well-delineated exceptions” to the warrant requirement that 
the Court had already recognized.264 
Several other late Warren Court rulings also indirectly bolstered the 
enforcement of the warrant requirement.  For example, in 1968 in Bumper 
v. North Carolina,265 over the dissent of Justices Black and White, the 
majority placed a boundary on the “consent” justification for a search by 
ruling that a person’s mere acquiescence to an assertion of authority by 
police did not constitute voluntary consent.  Additionally, in the 1969 ruling 
in Chimel v. California,266 and over the same dissent, the majority limited 
the scope of a warrantless search made incident to a lawful arrest in a 
residence to the area in which the arrestee could potentially reach for a 
weapon or evidence.  The majority also enhanced a defendant’s ability to 
contest the legality of searches by ruling in Simmons v. United States267 that 
inculpatory statements made by a defendant to establish his standing during 
a suppression hearing could not be admitted against the defendant at trial. 
However, Chief Justice Warren’s 1968 majority opinion in Terry v. 
Ohio268 produced results that defy easy classification.  On the one hand, 
Terry extended Fourth Amendment protections to a police “stop and frisk” 
practice that was already commonplace in American cites, and thus 
subjected that practice to legal review.  On the other hand, the majority 
invented an entirely new standard commonly referred to as “reasonable 
suspicion”—a lower threshold than probable cause—as the test for the 
constitutional validity of a “stop and frisk.”  And reasonable suspicion did 
 
262 Id. at 352-53. 
263 Id. 
264 Id. at 357.  Justice Stewart’s unpredictability during this period is evident in that fact 
that in the prior term, in Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967), he had joined Justice 
Black’s majority opinion in a five to four decision (liberal justices dissenting) that followed 
Rabinowitz in giving very broad authority for a warrantless police search of an auto being 
“held as evidence” following an arrest for narcotics.  
265 391 U.S. 543 (1968). 
266 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
267 390 U.S. 377 (1968). 
268 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
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not seem to require anything more than an officer’s ability to articulate 
some factual basis for suspicion.  Thus, although the facts in Terry itself 
involved fairly strong grounds for the officer to suspect an armed robbery 
was being planned, and although the justices also attempted to give 
concreteness to the new reasonable suspicion standard by bracketing Terry 
between a decision that found an absence of justification for any police 
detention in Sibron v. New York,269 and another that found sufficient 
“probable cause” for a warrantless arrest in Peters v. New York,270 the new 
standard remained disturbingly formless and potentially permissive. 
2. Pro-Government Decisions 
Other decisions during the Warren Court period favored law 
enforcement.  In particular, Justices Black and White often voted for the 
government in search cases, and they were not infrequently joined by 
Justice Clark (until his retirement at the end of the 1967 cases) as well as 
Justices Stewart and Harlan.  Additionally, the so-called liberal justices also 
voted for the government in a number of cases.  For example, in 1966, 
Justice Brennan authored the five-to-four majority opinion in Schmerber v. 
California,271 which concluded that taking a blood sample from a defendant 
charged with drunk driving without a warrant did not violate either the 
Fourth or Fifth Amendments. 
Additionally, in 1966, the justices overruled one of the more 
significant aspects of the 1921 Gouled decision by allowing an undercover 
agent to make a warrantless entry of a house through deception in Lewis v. 
United States,272 and also upheld the admissibility of the testimony of an 
undercover government informer who gained entry to private conversations 
through deception in Hoffa v. United States.273  A 1967 majority opinion by 
Justice Brennan in Warden v. Hayden274 also overruled the “mere evidence” 
doctrine that had been articulated in Gouled (although it is likely that 
doctrine was largely ignored in practice by that date as lower courts found 
creative ways to bring evidence within the “fruit or instrumentality of 
crime” categories).  More significantly, Hayden also indicated that the 
 
269 392 U.S. 40, 62-66 (1968) (announced the same day as Terry). 
270 392 U.S. 40, 66-68 (1968) (announced the same day as Terry, and decided in the 
same opinion as Sibron). 
271 384 U.S. 757 (1966).  
272 385 U.S. 206 (1966). 
273 385 U.S. 293 (1966). 
274 387 U.S. 294 (1967). 
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justices were prepared to accept a fairly expansive treatment of the “exigent 
circumstances” exception to the search warrant requirement.275 
Several Warren Court rulings also indirectly but significantly 
undermined the protection offered by the warrant requirement.  In the 1960 
ruling in Jones v. United States276 the justices (eight to one) followed 
Brinegar in allowing probable cause to be based on an officer’s recitation of 
hearsay information.  Next, in the 1964 ruling in Rugendorf v. United 
States,277 the Court divided five to four (Chief Justice Warren and Justices 
Douglas, Brennan, and Goldberg dissenting) in upholding the use of 
hearsay to show probable cause for a warrant and also ruling that the 
informants whose information was the basis for probable cause need not be 
produced or even identified to the magistrate who issued the warrant.  Then, 
in a similar five-to-four decision in 1967 in McCray v. Illinois,278 the 
majority further ruled that the identity of the confidential police informant 
whose information was the basis for probable cause for a warrantless arrest 
need not be disclosed to the defendant or court during a pretrial hearing on 
the validity of the arrest and incident search.  These rulings made it 
virtually impossible for a defendant to challenge the veracity of allegations 
attributed to informants in warrant affidavits, and thus eased the way for 
police to meet the Aguilar-Spinelli standard by inventing fictional and 
perjurious allegations.279 
A Warren Court ruling also facilitated warrantless searches of cars.  
Although the justices previously had unanimously ruled that a warrantless 
search of an impounded automobile could not be justified as a search 
incident to arrest,280 they ruled in the 1968 decision Harris v. United 
States281 that discovery of evidence in plain view when an officer opened a 
car door to prepare the auto for impoundment pursuant to police regulations 
did not constitute a “search” to which the Fourth Amendment applied—and 
thus did not require either probable cause or a warrant. 
 
275 Id. at 298-300 (allowing a warrantless search of an entire house, including the 
contents of a washing machine in the basement, for weapons in connection with a 
warrantless arrest for armed robbery made in the house shortly after the report of the 
robbery). 
276 362 U.S. 257 (1960). 
277 376 U.S. 528 (1964). 
278 386 U.S. 300 (1967). 
279 For evidence that the police sometimes resorted to perjury in warrant applications, 
see, e.g., Myron W. Orfield Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An 
Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 95-114 (1992). 
280 Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964). 
281 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968). 
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Additionally, Justice Clark’s 1965 opinion in Linkletter v. Walker282 
seriously undermined the rationale for the exclusionary rule.  The issue in 
the case was whether the ruling in Mapp was to be given retroactive effect.  
Unsurprisingly, the justices were not anxious to make a ruling that risked a 
“wholesale release” of convicted prisoners in states that had not enforced 
search standards prior to Mapp.283  However, instead of simply noting that 
those states had acted in reliance on Wolf, Justice Clark justified ruling 
against retroactivity284 by emphasizing that the purpose of the exclusionary 
rule was to deter future police misconduct, but omitted the legality and 
judicial integrity rationales that had also been attributed to the rule (but that 
arguably supported retroactivity).285  Although a majority of the justices 
later rejected a narrow deterrent conception of the exclusionary rule in the 
1969 ruling in Kaufman v. United States,286 the deterrence formulation in 
Linkletter nevertheless played into the hands of critics of exclusion, such as 
Judge Warren Burger, who were already arguing that exclusion failed as a 
deterrent.287 
However, notwithstanding Linkletter’s embrace of the deterrence 
rationale for exclusion, the Warren Court declined to make a change that 
would have substantially increased the exclusionary rule’s potency as a 
deterrent when the justices declined to broaden the standing required to 
challenge police conduct.  The goal of deterrence obviously is undercut 
when the government can deliberately violate person A’s privacy with 
impunity to gain evidence against person B—which is what the standing 
requirement permits.288  In 1955, the California Supreme Court—alone 
among all the states—had recognized as much by eliminating the standing 
requirement for challenging a search.289  However, in the 1969 ruling in 
 
282 381 U.S. 618 (1965). 
283 Id. at 637. 
284 Justice Clark’s majority opinion in Linkletter conceded that the ruling against 
retroactivity represented a break with the prior understanding that newly recognized 
constitutional standards did apply retroactively.  See id. at 628-29 n.13. 
285 The emphasis on deterrence in Justice Clark’s Linkletter opinion did not entirely 
square with the actual ruling in the case that permitted partial retroactivity by ruling that 
Mapp would not apply to all convictions that were “final” on the date when Mapp was 
announced.  Id. at 639-40.  Thus, Linkletter actually allowed Mapp to be applied to some 
prosecutions in which the police search had occurred prior to the Mapp decision, but in 
which the period for appeal had not expired as of the date of the Mapp decision. 
286 394 U.S. 217 (1969). 
287 See infra notes 303, 333 and accompanying text. 
288 See, e.g., United States v. Payner, 447 US. 727 (1980); see also Amsterdam, supra 
note 5, at 362-72. 
289 People v. Martin, 290 P.2d 855, 857 (Cal. 1955) (ruling that unconstitutionally 
obtained evidence “is inadmissible whether or not it was obtained in violation of the 
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Alderman v. United States,290 the Warren Court declined to follow 
California’s lead.  Although Justices Fortas and Douglas would have 
expanded standing to include a person who was the target of a police 
intrusion, the other justices adhered to the narrower standing rule 
announced in prior cases. 
D. INCORPORATION AND THE POLITICS OF CRIME 
The Warren Court’s “due process revolution” and incorporation 
decisions had effects beyond the regulation of police conduct and the 
resolution of criminal prosecutions themselves.  In retrospect, it appears 
likely that the search and exclusionary rule decisions merged in the public 
mind with the Court’s other criminal procedure rulings, especially Miranda 
v. Arizona,291 that enforced the protections of the Fifth Amendment 
protection against compelled self-incrimination.  And those extensions of 
constitutional protections to street criminals in state prosecutions 
fundamentally changed and intensified the politics of criminal justice. 
Prior to the incorporation doctrine, federal constitutional standards had 
largely applied either to the sorts of white collar crimes that did not overly 
scare or incite the public, or to the alcohol or drug cases that fell within the 
limited reach of federal court jurisdiction.  However, the incorporation 
doctrine of Elkins and Mapp, and the comparable self-incrimination rulings 
in Malloy v. Hogan292 and Miranda, meant that violent street criminals also 
could claim federal constitutional protections.  As a result, the search cases 
that reached the Court were no longer confined to booze, drugs, and white-
collar crimes; now they sometimes also included burglary, armed robbery, 
rape, and murder.293  And the extension of constitutional protections to 
persons accused of violent crimes did incite and scare the public.294 
Moreover, viewed in terms of public acceptance, the timing of the 
Court’s embrace of incorporation was infelicitous at best.  The decade 
 
particular defendant’s constitutional righs”).  Martin was subsequently overruled in In re 
Lance, 694 P.2d 744 (Cal. 1985). 
290 394 U.S. 165 (1969). 
291 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
292 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (incorporating the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-
incrimination). 
293 See, e.g., Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) (armed robbery); Linkletter v. 
Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) (burglary); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (armed 
robbery);  Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) (rape); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 
U.S. 721 (1969) (rape); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969) (second-degree murder); 
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (burglary); Shipley v. California, 395 U.S. 818 
(1969) (robbery); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (armed robbery). 
294 See, e.g., FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 8-25 (1970) (describing 
negative reaction to the Warren Court’s criminal procedure decisions). 
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during which the federal criminal procedure protections were extended to 
state proceedings coincided with what was widely perceived to be an 
unprecedented crime wave, with the emergence of the drug counter-culture, 
with race riots, and with intense political strife over the Vietnam War.  
Additionally, because street crime appears to have been widely perceived 
by white America in terms of race, the backlash against Mapp and Miranda 
probably blended with continuing resentment of Brown v. Board of 
Education and the use of school busing as a remedy for segregated schools.  
In hindsight, it is apparent that the liberal Warren Court majority was far 
more concerned with the rights of criminal suspects than the public.295 
VII. THE LAW-AND-ORDER REACTION AND THE BURGER COURT 
There is a large degree of truth in the cliché that the Supreme Court 
follows the elections.  That is so, of course, because shifts in the Court’s 
membership tend to track presidential elections and presidential agendas.  
However, the accidents or machinations by which vacancies occur (there 
are a number of examples of carefully timed retirements), coupled with 
variations in presidential influence (or lack thereof), means that some 
elections matter more than others.  The 1968 election was hugely important.  
Richard Nixon not only harnessed public opposition to the Warren Court 
when running for the presidency, but was also soon presented with an 
unusual opportunity to remake the high bench.296  Indeed, because President 
Nixon soon had four vacancies to fill on the Court, his election was a 
tipping point for constitutional criminal procedure and especially for search 
and seizure doctrine. 
A. NIXON’S AGENDA AND THE BURGER COURT’S PLUNGE TO THE 
RIGHT 
Chief Justice Earl Warren foresaw the likelihood that Nixon would 
win the November 1968 election.  So, in mid-1968 Chief Justice Warren 
informed President Lyndon Johnson that he would resign from the Court 
when his replacement was confirmed.  President Johnson then nominated 
Justice Fortas to replace Chief Justice Warren, and a Texas crony, Judge 
Homer Thornberry, to take the seat Justice Fortas would be vacating.297  
But Chief Justice Warren had acted too late, and President Johnson’s 
 
295 One indication of public dissatisfaction was the introduction in 1971 in Congress of a 
bill to curtail the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.  See LONG, supra note 240, at 164-
65. 
296 See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 215, at 10. 
297 See Thornberry, William Homer, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 10, at 1019-20. 
2010] CENTURY OF “SEARCH AND SEIZURE” DOCTRINE 993 
decision to elevate Justice Fortas unraveled when Justice Fortas became 
embroiled in a financial scandal that soon forced his resignation from the 
Court.298  The net result was that President Nixon was immediately given 
two vacancies to fill—one of them for chief justice. 
President Nixon then nominated Judge Warren Burger, an outspoken 
critic of the Warren Court’s criminal procedure rulings, to be Chief 
Justice.299  President Nixon also named Judge Harry Blackmun, a personal 
friend of Burger’s, to fill Justice Fortas’s vacant seat.  When Justices Black 
and Harlan both retired shortly before their deaths in the fall of 1971, 
President Nixon had two more vacancies.  After two failed nominations,300 
President Nixon then named Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist, and they 
took their seats midway through the 1971 Term.301  In all of these 
appointments, President Nixon chose nominees known for varying degrees 
of hostility toward the Warren Court’s pro-defendant rulings.  Indeed, one 
insider has reported that President Nixon had two salient criteria for 
appointees: opposition to the Warren Court’s criminal procedure rulings 
and opposition to busing as a remedy for segregated schools.302 
President Nixon’s nominees plainly met the criminal procedure 
criterion.  Chief Justice Burger had gained visibility as an outspoken critic 
of the exclusionary rule.303  Chief Justice Burger apparently vouched for 
Justice Blackmun’s views.304  Although regarded as a political moderate, 
Justice Powell, a former American Bar Association president, was noted for 
speaking “vigorously and emphatically on . . . the necessity for the control 
of crime.”305  And Justice Rehnquist’s opposition to the Warren Court’s 
rulings was also well known in the administration.  In fact, while serving in 
the Justice Department, Rehnquist had written a memorandum that 
 
298 See Fortas, Abe and Fortas Resignation, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 10, at 356-57. 
299 See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 215, at 12, 115. 
300 See, e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 46 (9th ed. 2007) (discussing the 
failed nominations of judges Clement Haynsworth and G. Harrold Carswell). 
301 See Succession of the Justices [table], in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 10, at 1145, 1148. 
302 JOHN W. DEAN, THE REHNQUIST CHOICE 57 (2001); see also id. at 16 (discussing the 
ideological content of “strict constructionism”), 232 (noting potential nominees’ opposition 
to busing), 257 (noting nominees’ views on criminal procedure). 
303 See, e.g., Warren E. Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchmen?, 14 AM. U. L. REV. 1 
(1964) (arguing that the exclusionary rule failed as a deterrent of police illegality); see also 
DEAN, supra note 302, at 12-13. 
304 See DEAN, supra note 302, at 23. 
305 J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, SERVING JUSTICE: A SUPREME COURT CLERK’S VIEW 114 
(1974); see also WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 215, at 161, 163 (noting Powell’s 
membership on Lyndon Johnson’s National Crime Commission and his public support for 
warrantless wiretapping of domestic radicals). 
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advocated the formation of a presidential commission to propose revisions 
of the criminal procedure provisions of the Bill of Rights—an aspect of his 
career that was not disclosed to the Senate during his confirmation 
proceedings.306 
Although the rulings of the Burger Court were not as robustly 
conservative across the board as some expected—indeed, it decided Roe v. 
Wade 307—there was a plunge to the right in criminal procedure, as the four 
Nixon appointees combined with Justice White, and sometimes Justice 
Stewart, to produce a dependable pro-government majority.308  Moreover, 
because prosecutions for possessory offenses almost always involved a 
search and seizure, the so-called war on drugs provided a substantial and 
continuing flow of potential cases.309  The effects of that combination on 
search and seizure were fairly dramatic. 
One effect was a sharp change in the source of the Court’s Fourth 
Amendment cases.  From 1925, when the justices acquired discretion to 
select the cases they would hear through certiorari,310 through the end of the 
Warren Court in 1969, the large majority of search cases the justices 
decided to decide came to the Court as certiorari petitions filed by criminal 
defendants.  However, starting with the 1973 decisions, government 
petitions, often filed by states, became the dominant source of the Court’s 
search and seizure cases.311 
 
306 Rehnquist’s memorandum is discussed in DEAN, supra note 302, at 268-70.  
However, the citation to the location of the document in the National Archives given in 
Dean’s book, id. at 268 n.14, is to an incorrect box number.  The correct location in the 
archives of the Nixon Administration is WHSF: Dean: Box 24: Crime and the Rights of the 
Accused, NARA. 
 Interestingly, Rehnquist’s memorandum is aimed principally at curtailing the Court’s 
rulings regarding police interrogation, but says little regarding search and seizure. 
307 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
308 See WILKINSON, supra note 305, at 147 (observing that although the early Burger 
Court was moderate in other respects, including the protection of criminal trial rights, “[a] 
quite significant change has occurred in those Warren Court cases inhibiting police 
discretion in their hunt for evidence” insofar as Burger Court rulings “broadening police 
search and seizure powers . . . and prosecutors’ use of evidence once thought to be wrongly 
obtained, have primarily been directed toward freeing the hand of official crime detection”). 
309 The federal effort to suppress drug use commenced with the Comprehensive Drug 
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970.  That campaign then took on a more punitive 
character during the 1980s, especially in the Anti-Drug Abuse Acts of 1986 and 1988.  See 
Drugs, Illegal, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN LAW, supra note 198, at 230-31. 
310 See supra note 10. 
311 Using Professor Greenhalgh’s compilation of search and seizure cases decided by the 
Supreme Court (and making occasional adjustments in instances where a case appears to be 
inappropriate for the present inquiry), it appears that during the period 1914 through 1972, 
the Supreme Court decided 117 cases initiated by defendants or other private parties, and 
only fourteen initiated by a government party.  However, from 1973 through 1991 (the last 
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The other and more important effect was a marked shift in case 
outcomes.  As noted above, the annual Harvard Law Review statistics set 
out in Table 1 indicate that government and defendant victories were nearly 
balanced in criminal search and seizure rulings during the eight years 1959 
through 1967.  Then defendants won fourteen of the nineteen cases decided 
in 1968 and 1969, the last two years of the Warren Court.  Defendants still 
won two of the three cases decided in 1970, after Chief Justice Burger took 
his seat.  During that year, the government was victorious in Chambers v. 
Maroney,312 in which the justices nearly unanimously extended the Carroll 
automobile exception to the warrant requirement to a decidedly non-
emergency setting.  However, over Chief Justice Burger’s and Justice 
Black’s dissents, the majority maintained the warrant requirement for a 
house search in Vale v. Louisiana.313 
However, there was a marked change during the next six years, 1971 
to 1976 (that is, beginning with the first year in which both Chief Justice 
Burger and Justice Blackmun participated) when the government won 
twenty-six of the thirty-one criminal search and seizure cases, bringing the 
total for the first seven years of the Burger Court to twenty-seven 
government victories in thirty-four cases (79%).  As these statistical shifts 
indicate, the early Burger Court effectively reversed the effects of the 
incorporation of the Fourth Amendment; instead of requiring state courts to 
apply higher federal standards, the Burger Court majority reached out to 
strike down state rulings that went beyond their view of appropriate federal 
standards. 
Indeed, the conservative majority of the early Burger Court engaged in 
a multi-prong campaign to loosen Fourth Amendment restraints on police.  
For example, the justices upheld warrantless controlled drug buys in which 
the informant wore a wire314 and confirmed that police factual errors that 
were understandable in the circumstances did not defeat probable cause.315  
The new majority also adopted an expansive interpretation of a Terry 
 
year included in the compilation), the Court decided 104 cases initiated by a government 
party (predominantly state governments as opposed to the federal government), and only 
forty-two initiated by a defendant or other private party.  See GREENHALGH, supra note 165, 
at 21-102. 
312 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (applying the Carroll automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement to an auto parked in front of the police station). 
313 399 U.S. 30 (1970) (ruling that a warrantless arrest made outside of the arrestee’s 
house could not justify a search inside the house). 
314 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971). 
315 Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971). 
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frisk316 and expanded the opportunities for police to conduct warrantless 
searches of automobiles.317 
In addition, the majority gave a new twist to “Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness” in United States v. Robinson318 by making police authority 
to search an arrestee’s person and possessions an automatic feature of any 
lawful arrest, regardless of whether there was any indication the arrestee 
was dangerous or whether there was any potential that evidence would be 
found regarding the offense for which the arrest was made.  This shift to the 
use of “reasonableness” rhetoric to justify categorical rules that empower 
government intrusions, rather than the fact-based, case-by-case analyses 
usually associated with that concept, would become a hallmark of the 
conservative drive to expand government search authority.319       
In two other decisions, the new majority also made it easier for police 
to obtain consent for searches—meaning that no further justification would 
be required.  In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,320 the majority ruled that police 
could obtain consent for searches without informing the subject of the 
search of his or her right to refuse consent.  And in Matlock v. United 
States,321 the majority also held that a co-inhabitant could give third-party 
consent for a search of a dwelling.  This expansive interpretation of consent 
 
316 Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) (allowing an officer to approach and frisk 
on the basis of a tip from an informant who had provided incorrect information on prior 
occasions).  
317 Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974). 
318 414 U.S. 218 (1973); see also Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973). 
319 In addition to the categorical treatment of search incident to arrest authority in 
Robinson, this categorical treatment was also evident in the expansion of the Carroll 
automobile search exception to the warrant requirement (discussed supra notes 153-155 and 
accompanying text).  When that doctrine was announced in 1925, prior to advent of police 
radios, police stopping a car were faced with a genuine exigency.  However, that was not the 
case in the 1970 decision involving an automobile parked in front of the police station in 
Chambers (discussed supra note 312 and accompanying text).  In addition, the conservative 
majority expanded the reach of that categorical source of police search authority when they 
applied it to any and all vehicles, including a recreational vehicle used as a residence, in the 
1985 ruling in California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985).  For a more recent example, the 
Court initially approved suspicionless random drug testing of high school students in 
Vernonia School Distict, 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995), in which the high school 
involved was allegedly experiencing an epidemic of student drug use.  Thereafter, however, 
in Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. 
Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002), the majority found it was also reasonable to allow such testing in 
a high school where there was only a potential threat of drug use—which would seem, as a 
practical matter, to categorically permit that practice in every high school.  
320 412 U.S. 218 (1973); see also WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 215, at 270-71 
(reporting that Justice Stewart deliberately delayed circulation of his majority opinion in an 
attempt to foreclose a wider debate among the justices over the Fourth Amendment). 
321 415 U.S. 164 (1974). 
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would prove to be of huge importance—by most estimates the 
overwhelming mass of warrantless police searches are justified on the basis 
of consent.322 
Among the minority of cases that a government party lost, a majority 
of the justices ruled that only a “neutral” magistrate could issue a warrant 
and also placed an outer limit on the application of the search incident to 
arrest doctrine to automobiles in the 1971 ruling in Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire.323  In a case that exhibited patent racial discrimination, the 
justices also struck down a vague vagrancy ordinance that effectively 
created discretionary arrest authority.324 
B. THE EARLY BURGER COURT AND THE INITIAL CURTAILMENT OF 
EXCLUSION 
Of course, abolition of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule 
would have been the most direct way to free law enforcement from arrest 
and search restrictions.  By the early 1970s, several justices had expressed 
an inclination to curtail or abolish the Weeks-Mapp exclusionary rule, and 
that subject had been broached within the Court in 1971 during the 
deliberations in Coolidge v. New Hampshire.325  Chief Justice Burger also 
added to his prior criticisms of the rule326 by calling for replacing exclusion 
with a statutory tort remedy in his 1971 dissenting opinion in Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Federal Agents.327  Justice Blackmun expressed similar 
sentiments.328  Thus, it appeared that the handwriting was on the wall when 
the majority adopted a costs and benefits approach to the exclusionary rule 
in 1974 in United States v. Calandra.329 
 
322 See, e.g., RICHARD VAN DUIZEND ET AL., THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS: 
PRECONCEPTIONS, PERCEPTIONS, AND PRACTICES 19-21 (1984) (quoting a detective’s estimate 
that as many as 98% of warrantless searches are justified by consent). 
323 403 U.S. 443 (1971).  The justices also ruled unanimously that an executive branch 
official’s approval of a domestic electronic surveillance warrant did not meet the “neutral” 
standard in United States v. United States District Court of Eastern District of Michigan, 407 
U.S. 297 (1972), but they permitted a municipal court clerk to issue arrest warrants for 
ordinance violations in Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972). 
324 Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). 
325 See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 215, at 115-19 (noting that Chief Justice 
Burger and Justices Black, Harlan, and White voiced some interest in curtailing exclusion, 
but that it was ultimately decided that Coolidge was not an appropriate occasion). 
326 See supra notes 287, 299, 303 and accompanying text. 
327 403 U.S. 388 (1971); see also WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 215, at 67-69. 
328 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 430 (opining that “for the truly aggrieved person other quite 
adequate remedies [that is, other than exclusion] have always been available,” but not 
identifying those remedies). 
329 414 U.S. 338 (1974). 
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Justice Powell’s majority opinion in Calandra rejected the earlier 
understanding that exclusion of unconstitutionally seized evidence was 
required by the Fourth Amendment itself.330  Instead he announced that the 
exclusionary rule was merely a policy aimed at deterring police from 
committing illegal intrusions in the future, and as such, it should be applied 
only in settings in which the rule’s deterrent benefits exceeded its social 
costs.331  In Calandra itself, the justices voted six to three to withdraw the 
exclusionary rule from grand jury proceedings.332  However, the adoption 
of the deterrence formulation also had a broader implication—it appeared to 
set the stage for the outright abolition of the exclusionary rule. 
Then-Judge Warren Burger had laid out the strategy for justifying 
abolishing the exclusionary rule by labeling it as a failed deterrent as early 
as 1964.333  Academic critics of exclusion had then produced articles 
claiming to offer empirical proof that exclusion failed as a deterrent.334  
Thus, it seemed that the exclusionary rule was ripe for extinction.  Indeed, I 
recall from my student days that Professor Fred Inbau (then affectionately 
known among Northwestern students as “Freddy the Cop”) was so 
confident that the rule would be abolished that he excised most of the 
material on the exclusionary rule from his criminal procedure casebook. 
However, the Burger Court stopped just shy of abolishing the rule in 
two 1976 decisions,335 Janis v. United States336 and Stone v. Powell.337  
 
330 Justice Powell asserted that admission of unconstitutionally seized evidence did not 
constitute a constitutional violation in its own right, because the violation of the Fourth 
Amendment was “fully accomplished” when the unconstitutional search and seizure was 
made, and hence use of that unconstitutionally seized evidence “work[ed] no new Fourth 
Amendment wrong.”  Id. at 354.  That analysis was borrowed, without attribution, from 
People v. Mayen, 205 P. 435 (Cal. 1922) (declining to adopt a state exclusionary rule).  See 
supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
331 Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348-52. 
332 Prior to Calandra, it was understood that the exclusionary rule prohibited the use of 
unconstitutionally seized evidence in all proceedings.  See supra note 135 and accompanying 
text. 
333 See supra note 303. 
334 See Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 665 (1970); James E. Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the 
Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 243 (1973). 
335 The Court actually granted certiorari in a third exclusionary rule case, Colorado v. 
Quintero, No. 82-1711.  However, the case was mooted when the petitioner died prior to 
argument.  Because that case involved the issue of suppression of evidence in a violent crime 
prosecution, it was widely thought at the time that it presented opponents of the rule with the 
most attractive vehicle for announcing the abolition of exclusion. 
336 428 U.S. 433 (1976).  Janis limited an earlier ruling that exclusion did apply in 
criminal forfeiture proceedings.  See One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 
696 (1965). 
337 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
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Although the academic claims that the rule failed as a deterrent had been 
deflated by other commentaries,338 it appears that Justice Powell simply 
balked at taking the extreme step of outright abolition.339 
Instead, the majority justices settled for a patently non-behavioral, 
split-the-difference approach to “deterrence”; namely, they would continue 
to assume that exclusion had some deterrent effect when unconstitutionally 
seized evidence was excluded from the prosecutor’s case-in-chief in a 
criminal trial, but would also assume that there would be no “additional” 
deterrent benefit from suppressing evidence in other procedural settings.  
Thus, in Janis the majority withdrew the rule from a civil tax proceeding 
that paralleled a criminal prosecution (even though “the civil proceeding 
served as an adjunct to the enforcement of the criminal law”340), and in 
Stone the majority generally barred review of state search rulings in federal 
habeas corpus proceedings, and thus drastically reduced the potential for 
federal court review of state rulings.341 
Moreover, the majority’s stance in Janis and Stone portended that 
exclusion would also be withdrawn from every procedural setting except 
the prosecutor’s case-in-chief in a criminal trial—and that is what 
subsequently occurred.  In later decisions the continuing conservative 
majority permitted use of unconstitutionally obtained evidence to impeach a 
defendant who testified in a criminal trial342 (but not to impeach other 
 
338 See Bradley C. Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health?  Some New Data 
and a Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 KY. L.J. 681 (1973) (reporting a variety of 
indications that the threat of exclusion improved police behavior, for example by increasing 
use of warrants and increasing training); Thomas Y. Davies, Critique: On the Limitations of 
Empirical Evaluations of the Exclusionary Rule: A Critique of the Spiotto Research and 
United States v. Calandra, 69 NW. U. L. REV. 740 (1974) (criticizing the Oaks and Spiotto 
studies and arguing that it was not feasible to validly measure the deterrent effect of 
exclusion on police conduct). 
339 See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 215, at 429-30. 
340 Janis, 428 U.S. at 463 (Stewart, J., dissenting).  It seems likely that the civil tax 
penalty in Janis of $89,026.09, id. at 437 (majority opinion), was at least as important to the 
government as the criminal prosecution. 
341 During the “due process revolution,” the Warren Court expanded the potential for 
federal court review of state criminal convictions by expanding the reach of federal habeas 
corpus review.  See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). Thereafter, state search rulings 
could be challenged in habeas corpus proceedings in the lower federal courts, as well as in 
petitions for certiorari to the Supreme Court.  After Stone, however, the only path for federal 
review of a state search ruling is a certiorari petition to the Supreme Court following 
appellate review by the state courts themselves. 
342 United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980) (permitting use of unconstitutionally 
seized evidence for impeachment whenever the defendant testified in his own defense at 
trial).  The Warren Court had previously allowed a narrower use of unconstitutionally seized 
evidence to impeach a defendant who had specifically testified that he had not possessed the 
suppressed item.  Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).  
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defense witnesses343), and also permitted use of unconstitutionally seized 
evidence in deportation proceedings.344 
Lower courts then also invoked the Calandra-Janis-Stone formula to 
permit the government to freely use unconstitutionally obtained evidence in 
preliminary hearings, bail proceedings, sentencing proceedings, and parole 
revocation proceedings.345  As a result, because few criminal prosecutions 
are actually disposed of by trial, prosecutors can now freely use 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence in the mass of criminal justice 
settings, which are typically crucial in the disposition of criminal charges.  
Hence, notwithstanding their use of “deterrence” rhetoric, the message that 
the Burger Court majority actually sent to police officers and prosecutors in 
Calandra, Janis, Stone, and their progeny was that unconstitutional 
searches would likely pay off for the government.346 
C. THE HIATUS IN THE CONSERVATIVE RULINGS AND THE 
REINFORCEMENT OF THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT 
The fact that the exclusionary rule escaped outright abolition in the 
1976 cases may also reflect the indirect moderating influence of the 
Watergate scandal.347  Indeed, Watergate had one important specific 
effect—it meant that President Gerald Ford, the only unelected president in 
the nation’s history, had little choice but to avoid an ideological fight when 
Justice Douglas was finally persuaded to retire in late 1975.  So President 
 
343 James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307 (1990). 
344 INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984). 
345 See 1 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE: INVESTIGATION 387 (4th ed. 2006) (reviewing lower court rulings removing the 
exclusionary rule from various proceedings). 
346 Not surprisingly, the decidedly arbitrary and non-data-based treatment of “deterrence” 
in the 1976 decisions discouraged and effectively ended attempts to measure the 
exclusionary rule’s deterrent efficacy.  See Davies, supra note 204, at 632-34. 
347 It seems likely that the continuing fallout from the Watergate scandal—which was 
widely perceived as an abuse of executive power by the Nixon administration, and which 
arose from an unlawful search of a political office by persons connected to the 
administration—may have made 1976 an infelicitous time to remove one of the most visible 
checks on governmental abuse of power.  The Watergate burglary occurred in June 1972, a 
few months before Nixon’s reelection in November of that year.  In March 1973, one of the 
burglars implicated high White House officials, including Attorney General John Mitchell.  
In July 1973, the existence of White House tapes came to light, and in December 1973 the 
infamous eight-and-a-half minute gap was discovered.  Litigation over the tapes then 
reached the Supreme Court, which ordered Nixon to turn them over to the special prosecutor 
on July 24, 1974.  Nixon resigned in disgrace on August 9, 1974, and Gerald Ford, who then 
assumed the presidency, gave Nixon a full pardon shortly thereafter.  See Pardon Power, in 
THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 10, at 
718, 719.   
2010] CENTURY OF “SEARCH AND SEIZURE” DOCTRINE 1001 
Ford nominated a moderate Republican, Judge John Paul Stevens, to that 
vacancy.348 
Justice Stevens’s appointment had no immediate effect on 1976 search 
rulings, during which the government won all six cases.349  One of those 
cases, the ruling in South Dakota v. Opperman,350 which endorsed a broad 
warrant exception for inventory searches of impounded automobiles on the 
basis of the government’s administrative interests, would become a major 
exception to the warrant requirement as it was applied expansively in later 
cases.351 
However, something of a hiatus in the law-and-order tilt occurred 
during the five years 1977 through 1981, when the government won 
seventeen criminal search and seizure cases but defendants also won 
seventeen.  During this period, Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and especially 
Stevens sometimes voted with the two remaining liberals—Justices 
Brennan and Marshall.  Some of the pro-defendant decisions were 
noncontroversial and even unanimous: for example, in Connally v. 
Georgia352 the justices ruled that warrants could not be issued by 
magistrates who were paid a fee for doing so; in Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New 
York353 the justices condemned a magistrate’s personal participation in a 
search conducted under a still blank warrant; and in Brown v. Texas354 they 
ruled that a person could not be seized by police simply for refusing to 
identify themselves.  Other rulings that went against the government were 
divided.  For example, in 1979, the justices ruled six to two in Dunaway v. 
New York355 that “pick[ing] up” a suspect and taking him to the police 
 
348 See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 215, at 400-01. 
349 See infra Table 1.  Casting a wider net than the six criminal search cases themselves, 
Justice Brennan identified a total of nine government search victories during that term that 
contributed to the “continuing evisceration of the Fourth Amendment.”  See United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 567 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
350 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (permitting warrantless inventory search of impounded car for 
safety and administrative reasons, and thus deeming that there need be no showing of 
probable cause). 
351 The Burger Court also used the same safety/administrative rationale when it endorsed 
inventory searches of the person and possessions of arrestee in Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 
640 (1983).  In addition, in the 1983 decision Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983), the 
Burger Court permitted an inventory search of an auto to be conducted at the scene of an 
arrest that followed a stop at a driver’s license checkpoint, and in the 1987 decision 
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987), the Rehnquist Court subsequently upheld an 
inventory search of an auto conducted at the scene of an arrest under police regulations that 
allowed police to choose to either impound or simply park the vehicle. 
352 429 U.S. 245 (1977). 
353 442 U.S. 319 (1979). 
354 443 U.S. 47 (1979). 
355 442 U.S. 200 (1979). 
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station without probable cause constituted a de facto unconstitutional arrest.  
Additionally, in a 1979 ruling of continuing significance the justices ruled 
six to three in Ybarra v. Illinois356 that a search warrant did not authorize 
the search of everyone who was simply present in the premises when the 
warrant was executed. 
The most important ruling that strengthened Fourth Amendment 
protections during this period was the 1980 ruling in Payton v. New York.357  
The Burger Court had previously ruled in the 1976 decision in United 
States v. Watson358 that a warrantless felony arrest based on probable cause 
could be made in any place accessible to the public.  Conversely, in 1978, 
the justices had also rejected creation of a “murder scene” exception to the 
search warrant requirement for a house search.359  The issue in Payton was 
whether police with probable cause could justify a warrantless entry of a 
residence to make a felony arrest.  The justices ruled six to three that, in the 
absence of consent or emergency circumstances, warrantless entry of a 
residence to make an arrest violates the Fourth Amendment regardless of 
the police having probable cause to support the arrest.  The importance of 
the warrant was similarly underscored a year later in Steagald v. United 
States,360 when the majority further ruled that a search warrant for the 
person to be arrested (not just an arrest warrant) was required to enter a 
house, other than the residence of the wanted suspect, to make an arrest.361 
Nevertheless, the government still won its share of contested cases 
during these years.  For example, in 1978 a six-to-two majority adopted 
“attenuation” analysis in the course of refusing to suppress the testimony of 
a witness whose identity was discovered unconstitutionally.362  In addition, 
in the 1978 ruling in Rakas v. Illinois363 a five-to-four majority invoked the 
reasonable expectation of privacy formulation to strip passengers in an auto 
of standing to challenge a search of the auto.  The majority also used the 
same rationale to impose strict standing requirements in three 1980 
decisions.364 
 
356 444 U.S. 85 (1979). 
357 445 U.S. 573 (1980). 
358 423 U.S. 411 (1976). 
359 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978). 
360 451 U.S. 204 (1981). 
361 The showing of probable cause required for a search warrant is more demanding than 
that for an arrest warrant insofar as it requires information indicating that the person to be 
arrested would be found at a particular location in addition to information indicating that the 
person to be arrested was involved in criminal activity. 
362 See, e.g., United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978). 
363 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
364 Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 
(1980); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980). 
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Additionally, in the 1981 ruling in New York v. Belton,365 a six-to-three 
majority again took a categorical approach to Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness and extended the bright-line automatic search incident to 
arrest rule previously announced in Robinson to include the passenger area 
of an auto in which an arrestee had been riding.  Even so, a knowledgeable 
commentator suggested in 1982 that the Burger Court’s rulings in criminal 
procedure cases had not turned out to be as different from those of the 
Warren Court as might have been expected.366  But that was about to 
change. 
D. THE LATER BURGER COURT’S RENEWED CAMPAIGN TO LOOSEN 
FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS 
There were no vacancies on the Court during President Jimmy Carter’s 
single term—thus, his was an election that the Court did not follow.  In 
contrast, President Ronald Reagan had a vacancy almost at the outset of his 
term when Justice Stewart retired in 1981.  In line with a campaign pledge, 
President Reagan named the first woman to the Court, Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor. 
Justice O’Connor’s arrival provided a striking demonstration of the 
potential importance of the fifth vote.  Where Justice Stewart had 
sometimes sided with defendants, Justice O’Connor leaned strongly toward 
the government in search cases.  Indeed, whatever might be said of Justice 
O’Connor’s moderation in other areas, during the late Burger Court she 
provided a reliable fifth vote for the law-and-order majority (along with 
Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Powell, and Rehnquist).  Thus, 
there was another plunge to the right as the government won thirty of thirty-
seven search and seizure cases (81%) decided in the years 1982 through 
1986.367 
One development was that the conservative majority continued to use 
the Katz “reasonable [or legitimate] expectation of privacy” formulation as 
a way to justify narrowing rather than expanding the scope of Fourth 
Amendment protections.  In the seven-to-two decision in 1976 in United 
States v. Miller368 and in the five-to-three decision in 1979 in Smith v. 
Maryland,369 a majority of the justices had ruled that bank records and 
 
365 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
366 See Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was It Really So Defense-Minded?), The 
Burger Court (Is It Really So Prosecution-Oriented?), and Police Investigatory Practices, in 
THE BURGER COURT, THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN’T 62 (Vincent Blasi ed., 
1983).  This book went to press in late 1982.  See id. at 284 n.120. 
367 See infra Table 1. 
368 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
369 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
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phone company records of numbers that had been dialed from a phone were 
exempt from Fourth Amendment protection because the complaining party 
had exposed that information to others and thus had assumed the risk that 
the information could be provided to the government.  The conservative 
majority then used that same rationale as the basis for ruling that the Fourth 
Amendment did not apply to police surveillance from overhead by airplane 
or helicopter because defendants had left their properties exposed to 
observation from above.370  Likewise, they ruled that the Amendment did 
not apply to police inspection of garbage left out for the garbage 
collector.371  The majority also ruled that tracking a person’s movement on 
public roads by using a helicopter to follow an electronic beeper did not 
constitute a “search,”372 and that planting such a beeper in a container that a 
person was expected to purchase so that it could be followed also did not 
constitute a “seizure.”373 
Additionally, although the justices reaffirmed that one could have a 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” in a house and the “curtilage” around it, 
they ruled that there could never be a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
“open fields” (even if they were fenced and posted against trespassing).374  
Notably, however, the majority seemed unconcerned with providing police 
with meaningful guidance when it later announced a highly flexible four-
factor definition of “curtilage.”375  “Deterrence” seems to have mattered to 
the majority primarily when that concept was useful as a rationale for 
withdrawing the exclusionary rule, not when it came to formulating search 
standards that would actually protect privacy from police intrusions. 
The justices also significantly limited the reach of Fourth Amendment 
protections when they declared in 1983 in United States v. Place376 that an 
inspection of luggage by a trained police drug-detecting dog was not a 
“search” for Fourth Amendment purposes because the dog’s sniff would not 
detect anything but contraband, and no one could have a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in forbidden items.377  Thus, police can randomly 
subject persons, luggage, or automobiles to a drug dog’s sniff—because the 
sniff is not regarded as a “search,” no Fourth Amendment or other 
constitutional standards apply. 
 
370 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (airplane); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 
(1989) (helicopter). 
371 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988). 
372 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
373 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
374 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984). 
375 United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987). 
376 462 U.S. 696 (1983). 
377 See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984). 
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There was a particularly notable spike of conservative activism during 
the years 1983 through 1985 when the Court ruled for the government in 
twenty-four of thirty criminal search cases.378  Many of the pro-government 
decisions during these years further developed limits on Fourth Amendment 
protections, or on enforcement of such protections, that the conservative 
justices had previously staked out.  For example, the five-to-four ruling in 
1983 in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons379 followed earlier Burger Court 
decisions in refusing to allow the use of an injunction to curb police use of a 
chokehold on motorists stopped for traffic infringements.380  Thus, that 
alternative to enforcing the Fourth Amendment through exclusion was 
effectively barred. 
The conservative majority also took two huge steps toward minimizing 
the significance of the Fourth Amendment by eviscerating the probable 
cause standard in the 1983 ruling in Illinois v. Gates,381 and then by 
effectively relaxing even that minimal probable cause standard for issuance 
of a warrant a year later in United States v. Leon.382  Indeed, those two 
interrelated decisions epitomize the aggressive search and seizure agenda of 
the late Burger Court. 
1. The Evisceration of Probable Cause in Gates 
The justices initially granted certiorari in Gates to assess whether there 
had been probable cause for the search warrant for drugs issued in that case.  
The information for probable cause consisted of an anonymous tip and 
police attempts to corroborate aspects of the tip.  Because the police did not 
know the identity of the informant,383 there was no direct way to satisfy the 
“informant-veracity” prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli standard.384  Moreover, 
the anonymous tip lacked basic information such as the specific address of 
the alleged drug dealers, and when police attempted to corroborate the 
informant’s predictions they found the tip was erroneous in significant 
 
378 See infra Table 1. 
379 461 U.S. 95 (1983). 
380 See O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).  
However, the Burger Court did endorse issuance of an injunction barring enforcement of a 
statute that authorized warrantless inspections of a business in Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 
436 U.S. 307, 325 (1978). 
381 462 U.S. 213 (1983). 
382 486 U.S. 897 (1984). 
383 Gates, 462 U.S. at 225 (noting that the tip was anonymous).  Subsequent to the Gates 
decision I was told, by persons in a position to know, that the informant was actually the 
hairdresser of Sue Gates.  She identified herself to the police department after reading about 
the case in the newspapers.  Apparently, she provided the tip because she was irritated by 
Sue Gates’s bragging about not having to work. 
384 See supra notes 250-252 and accompanying text. 
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ways.385  Because of those weaknesses, the Illinois Supreme Court had 
found a lack of probable cause.386 
However, after the oral argument at the Supreme Court—and possibly 
because of the difficulties involved in attempting to rationalize a finding of 
probable cause—the conservative majority took an unusual step.  With 
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens in dissent, the majority sua sponte 
ordered reargument in Gates on a different issue—whether there should be 
a “good faith mistake” exception to the exclusionary rule.387 
Proposals for a “good faith mistake” or “good faith” exception to the 
exclusionary rule gained prominence after the justices refused to totally 
abolish the exclusionary rule in the 1976 decisions.388  Justice Rehnquist 
initially sketched out a rationale for such an exception in opinions in 1974 
and 1975 that dealt with the narrow situation in which police officers had 
followed current law when making an arrest or search only to have the legal 
standard overturned in another case prior to trial.389  However, the “good 
faith” proposal was then broadened out, partly along the lines of the Burger 
Court’s invention and expansion of the doctrine of qualified immunity for 
alleged violations of constitutional rights by officials and officers in § 1983 
lawsuits.390  Boiled down to its essence, the proposal for a good faith 
 
385 The tip simply identified the address as being in a set of condominiums, but gave no 
number.  See Gates, 462 U.S. at 225.  That lack of detail indicated that it was unlikely the 
informant had been in the residence.  In addition, the tip predicted a travel arrangement 
whereby one of the Gateses would always be in the residence, which supposedly held a large 
amount of drugs.  Id.  However, police observation indicated that Sue Gates was actually in 
Florida when Lance Gates arrived there.  Id. at 226.  That effectively undermined the tip’s 
claim of a large amount of drugs in the residence.  See id. at 291-92 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
386 Id. at 216-17. 
387 See Order for Reargument, Illinois v. Gates, 459 U.S. 1028 (Nov. 29, 1982).  Justice 
White was the likely proponent of taking up the good faith issue in Gates.  In a concurring 
opinion, he endorsed the good faith exception proposal, but then asserted that probable cause 
could be found under the existing Aguilar-Spinelli standard. 
388 Although the 1976 rulings in Janis and Stone were widely viewed as having settled 
the issue, members of the Court persisted in calling for abolition of the exclusionary rule.  
See California v. Minjares, 443 U.S. 916, 928 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial 
of stay); see also Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 437 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
389 See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 539 (1975); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 
433, 447 (1974); see also WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 215, at 383-84 (noting the 
reaction within the Court when Rehnquist’s Peltier opinion went beyond the narrow 
retroactivity issue itself); Francis A. Allen, Foreword—Quiescence and Ferment: The 1974 
Term in the Supreme Court, 66 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 391, 397-98 (1976) (criticizing 
Peltier on this point). A similar retroactivity issue was also addressed in Michigan v. 
DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979). 
390 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (creating qualified immunity for high state 
executive officials); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (extending qualified 
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exception rested on the unsupported assertion that most illegal searches 
were the result of police errors that occurred because of the confused state 
of doctrine.  Advocates of the exception asserted that “good faith” police 
mistakes in applying Fourth Amendment standards were not susceptible to 
deterrence (though in my view none ever provided a plausible explanation 
why that should be so391). 
To say that the good faith exception proposal generated a massive law 
review commentary would be an understatement.  The Journal published 
articles by proponents of the exception392 and defenders of exclusion.393  
Additionally, several bills proposing such an exception were introduced in 
Congress, as politicians vied for a “tough against crime” reputation.394  
However, the Supreme Court passed up opportunities to take up the 
issue.395  In fact, the justices even denied a pre-briefing motion by Illinois to 
add the good faith exception issue to the grant of certiorari in Gates.396  
Nevertheless, the order for reargument seemed to set the stage for the 
conservative majority to adopt the good faith exception in Gates.  In fact, 
shortly after the order for reargument was issued, the Reagan Justice 
Department unveiled a new report that purported to prove that the 
 
immunity to other executive officials); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986) (extending 
qualified immunity to police officers accused of improperly obtaining arrest warrants). 
391 The proposal for a good faith mistake exception was presented rhetorically as though 
it were shaped by deterrence considerations but actually conflated a notion of fairness to the 
police with the behavioral implications of exclusion.  In particular, the proposal ignored the 
point that deterrence is forward-looking; hence, as a behavioral matter it would make no 
difference whether the prior illegal conduct was deliberate or accidental, because either case 
would provide an educational opportunity for the Court to convey to police departments and 
law enforcement officers that there will be adverse consequences if the conduct is repeated 
in the future. 
392 See, e.g., Edna F. Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth Amendment: The “Reasonable” 
Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 635 (1978); D. Lowell 
Jensen & Rosemary Hart, The Good Faith Restatement of the Exclusionary Rule, 73 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 916 (1982); James R. Thompson, Foreword—Remarks by Governor 
James. R. Thompson on the Attorney General’s Task Force on Violent Crime, 73 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 867 (1982). 
393 See, e.g., Pierre J. Schlag, Assaults on the Exclusionary Rule: Good Faith Limitations 
and Damage Remedies, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 875 (1982). 
394 See id. at 875 n.2 (listing bills introduced in Congress in 1981 and 1982 proposing to 
adopt various forms of “good-faith exceptions”). 
395 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 339 
U.S. 1127 (1981). 
396 See Illinois v. Gates, 455 U.S. 986 (Mar. 1, 1982) (denying motion by Petitioner 
Illinois moved to enlarge the question presented for review, filed Feb. 8, 1982); see also 
Illinois v. Gates, 459 U.S. 1028, 1029 (Nov. 29, 1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting from order for 
reargument). 
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exclusionary rule caused a major “loss” of criminal prosecutions in 
California397 (but did so only by grossly distorting the data398). 
However, the majority justices had been so eager to take up the 
exception issue that they had overlooked some rather basic aspects of the 
record in Gates.399  In particular, the good faith exception issue had not 
been argued in the Illinois courts, probably because an Illinois statute, 
quoted in the defendants’ brief, expressly required suppression of any 
evidence seized pursuant to a warrant issued without probable cause.400  
Thus, if there was no probable cause for the search warrant, there was an 
undeniable independent and adequate state ground for affirmance of the 
Illinois Supreme Court’s ruling regardless of any exception to the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule the justices might wish to announce.401  
Conversely, if the majority found there was probable cause, then the search 
was legal and there was no occasion to address any “exception” to 
exclusion.402  In view of these difficulties—but without mentioning the 
 
397 See NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, THE EFFECTS OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE: A STUDY IN 
CALIFORNIA (1982) (commonly referred to as the “NIJ Study”). 
398 See Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) 
About the “Costs” of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of “Lost” 
Arrests, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. [renamed LAW & SOC. INQUIRY] 611 (presenting a 
detailed criticism of the distortions in the NIJ study and contrasting those claims to the much 
lower effects reported in a number of other studies). 
399 One peculiarity was that there had been no factual findings about why the police acted 
as they did in Gates—in fact, no police officer had testified during the suppression hearing in 
the case, which had consisted solely of legal arguments regarding the sufficiency of the 
warrant affidavit itself. 
400 ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, par. 114-12 (1976), discussed and quoted in Brief of 
Respondents at 24-26 app. 1a-2a, Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).  Illinois was among 
the states that adopted a state exclusionary rule prior to Mapp.  See People v. Brocamp, 138 
N.E. 728, 732 (Ill. 1923). 
401 See, e.g., Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 334, 446 (1965) (discussing the independent 
and adequate state ground for affirmance doctrine). 
402 Whether from embarrassment or for strategic reasons, Justice Rehnquist’s Gates 
opinion omits any mention of the Illinois statute.  However, its significance was plain during 
the second Gates oral argument, at which I was present because I had assisted with the 
defendant’s brief.  Extended time (forty-five minutes to each side) had been set for the 
reargument, but soon after it began, Justice Powell asked the attorney representing Illinois if 
Illinois required exclusion by state law.  When the attorney conceded as much the justices 
were seen to lean back in their chairs and begin reading other materials.  There were only a 
few polite questions from the bench during the remainder of the state’s argument.  Justice 
Stevens asked the Solicitor General, Rex Lee, appearing as an amicus, how the Court was 
supposed to reach the exclusionary rule issue.  Lee did not provide an answer.  There were 
virtually no questions for the defendant’s attorney, and after a while he simply stopped 
reciting nice things that had been said about the exclusionary rule.  The result was that what 
had been billed as the search argument of the decade became merely a peculiar nonevent.  
See, e.g., Jim Mann, A Change of Heart at the High Court, AM. LAW., May 1983, at 91, 91-
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Illinois statute—the majority justices set aside the good faith exception 
issue with “apologies to all,” and returned to issue of whether the warrant 
was supported by probable cause.403  The Gates majority then declared the 
warrant valid by gutting the probable cause standard. 
Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion threw out the Aguilar-Spinelli 
two-prong standard for assessing probable cause on an informant’s tip and 
instead adopted a flexible “totality of the circumstances” approach to 
assessing probable cause.404  But it did not stop there.  Justice Rehnquist’s 
opinion also ignored the settled definition of probable cause that had been 
followed since the framing era—that is, reliable information sufficient to 
justify a prudent person in believing there was criminal activity.405  Instead, 
and without ever even mentioning that traditional definition, Justice 
Rehnquist opined that information merely indicating a “fair probability” or 
“substantial chance” of criminal activity would suffice for probable 
cause.406 
Even Justice White expressed concern that the new definition 
threatened to “eviscerate” the probable cause standard.407  Indeed, after 
Gates there was little if any discernible difference between “probable 
cause” and Terry’s “reasonable suspicion” standard—except that the latter 
was supposed to be less demanding than the former.  After Gates, “probable 
cause” meant something more like “possible cause”—and that relaxed 
standard applied to warrantless arrests and searches as well as issuance of 
warrants. 
 
92 (describing the Gates reargument as one in which the justices “seemed to be stricken by 
an epidemic of acute indifference”). 
 As a sidenote, the Illinois statute that required exclusion must have been an 
embarrassment for then Illinois Governor James Thompson, who was a prominent advocate 
for a good faith exception.  The statute was amended in 1987 to include a “good faith” 
exception to exclusion.  See 75 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/114-12 (b). 
403 Gates, 462 U.S. at 217. 
404 Some courts and commentators initially resisted the conclusion that the Aguilar-
Spinelli standard had been completely overruled, but the justices confirmed its complete 
extinction a year later in a per curiam decision in Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727 
(1984). 
405 Probable cause was defined in the 1949 Brinegar decision as “reasonably reliable 
information sufficient to warrant a prudent man in the belief that criminal activity was 
occurring.”  That definition was not novel, Chief Justice Taft had given virtually the same 
definition in 1925 in Carroll, and the definition effectively was rooted in framing era law.  
See supra notes 156, 194 and accompanying text. 
406 Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 244 n.13, 246 (emphasis added).  Justice Rehnquist purported 
to follow the treatment of probable cause in an 1813 customs forfeiture proceeding.  Id. at 
235.  However, Justice Rehnquist did not identify the nature of that case, but simply 
described it as a treatment of probable cause “in a closely related context.”  Id.  See also 
Davies, Probable Cause, supra note 16, at 62. 
407 Id. at 272 (White, J., concurring). 
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The majority’s inability to adopt the good faith mistake exception in 
Gates quickly led to two further developments.  One was that that the Gates 
majority exposed its disdain for federalism in criminal procedure by 
preemptively hobbling the independent and adequate state ground doctrine 
in another opinion announced in the same term.408  Thus the majority made 
sure that it would not again be stymied as it had been in Gates.  The other 
development was that, only two and one-half weeks after announcing 
Gates, the justices granted certiorari to again take up (and this time adopt) a 
“good faith” exception in Leon.409 
2. The Adoption of the Blame-the-Magistrate  
Exception to Exclusion in Leon 
There was never any suspense about the direction of the ruling that the 
justices would announce in Leon.  As expected, Justice White’s majority 
opinion brushed aside the strong likelihood that the warrant at issue in Leon 
was actually valid under the relaxed fair probability standard adopted in 
Gates,410 and marched on to endorse the good faith mistake exception.411  
However, the scope of the exception announced in Leon was significantly 
narrower than the more abstract exception for police good faith advocated 
for in Gates. 
In particular, the exception announced in Leon was focused 
specifically on police reliance on a judicially issued (albeit 
unconstitutional) warrant.  Indeed, although couched in Calandra’s cost-
 
408 Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1037-44 (1983).  For an example of this effect, see 
the broad application of Long in Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 36-38 (1996). 
 The Burger Court majority’s disregard for state courts was also evident in another aspect 
of Gates.  Justice Rehnquist’s opinion directed courts reviewing the adequacy of the showing 
of probable cause for a warrant to “pa[y] great deference” to the judgment of the magistrate 
who issued the warrant.  See Gates, 462 U.S. at 236 (citing United States v. Ventresca, 380 
U.S. 102 (1965)).  Whether a state court is permitted to defer to a state magistrate who issues 
a warrant may be a matter of federal law.  However, whether a state reviewing court should 
nevertheless exercise de novo, nondeferential review of decisions made by a state magistrate 
in granting a warrant would seem to be an appropriate decision for the state to make. 
409 United States v. Leon, 463 U.S. 1206 (June 27, 1983) (granting certiorari).  Gates was 
decided on June 8, 1983. 
410 The warrant in Leon was ruled deficient, prior to the Gates decision, because the 
probable cause for the search warrant was based on “stale” information.  See United States v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 903 n.2 (1984).  However, the “fair probability” version of probable 
cause announced in Gates would seem to allow more leeway in that regard. 
411 The ruling in Leon also had virtually no effect on the disposition of the prosecutions 
in question because, as Justice White noted, evidence seized from the various defendants 
could be used against their co-defendants in any event because they each lacked standing to 
challenge the evidence found during the searches of the other defendants’ houses or cars.  Id. 
at 903 n.3. 
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and-benefit rhetoric,412 the rationale Justice White offered for the Leon 
exception took the form of a blame-the-magistrate syllogism composed of 
two false dichotomies.  His major premise was that the exclusionary rule 
was meant to deter police “rather than” magistrates (a novel and false 
dichotomy).413  His minor premise was that a bad warrant was the fault of a 
magistrate “rather than” the police (another false dichotomy).414  Thus, he 
concluded that the exclusionary rule should not apply to evidence obtained 
pursuant to unconstitutionally issued warrants.415 
Hence, the Leon exception had little to do with police “good faith” in 
anything approaching the usual understanding of that term—especially 
because Justice White made it clear that the reasonableness of police 
reliance on a warrant was to be assessed “objectively” (that is, in terms of 
what a hypothetical reasonable officer might think) rather than 
“subjectively” (that is, in terms of what the real officers actually 
thought).416  The significance of that distinction was evident in Leon’s 
companion decision in Massachusetts v. Sheppard417 in which the majority 
ruled that police who knew they had presented a defective warrant to a 
magistrate (they knew the warrant form misstated the items to be searched 
for) could nevertheless “objectively reasonably” rely on the issued warrant 
because they did not read it after the judge signed it and gave it back while 
orally stating that it was corrected, and thus they remained unaware that the 
defect had not been corrected at all.418 
Most importantly, the Leon blame-the-magistrate exception meant that 
the Fourth Amendment’s explicit command that “no warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause” was no longer to be enforced by American 
 
412 Id. at 907-08. 
413 Id.at 916-17 (stating that “the exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct 
rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates” and expounding on why 
magistrates would not be susceptible to deterrence in any event).  In contrast, the Weeks 
opinion plainly stated that the obligation to comply with the Fourth Amendment falls on the 
entire government—courts and judges as well as officers. 
414 Id. at 920-21 (concluding that “[p]enalizing the officer for the magistrate’s error, 
rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment 
violations”).  In actuality, of course, police apply for warrants.  Moreover, Justice White’s 
analysis failed to address the key role played by prosecutors who typically “screen” warrant 
applications for their adequacy before they are submitted to magistrates. 
415 Id. at 922. 
416 Id. at 922 n.23 (stating that the “good-faith inquiry is confined to the objectively 
ascertainable question whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the 
search was illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization”). 
417 468 U.S. 981 (1984). 
418 Id. at 989-90 (rejecting the argument that the officer should have examined the 
warrant when the magistrate returned it and refusing to conclude that an officer has a duty to 
read a warrant after a magistrate tells him it is valid). 
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courts.419  In keeping with Leon’s “objectively reasonable reliance” 
formulation, evidence seized under a warrant was to be fully admissible so 
long as the warrant was not “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to 
render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable”420—a 
formulation that would appear to be satisfied by anything more than a blank 
or entirely conclusory warrant affidavit.  Indeed, Justice White’s Leon 
opinion advised lower courts that they had the option of simply applying 
the new exception without stopping to assess whether a warrant was 
actually supported by probable cause.421  Unsurprisingly, lower courts 
choose that option.422 
However, Leon’s blame-the-magistrate rationale had an inherent 
limitation.  Although it could readily be extended (and soon was) to other 
instances in which an unconstitutional search could be blamed on someone 
other than the police—for example by blaming a legislature for an 
unconstitutional statute423 or a court clerk for an erroneous record of an 
outstanding warrant424—it could not excuse an unconstitutional warrantless 
search in which police were the only actors.  Thus, the majority would have 
to justify further curtailments of the application of the exclusionary 
principle to warrantless intrusions in terms of something other than Leon’s 
good faith mistake rationale.425 
Leon and Sheppard were not the only Orwellian rulings issued in 
1984.  On the same day those decisions were rendered, Chief Justice 
Burger’s majority opinion in Segura v. United States426 announced that 
police who entered an apartment illegally and remained there for nineteen 
 
419 See supra text accompanying note 4 (quoting text of Fourth Amendment). 
420 Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11 (1975) 
(Powell, J., concurring in part)).  The blame-the-warrant syllogism was so crude that Justice 
White had to recognize that there were some limits on the situations in which police could 
“objectively reasonably rel[y]” on an unconstitutional warrant.  However, he defined those 
limits very narrowly.  Like the “entirely unreasonable” formulation of “‘indicia of probable 
cause,’” Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (emphasis added) (quoting Brown, 422 U.S. at 610-11).  
Justice White also wrote that police could not rely on a warrant issued by a magistrate who 
“wholly abandoned his judicial role.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
421 Id. at 924-25 (concluding that lower courts can “turn[] immediately to a consideration 
of the officers’ good faith” without deciding whether there was a Fourth Amendment 
violation). 
422 See, e.g., United States v. Proell, 485 F.3d 427, 430 (8th Cir. 2007). 
423 Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987).  Notably, Justice O’Connor, who was then the 
only justice with legislative experience, was among the four dissenters. 
424 Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995). 
425 See infra notes 542, 546 and accompanying text (discussing recent additional 
limitations imposed on exclusion by the Roberts Court on the basis of notions of 
“attenuation” and “isolated negligence”). 
426 468 U.S. 796 (1984). 
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hours before obtaining a search warrant did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.  Chief Justice Burger opined that the police did not violate the 
defendant’s privacy because they did not search the apartment until a 
warrant was later procured, and he also opined that the police occupation of 
the apartment did not constitute an unreasonable seizure because it did not 
actually interfere with the occupants’ possessory interests because they 
were incarcerated at the time.427  The Chief Justice’s opinion also brushed 
aside any need to sanction the admittedly illegal initial police entry of the 
residence by stating that the majority was “unwilling to believe that officers 
will routinely and purposely violate the law as a matter of course.”428 
In another 1984 ruling, the Burger Court majority also extended the 
independent source doctrine by recognizing a hypothetical “inevitable 
discovery” doctrine that would apply where the government proved by a 
preponderance of evidence that the police would have discovered evidence 
constitutionally had they not previously discovered it unconstitutionally.429 
However, even the late Burger Court still placed some significant 
limits on police power.  For example, in 1985 the justices unanimously 
limited surgical searches of an arrestee’s body for evidence in the form of 
an embedded bullet.430  In the same year, but over a dissent by Justice 
O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, a majority 
of the justices limited the use of deadly force to “seize” a crime suspect in 
Tennessee v. Garner431 (although that ruling has since been severely 
diluted432).  A majority of the justices also ruled in Welsh v. Wisconsin433 
that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not 
apply to the entry of a home regarding a misdemeanor offense. 
 
427 Id. at 805-13.  Chief Justice Burger also wrote that “initial entry—legal or not—does 
not affect the reasonableness of the seizure [of a residence]” if police have probable cause.  
Id. at 811. 
428 Id. at 812. 
429 Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984).  The concept of an “independent source” was 
recognized in Silverthorne Lumber in 1921.  See supra note 136 and accompanying text.    
The majority’s adoption of the preponderance of evidence standard in Williams contrasted 
with the Warren Court’s ruling in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), in which the 
justices held that a trial error involving a violation of a constitutional standard could be 
harmless only if the prosecution demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had 
not affected the verdict. 
430 Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985). 
431 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (a lawsuit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).   
432 The ruling in Garner has been undercut by Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) 
(holding that a police officer used reasonable force in ramming a car while trying to stop it 
for speeding with the result that the car crashed and left the driver a quadriplegic, and stating 
that the reasonableness of police use of force can be assessed only by “slosh[ing] . . . through 
the factbound morass of ‘reasonableness’”). 
433 466 U.S. 740 (1984). 
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VIII. THE CONTINUATION OF THE CONSERVATIVE REACTION DURING THE 
REHNQUIST AND ROBERTS COURTS 
The Burger Court came to an end at the end of the 1986 decisions 
when Chief Justice Burger retired.  President Reagan then elevated Justice 
Rehnquist to Chief Justice, and named Judge Antonin Scalia to Justice 
Rehnquist’s vacant associate justice seat.  Although there were several 
subsequent changes in membership during the Rehnquist Court years, there 
was no break in the conservative majority.434  Indeed, if anything there was 
at least a marginal increase in the intensity of the majority’s rightward 
tilt.435  The same has been true of the Roberts Court, which began when 
 
434 The substitutions of Chief Justice Rehnquist for Chief Justice Burger, and of Justice 
Scalia for Justice Rehnquist’s vacated seat did not alter the overall ideological lineup on the 
Court, although the appointment of Justice Scalia did result in some intensification of the 
rhetoric of the conservative retrenchment.  Subsequent changes in the Court’s membership 
have also had only marginal effects on its search and seizure rulings.  The rhetorical assault 
on the Fourth Amendment might have been more intense had Judge Robert Bork been seated 
when Justice Powell retired in 1987, but the Senate balked at that nomination and the seat 
went to Judge Anthony Kennedy instead.  Although less conservative than Judge Bork likely 
would have been, Justice Kennedy has been a reliable vote for the government in Fourth 
Amendment cases. 
 Subsequent changes in the membership of the high bench have marginally strengthened 
the conservative majority.  The last of the real “liberals” departed with the retirements of 
Justice Brennan in 1990 and of Justice Marshall in 1991.  Justice Souter, who replaced 
Brennan, turned out to be somewhat like Justice Powell—that is, he sometimes took the 
defendant’s side, but usually voted for the government and sometimes authored significant 
expansions of government power.   There was a starker shift when Justice Clarence Thomas 
replaced Justice Marshall.  Indeed, Justice Thomas has emerged as perhaps the most 
consistent statist in criminal procedure cases.  However, the Marshall/Thomas change was 
somewhat offset when President Clinton named Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg on the 
retirement of Justice White in 1993, and also named Judge Steven Breyer to replace Justice 
Blackmun in 1994.  Although both Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer have often been to 
the right of Justice Stevens, they have usually been to the left of the Court’s center in search 
cases.  Following the appointment of Justice Breyer, there were no further changes in the 
Court’s membership during the next eleven years—the longest period without a change in 
the history of the Court. 
 For a quantitative analysis of ideological balance of the Rehnquist Court during this 
period, see BAUM, supra note 300, at 124 fig.4-1 (presenting a scalogram analysis of the 
justices’ votes in non-unanimous criminal cases decided in 2004 (the 2003 term) indicating 
that Justices Souter and Stevens were tied as the most liberal justices, then Justices Ginsburg 
and Breyer, while Jusice Kennedy was the usually conservative swing vote (four liberal 
votes of fourteen cases), then Justices O’Connor and Scalia, and finally Justices Rehnquist 
and Thomas were tied as the most conservative). 
435 The annual Harvard Law Review statistics are consistent with the view that the 
various changes in the membership of the Rehnquist Court did not appreciably alter the 
ideological balance among the justices.  From the beginning of the Rehnquist Court in the 
1987 cases through the replacement of Justice Marshall by Justice Thomas in the 1992 cases, 
the government won 21 of 26 cases (81%), while from Justice Breyer’s replacement of 
Justice Blackmun in the 1995 cases to the end of the Rehnquist Court with the 2005 cases 
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Judge John Roberts was named Chief Justice in 2005, following the death 
of Chief Justice Rehnquist.436  The search and seizure decisions during the 
first five years of the Roberts Court appear to be essentially a continuation 
and further development of the direction set by the Rehnquist Court. 
A. THE TRAJECTORY OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE CASES 
The trajectory of Fourth Amendment rulings during the Rehnquist and 
Roberts Courts has followed the course that the ideological imbalance 
among the justices would lead one to predict.  Again, the annual Harvard 
Law Review statistics indicate that the government won forty-eight of the 
sixty-two criminal search and seizure cases decided by the Rehnquist Court 
during the nineteen years 1987 through 2005.  Likewise, the government 
has won nine of the twelve such rulings decided by the Roberts Court 
during the five years 2006 through 2010.  Taken together, the government 
has won fifty-seven of the seventy-four cases (77%).437 
Another statistic is also noteworthy: after a brief flurry of criminal 
search cases at the outset of the Rehnquist era, especially the sixteen 
decided in 1990, the volume of criminal search cases fell off during this 
twenty-three year span to average slightly less than three per year.  One 
explanation might be that the lower courts have become so attuned to the 
conservative majority on the Supreme Court that they produce fewer cases 
that prompt the justices to grant certiorari to reverse a decision.438  
Alternatively, it may be that Fourth Amendment protections have been so 
curtailed that there was relatively little work left for the conservative 
majority. 
Nevertheless, the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have found continuing 
opportunities to enhance law enforcement powers.  Indeed, the rulings in 
this period lend the impression that the majority reached out to strike down 
any lower court decision that accorded a degree of substance to Fourth 
 
the government won 26 of 33 cases (79%).  See infra Table 1.  Thus, unlike the Warren and 
Burger Courts, there have been no aberrant periods during the duration of the Rehnquist 
Court. 
436 The appointment of Judge John Roberts as Chief Justice does not appear to have 
altered the ideological complexion of the bench.  However, the Court probably tilted slightly 
more to the right when Justice Samuel Alito was appointed to the vacancy that occurred with 
the retirement of Justice O’Connor in 2006.  The effect of Justice Sonya Sotomayor’s 
appointment to replace Justice Souter in 2009 and of Justice Elena Kagan’s appointment to 
replace Justice Stevens in 2010 are still too recent to be addressed in this Article. 
437 See infra Table 1. 
438 The justices usually reverse or alter the decision below in more than two thirds of the 
cases they decide on the merits.  See BAUM, supra note 300, at 94.  Hence, a grant of 
certiorari usually indicates that at least the requisite four justices are inclined to change the 
lower court decision. 
1016 THOMAS Y. DAVIES [Vol. 100 
Amendment limits on police power.439  With condolences to the reader, the 
only way to adequately convey the degree to which the Rehnquist and 
Roberts Courts have shut down Fourth Amendment protections is to review 
a substantial proportion of the more significant rulings. 
One such ruling was the 1988 decision Murray v. United States.440  In 
that case the justices ruled four to three that marijuana could be admitted 
under the independent source doctrine in a case in which officers, following 
up on an informant’s tip, had made an unconstitutional entry of a warehouse 
during which the marijuana was observed, and then subsequently obtained a 
warrant on the basis of the initial tip without mentioning their prior 
unconstitutional discovery.  Because the earlier 1984 ruling in Leon makes 
evidence seized under a warrant admissible provided only that the warrant 
is not completely lacking some “indicia of probable cause,” Murray would 
appear to provide police with a useful technique for curing otherwise 
unconstitutional intrusions.441  Similarly, the Rehnquist Court majority 
provided police with a means of at least partly curing a violation of the 
Payton rule against making warrantless arrests in houses by announcing in 
1990 in New York v. Harris442 that incriminating statements made by an 
arrestee during a warrantless arrest in a house in violation of Payton would 
not be excluded as the fruit of the illegal entry and arrest if police had 
probable cause for the arrest and the arrestee repeated the statements when 
taken outside of the house. 
The justices also underscored the flexibility of police authority in 
several cases.  For example, in 1991 in County of Riverside v. 
McLaughlin443 the majority held that a person arrested without a warrant 
can be detained for up to forty-eight hours without the required assessment 
of probable cause by a magistrate.444  Likewise, in the 2001 ruling Illinois v. 
McArthur,445 they confirmed the broad authority of police to control access 
to a home while a search warrant was being obtained.  Additionally, the 
 
439 I say “impression” because a full assessment of this proposition would require an 
examination of the certiorari petitions presented to the Court, and the frequency with which 
the justices grant government petitions.  I have not undertaken that examination except to the 
limited extent reported infra note 562. 
440 487 U.S. 533 (1988); see also Bradley C. Graveline, Fourth Amendment—An 
Acceptable Erosion of the Exclusionary Rule, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 647 (1988). 
441 Cf. Amar, supra note 6, at 794 n.137 (suggesting that Murray’s “inevitable discovery” 
doctrine should “be vastly widened”). 
442 495 U.S. 14 (1990). 
443 500 U.S. 44 (1991). 
444 See also Powell v. Nevada, 511 U.S. 79 (1994) (finding that an arrestee’s being held 
for four days prior to a probable cause hearing violated McLaughlin, but remanding without 
deciding whether that violation carried any consequence). 
445 531 U.S. 326 (2001). 
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justices reinforced a 1981 ruling that police could seize and detain any 
person who was present when a search warrant is executed446 by ruling in 
2005 that police were entitled to use reasonable force to do so—including 
handcuffing any third parties who were present for the several hours that 
execution of a warrant search might take.447 
B. REDUCING THE COVERAGE OF FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION 
A series of pro-government search rulings during the Rehnquist Court 
also expanded upon earlier Burger Court rulings by withdrawing Fourth 
Amendment protections from a variety of routine law enforcement 
practices.  In particular, the Rehnquist Court majority decided several cases 
that enlarged the room for proactive police conduct by narrowing the 
definition of whether a person was “seized” for Fourth Amendment 
purposes—and thus allowed the police to act without probable cause or 
even reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.  For example, in the 1991 
ruling in California v. Hodari D.,448 the majority concluded that a person 
was not seized when police chased him; rather, a seizure occurred only 
when the person being chased either submitted to police authority or was 
forcibly restrained.449  Thus, the police did not have to justify the initial 
chase, and any contraband dropped or abandoned by the person being 
chased prior to being tackled would be admissible evidence.  Likewise, the 
Court has ruled that a person would not be seized for Fourth Amendment 
purposes if police conduct unintentionally caused that person’s death—
hence, the constitutionality of the police conduct would not be assessed 
according to the reasonableness of the police conduct.450 
Likewise, the majority announced in the 1991 decision in Florida v. 
Bostick,451 and again in the 2002 decision in United States v. Drayton,452 
 
446 Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981). 
447 Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005). 
448 499 U.S. 621 (1991). 
449 The Court had earlier ruled that police chasing a person did not necessarily constitute 
a “seizure” subject to Fourth Amendment standards in Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 
(1988). 
450 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842-45 (1998) (holding that a police 
high-speed vehicle chase that resulted in the death of the pursued motorist as a result of 
alleged deliberate or reckless indifference to life did not constitute a “seizure” under the 
Fourth Amendment and thus was not susceptible to assessment of the reasonableness of 
police conduct).  The ruling in Lewis followed the analysis previously set out in dicta in 
Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596-97 (1989) (stating that a seizure subject to the 
Fourth Amendment occurs only when an individual’s freedom of movement is curtailed 
“through means intentionally applied”). 
451 501 U.S. 429 (1991). 
452 536 U.S. 194 (2002). 
1018 THOMAS Y. DAVIES [Vol. 100 
that seated bus passengers who were randomly approached, questioned, and 
asked to consent to searches of their persons or luggage by officers 
“working the buses” (that is, looking for possible drug couriers) were not 
seized because the encounters were “consensual.”  The premise for that 
characterization seems to have been the justices’ rather naive (if not 
disingenuous) assumption that an average person would believe that police 
officers would simply leave them alone if they declined to cooperate.  In the 
1996 ruling in Ohio v. Robinette,453 the justices also ruled that a police 
officer who had concluded a traffic stop need not inform the person who 
had been detained that they were free to go, and thus allowed the previously 
detained person’s consent to a search of the auto to be characterized as 
“voluntary” and valid. 
The Rehnquist Court majority also extended third-party consent for 
police to enter a residence to instances of mere “apparent consent” in the 
1990 ruling in Illinois v. Rodriquez.454  Justice Scalia used his majority 
opinion in that case to advance the “generalized reasonableness” approach 
to the Fourth Amendment455 by announcing that police could be justified in 
making a warrantless entry of a home either if a genuine co-inhabitant 
actually gave consent or if it was reasonable for police to mistakenly 
believe that the person who had given consent was a co-inhabitant.456  
Notably, Justice Scalia’s opinion did not require the police to make 
inquiries about the consenting person’s status, but simply allowed the police 
to assess apparent consent on “the facts available to the officer at the 
moment.”457  The Rehnquist Court also announced an expansive approach 
to assessing the scope of consent to a search in the 1991 ruling in Florida v 
Jimeno458 when it construed a driver’s consent to search an auto “for drugs” 
to constitute consent to an unlimited and intensive search of any and all 
 
453 519 U.S. 33 (1996). 
454 497 U.S. 177 (1990). 
455 Justice Scalia published an article shortly after joining the Court in which he argued 
that the rule of law should be a law of rules—except for search and seizure, which should be 
governed by a flexible reasonableness standard.  Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law 
of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1180-86 (1989).  Those statements may seem to contrast 
the rule based approach he took in his inaugural search opinion in Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 
321 (1987).  However, Justice Scalia has since emerged as a leading advocate for a 
“generalized reasonableness” approach to Fourth Amendment issues.  See, e.g., California v. 
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (asserting that “colonial juries” 
employed a “reasonableness” standard when deciding trespass cases brought against 
officers).  However, the historical claim Justice Scalia made in Acevedo was groundless.  See 
Davies, Arrest, supra note 16, at 263 n.64. 
456 Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186-89. 
457 Id. at 188 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)). 
458 500 U.S. 248 (1991). 
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containers found in the auto.  In addition, the Rehnquist Court ruled in 1990 
that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to government searches or 
seizures beyond the national border.459 
C. EXPANSIVE CONSTRUCTIONS OF TERRY “DETENTIONS” AND 
“FRISKS” 
In addition to enlarging the arena in which the police could act without 
complying with any Fourth Amendment standard, the Rehnquist Court 
majority also advanced a permissive construction of the reasonable 
suspicion standard for Terry detentions and frisks.  Thus, in the 1989 
decision United States v. Sokolow,460 the majority effectively upheld 
detentions of air travelers under a “drug courier profile” while opining that 
reasonable suspicion merely required something more than an “inchoate 
and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’” but less than the “fair 
probability” required for probable cause.461  Additionally, in the 1990 ruling 
in Alabama v. White,462 the Court found that police had sufficient grounds 
for reasonable suspicion in a situation in which police observation had not 
borne out an important aspect of an anonymous tip regarding drug dealing.  
Similarly, the majority also interpreted reasonable suspicion expansively in 
2000 in Illinois v. Wardlow463 by ruling that a person’s “flight” from the 
approach of police in a “high crime area” sufficed to meet that standard.  
However, the justices unanimously set a minimum threshold for reasonable 
suspicion in the 2000 ruling in Florida v. J.L.464 by holding that an 
anonymous tip that a person had a gun but that otherwise provided nothing 
more than a description of a person standing in a public location was 
inadequate to justify a Terry detention. 
In a series of related rulings, the majority justices also used Terry’s 
approval of a pat-down “frisk” for weapons based upon reasonable 
suspicion that a suspect was dangerous as a basis for expanding police 
opportunities to conduct warrantless searches—albeit without using that 
term.  The Burger Court had extended Terry’s “frisk” doctrine to an 
inspection of the interior of an automobile for weapons in the 1983 ruling in 
Michigan v. Long.465  In the 1990 ruling in Maryland v. Buie, the Rehnquist 
Court also used Terry as a basis for permitting a “protective sweep” of an 
 
459 United States v. Verdugo-Urguidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
460 490 U.S. 1 (1989). 
461 Id. at 7 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 
213, 238 (1983)). 
462 496 U.S. 325 (1990). 
463 528 U.S. 119 (2000). 
464 529 U.S. 266 (2000). 
465 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). 
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entire house to locate any persons who might be present.466  These “frisks” 
and “sweeps” are especially important because they provide police with 
opportunities to locate incriminating evidence under the “plain view” 
doctrine according to which police can seize contraband or evidence they 
discover in the course of lawful conduct.467  Additionally, in 2004, the 
majority ruled that a person can be constitutionally arrested under a state 
stop-and-identify statute if he or she fails to identify themselves during a 
valid Terry stop.468  And in 2009, the Roberts Court ruled that an officer is 
entitled to conduct a Terry frisk for weapons during a minor traffic stop on 
the basis that the person in question appeared to be a gang member, even 
though there was no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity at the time.469  
For all practical purposes, the “officer safety” rationale seems to have 
expanded to the point where police can frisk virtually anyone they have 
grounds to detain. 
D. EXPANSION OF WARRANTLESS ARREST AUTHORITY AND AUTO 
SEARCHES INCIDENT TO SUCH ARRESTS 
Particularly during its later years, the Rehnquist Court majority also 
effectively eradicated any vestige of privacy a driver or owner might have 
in an automobile.  (As noted above, the Burger Court had earlier ruled that 
passengers had no standing to challenge a search of a car in which they had 
been riding.470)  To begin with, a five-to-four majority held that police use 
of “sobriety checkpoints” to stop autos was “reasonable” in 1990 in 
Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz,471 notwithstanding doubts as 
to whether such checkpoints were actually efficacious for identifying 
inebriated drivers. 
Although Sitz justified checkpoints on safety rather than criminal law 
enforcement grounds, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and 
Thomas also would have approved the use of checkpoints for the primary 
purpose of detecting the transportation of illegal drugs in the 2000 case City 
of Indianapolis v. Edmond.472  However Justice O’Connor’s majority 
 
466 494 U.S. 325 (1990). 
467 The Rehnquist Court also enlarged the plain view doctrine somewhat in Horton v. 
California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990), when it ruled that “plain view” could apply to items the 
police anticipated finding, and thus overruled Justice Stewart’s 1971 opinion in Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), insofar as it had limited “plain view” seizures to 
inadvertent discoveries. 
468 Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177 (2004). 
469 Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781 (2009). 
470 See supra note 363 and accompanying text. 
471 496 U.S. 444 (1990). 
472 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000). 
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opinion in Edmond ruled that to be an improper purpose—but included a 
footnote declining to rule on the propriety of “expand[ing] the scope of a 
license or sobriety checkpoint seizure in order to detect the presence of 
drugs in a stopped car”—a qualification that effectively allows the use of 
drug dogs to sniff cars properly stopped at a sobriety checkpoint.473  Thus, 
the Edmond majority opinion policed only the official label applied to the 
checkpoint, but actually left police free to use the checkpoint for a criminal 
law enforcement purpose.  Likewise, in 2005 the justices, six to three, also 
approved of the use of a police drug-dog to inspect an auto during a traffic 
stop for speeding, providing the traffic stop was not unreasonably 
prolonged.474  Additionally, the justices unanimously ruled that police could 
operate a highway checkpoint to attempt to locate witnesses of a fatal 
accident in 2004 in Illinois v. Lidster.475  Thus, police do not lack 
opportunities to stop and inspect even motorists who are complying with 
traffic laws. 
The Rehnquist Court majority also removed limitations which had 
earlier been placed on the Carroll automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement when, in the 1991 ruling in California v. Acevedo,476 the 
majority brushed aside earlier cases that had limited a warrantless search to 
a specific container in an automobile when police had probable cause only 
to believe contraband would be found in that specific container.477  Instead, 
in Acevedo the majority ruled that the entire auto as well as all containers 
found in it could be searched without warrant under Carroll.478 
Additionally, Justice Scalia’s 1996 majority opinion in Whren v. 
United States479 departed from earlier decisions that had disapproved of 
pretextual police conduct and instead approved of police use of a traffic 
stop as a pretext for discovering drug offenses, notwithstanding that the 
 
473 Id. at 47, n.2. 
474 Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005). 
475 540 U.S. 419 (2004). 
476 500 U.S. 565 (1991). 
477 In 1979, the justices had ruled in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), that if 
police had probable cause to believe that contraband was in a container such as luggage that 
was only “coincidentally” in an auto, their warrantless search of the auto was limited to 
locating that specific container.  The justices also applied that rule in Robbins v. California, 
453 U.S. 420 (1981).  However, the Court ruled in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 
(1982), that if police had probable cause that contraband was somewhere in a car, but did not 
know where, they could search the entire car including any containers found in it.  This 
“car/container” distinction was frequently cited by proponents of a good faith exception to 
the exclusionary rule as evidence that search law was too complex to be correctly applied by 
police.  See Davies, supra note 398, at 682-83. 
478 Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 580. 
479 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
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plain clothes officers violated department regulations in doing so.  In 1997, 
the justices also decided, by a vote of seven to two, that police could order 
passengers as well as the driver to get out a car during a traffic stop.480  And 
in the 1999 decision in Wyoming v. Houghton481 the justices also ruled six 
to three that a purse a passenger left behind while exiting a stopped auto 
could be searched by police in the course of conducting an automobile 
search under Carroll. 
The Rehnquist Court also expanded the potential for police to conduct 
searches of automobiles under the search of an auto incident to arrest 
doctrine, which the Burger Court had previously announced in Belton.482  
Although the justices unanimously disapproved of one state’s attempt to 
permit car searches based merely on the issuance of a traffic citation,483 
subsequent rulings suggest that the justices were again more concerned with 
policing the rhetoric by which car searches were justified than with 
regulating the searches themselves.  Thus, in the 2001 ruling in Atwater v. 
City of Lago Vista,484 a five-to-four majority vastly increased the potential 
for searching automobiles incident to arrest by upholding a custodial arrest, 
complete with handcuffs, of a suburban “soccer mom” who had committed 
the heinous offense of driving slowly through a residential neighborhood 
without a seat belt.  Writing for the majority, Justice Souter announced that 
the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard did not preclude 
custodial arrests for even trivial offenses.  To justify that conclusion, Justice 
Souter presented a purportedly originalist analysis of framing-era doctrine 
that buried the genuine historical and traditional restrictions on less-than-
felony warrantless arrests under a mass of fraudulent pseudo-historical 
claims.485  He also expressed doubts “whether warrantless misdemeanor 
arrests need constitutional attention,”486 and suggested that it would be 
sufficient for the Court to address such arrests if an “epidemic” of abuses 
developed.487 
Additionally, in the 2003 ruling in Maryland v. Pringle,488 the justices 
ruled that police can have probable cause to arrest multiple occupants of a 
 
480 Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997).  The Burger Court had earlier ruled in 
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), that the police could legally order the driver to 
get out of the car during a traffic stop. 
481 526 U.S. 295 (1999). 
482 See supra note 365 and accompanying text. 
483 Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998). 
484 532 U.S. 318 (2001). 
485 See generally Davies, Arrest, supra note 16. 
486 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 351-52. 
487 Id. at 353. 
488 540 U.S. 366 (2003). 
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car in which contraband is found.  And in the 2004 ruling in Thornton v. 
United States,489 the justices voted seven to two that autos could be 
searched incident to the arrest of a “recent occupant” who was no longer 
close to the car, as well as of a person who was in the car at the time it was 
stopped. 
The Rehnquist Court further expanded police arrest powers in 2004 in 
Devenpeck v. Alford.490  Justice Scalia’s opinion announced that it was 
irrelevant that there was no probable cause for the offense for which a 
warrantless arrest was made (in this case, because the conduct alleged did 
not amount to the charged offense under state law), as long as the arrestee’s 
conduct later could be construed as probable cause regarding some other, 
albeit unrelated, offense.491  Remarkably, not a single justice took issue 
with that treatment. 
Additionally, in 2008, the Roberts Court further expanded the potential 
for warrantless arrests for minor offenses by ruling in Virginia v. Moore492 
that police could make a constitutional arrest for a minor offense (and, 
presumably, search the driver and auto incident to that arrest) so long as 
they had probable cause—that is, a “fair probability”493—that an offense 
might have been committed notwithstanding that the law of the jurisdiction 
did not permit an arrest for the charged offense.  Writing for the Court, 
Justice Scalia explained that “probable cause” was the only constitutional 
requirement for an arrest under the Fourth Amendment, so any other limits 
imposed by state law were irrelevant to the federal constitutional issue.  
Notably, Justice Scalia’s opinion failed to mention that the Court had 
 
489 541 U.S. 615 (2004). 
490 543 U.S. 146 (2004). 
491 Alford was arrested for violating the Washington Privacy Act for tape recording his 
interaction with police officers; however that charge was dismissed because it had previously 
been ruled that the Privacy Act did not apply to conversations with police officers.  Alford 
then sued for false arrest.  The Ninth Circuit ruled that it was not adequate for police to 
defend the arrest on the ground that they could have asserted probable cause to arrest for 
another crime (impersonating a police officer) that was not at least “closely related” to the 
crime for which the arrest was made.  The Supreme Court reversed and announced that a 
warrantless arrest is valid under the Fourth Amendment so long as the alleged conduct could 
have constituted probable cause for some offense, regardless of whether that offense was 
related to that charged. 
 Justice Scalia also rationalized this ruling, in part, by suggesting that otherwise officers 
might stop providing reasons for arrest—and thus implied that police could make 
constitutional arrests without any specific charge—the abuse that was condemned in the 
Petition of Right of 1628.  See Davies, Correcting Search History, supra note 16, at 45-47. 
492 553 U.S. 164 (2009).  Of course, state courts could still rule the arrest illegal and 
suppress any evidence seized incident to the arrest under a state exclusionary rule, if the state 
had adopted one.  However, Virginia was among the states that had never done so. 
493 See supra note 406 and accompanying text. 
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created the automobile exception to the warrant requirement in Carroll 
precisely because the justices had recognized on that occasion that only a 
lawful arrest could justify a search as being incident to arrest.494  Among 
other results, the analysis in Moore would seem to have erased all of the 
historical limitations that previously applied to warrantless misdemeanor 
arrests, including the rule—recognized in Carroll—that such arrests can be 
made only for an offense committed in the officer’s view.495  Remarkably, 
not a single justice dissented from these extreme departures from prior 
doctrine in Moore. 
The standard for a valid warrantless arrest was already weak prior to 
Atwater, Devenpeck, and Moore.  In the aftermath of those decisions—and 
especially in light of the ubiquity of minor traffic violations—it is now 
difficult to discern any meaningful constraint on police discretion to arrest 
and search incident to arrest. 
E. WARRANTLESS ENTRY OF HOUSES IN “EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES” 
Two recent decisions also seem to chip away at the rigor of the basic 
rule, reiterated in Payton in 1980,496 that a warrant is required to justify 
police entry of a house in the absence of consent or exigent 
circumstances.497  In both cases, a large majority of the justices reversed 
state court assessments that there was no exigency sufficient to justify the 
warrantless entry of a house.498  In the 2006 ruling in Brigham City, Utah v. 
Stuart499 the justices overruled the Utah courts eight to one (Justice Stevens 
 
494 See supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
495 See supra notes 148, 154 and accompanying text. 
496 See supra notes 357-361 and accompanying text.  The warrant requirement for entry 
of a house has not been directly challenged since Payton.  However, statements by Justices 
Scalia and Thomas advocating a “generalized reasonableness” approach to search issues 
have questioned the warrant requirement more generally.  See, e.g., Groh v. Ramirez, 540 
U.S. 551, 576-77 (2004) (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., dissenting) (asserting that a search of a 
residence under a defective warrant can nevertheless satisfy the Fourth Amendment 
“reasonableness” standard); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581-82, 584 (1991) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (asserting that the Framers meant to “restrict[] the issuance of 
warrants” and questioning whether the general rule that a warrant is required is consistent 
with Fourth Amendment reasonableness). 
497 The justices also provided leeway for police errors in the execution of a search 
warrant in Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987) (upholding the admissibility of drugs 
found “in plain view” when police entered an apartment for which they had no warrant (or 
probable cause) as a result of a mistaken belief, based on a reasonable investigation, that it 
was part of another apartment for which they did have a warrant). 
498 These rulings seem to contrast with the deference the justices previously showed to a 
state court’s assessment that there was no exigency for a warrantless entry of a house in 
Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100-01 (1990). 
499 547 U.S. 398 (2006). 
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dissented) when they concluded that a “fracas” inside a house was sufficient 
to justify a warrantless entry when an officer, who was looking in through a 
screen door, saw a punch that resulted in a bloody nose.  More recently, in 
the December 2009 ruling Michigan v. Fisher,500 the Court overruled the 
Michigan courts in a per curiam ruling (over the dissent of Justice Stevens, 
joined by Justice Sotomayor) that found that police had exigent grounds to 
make a forcible warrantless entry after the resident told them they could not 
enter without a warrant.501  It is difficult to disagree with Justice Stevens’s 
conclusion that the majority was reaching out to “micromanag[e] the day-
to-day business of state tribunals making fact-intensive decisions.”502 
F. PRO-DEFENDANT RULINGS 
Of course, even the Rehnquist Court occasionally rendered decisions 
that strengthened or upheld enforcement of Fourth Amendment limits on 
police authority.  Indeed, the justices would hardly appear to be “neutral 
and detached” if that were not the case.  The most significant ruling of this 
sort—though it is not immediately apparent without closely counting 
noses—is that a bare majority of five justices indicated in 1998 in 
Minnesota v. Carter503 that “social guests” who are present in a home when 
police make an unconstitutional warrantless search usually would have 
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the entry and seek suppression 
of evidence found during that search.504  That conclusion, which extended 
 
500 130 S. Ct. 546 (2009). 
501 After an officer attempted to enter, the resident was seen pointing a gun at the officer, 
and that observation formed the basis for the resident’s prosecution for assault with a deadly 
weapon.  Id. at 547. 
502 Id. at 550-51.  Lower federal courts also have shown a lack of interest in preserving 
the privacy of the house.  See, e.g., United States v. Lemus, 596 F.3d 512 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(Kozinski, C.J., dissenting) (objecting to the denial of rehearing en banc from the approval of 
“a police sweep of a person’s home without a warrant, without probable cause, without 
reasonable suspicion and without exigency—in other words, with nothing at all to support 
the entry except the curiosity police always have about what they might find if they go 
rummaging around a suspect’s home” which turned up “a gun ‘in plain view’—stuck 
between two cushions of the living room couch”). 
503 525 U.S. 83 (1998). 
504 The judgment in the case, announced in Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion of the 
Court, was for the government.  Additionally, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas were of the view that the defendants lacked standing to 
challenge a search of a house in which they did not reside.  However, four Justices (Stevens, 
Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer) expressed the view that guests in a home should always have 
standing to challenge a search of a residence.  In an important concurring opinion, Justice 
Kennedy stated that “almost all social guests” would have standing to challenge a 
warrantless search of “their host’s home,” but stopped short of a per se rule to that effect.  
Carter, 525 U.S. at 99, 102-03 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  However, because Justice 
Kennedy concluded that the defendants in that case did not constitute “social guests,” he 
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an earlier 1990 ruling that an overnight guest had such standing,505 
indirectly bolstered the warrant requirement for house searches insofar as it 
made it less likely that the police could make use of evidence obtained 
during an unconstitutional entry of a residence.  Additionally, in the 2004 
decision in Groh v. Ramirez,506 five justices treated a search made pursuant 
to search warrant that omitted any description of the items to be searched 
for as such a patent violation of the Fourth Amendment’s explicit 
particularity requirement as to overcome the officers’ qualified immunity to 
§ 1983 liability (and, presumably, to also fall outside of the Leon good faith 
mistake exception). 
Other pro-defendant rulings handed down during the Rehnquist Court 
seem to be of less consequence—sometimes decidedly so.  For example, the 
justices confined their earlier recognition of a “plain feel” exception to the 
warrant requirement507 by disapproving of a police practice of squeezing 
soft-sided luggage in the 2000 ruling in Bond v. United States.508  However, 
it seems questionable that would have become an important law 
enforcement technique in any event.  Similarly, in the 2006 decision 
Georgia v. Randolph,509 the justices ruled five to four that a house search 
cannot be justified by consent if two co-inhabitants were present at the time 
and one objected, even though the other was agreeable.  However, it 
appears that police could readily avoid that situation by making their 
request at a time when the person who could be expected to be most likely 
to object would be absent. 
 
concurred with the judgment for the government.  Thus, the government won the judgment 
but the doctrinal standard announced in the opinions tilted toward a broad recognition of 
standing for social guests in homes. 
 However, the justices continued to hold that passengers in autos lacked standing in 
United States v. Padilla, 508 U.S. 77 (1993) (rejecting a claim of standing based on joint 
control of an auto). 
505 Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990).  Interestingly, Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justice Blackmun took the unusual step of dissenting without opinion in Olson.  I speculate 
that they may have opted not to write in Olson because it would have been difficult to square 
their vote to deny standing to an overnight guest in Olson when they were endorsing police 
reliance on the “apparent” consent of a person who was not a co-resident at all in the 
Rodriguez decision during the same term.  Rodriguez was argued roughly a month after 
Olson, and the defendant’s brief in Rodriguez called attention to the relationship to the 
standing issue in Olson.  See Brief for Respondent at 32 n. 24, Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 
U.S. 177 (1990). 
506 540 U.S. 551 (2004). 
507 The Court recognized a “plain feel” doctrine, comparable to the “plain view” 
doctrine, in Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993).  However, the doctrine was of 
limited significance because it applied only when a police officer immediately recognized 
contraband by touch, without manipulating the object. 
508 529 U.S. 334 (2000). 
509 547 U.S. 103 (2006). 
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Indeed, one line of rulings in the Rehnquist Court that may initially 
have seemed to strengthen Fourth Amendment protections turned out to be 
meaningless.  In his 1995 opinion for the Court in Wilson v. Arkansas,510 
Justice Thomas purported to follow framing-era common law (but did not 
actually follow it) by announcing that police were required to “knock and 
announce” prior to executing a warrant unless it would be “reasonable” to 
dispense with that requirement in the circumstances.511  Because Justice 
Thomas’s opinion in Wilson mentioned the potential for armed resistance or 
prompt destruction of evidence as circumstances that would excuse a 
knock, it was understandable that a lower court might conclude that 
knocking was never required in executing a warrant for drug dealing.  
However, in another opinion that policed search rhetoric more than it 
regulated search practices, the Court in 1997 struck down a per se exception 
for the execution of drug search warrants in Richards v. Wisconsin512—and 
thus required lower courts to go through the motion of making a case-by-
case evaluation before reaching the predictable result. 
Next, in 2003 the justices held that police need wait only fifteen 
seconds after knocking before breaking down a door (a period based on 
how fast an occupant might destroy drugs rather than on how fast an 
occupant might open the door).513  And then the justices capped off this line 
of cases in a 2006 decision, discussed below, by holding that a police 
violation of the by-then minimal constitutional knock-and-announce 
requirement would never result in suppression of the evidence seized in the 
ensuing search in any event.514  Thus, three decisions later Wilson’s knock-
and-announce rule turned out to be much ado about nothing. 
The significance of some of the other seemingly pro-defendant rulings 
during the Rehnquist Court are still unclear.  For example, in the 2001 
ruling in Kyllo v. United States,515 Justice Scalia’s majority opinion 
concluded that police use of a heat-detection device to identify a house in 
which marijuana was being grown indoors constituted an impermissible 
warrantless search of the house.  Although the decision did underscore the 
importance accorded to the house, the substantiality of the announced 
prohibition was unclear insofar as it was rooted in the fact that such devices 
were not yet in common usage—a factor that could easily change over 
 
510 514 U.S. 927 (1995). 
511 I say Justice Thomas “purported” to follow common law because the common law 
knock-and-announce requirement actually was stated absolutely, not conditioned on the 
circumstances.  See Davies, Arrest, supra note 16, at 264-65 n.67. 
512 520 U.S. 385 (1997). 
513 Banks v. United States, 540 U.S. 31 (2003). 
514 See infra notes 542-543 and accompanying text. 
515 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
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time.516  Additionally, it seems quite possible that police could show a “fair 
probability” of criminal activity—that is, the Gates formulation of probable 
cause for issuance of a search warrant517—simply by obtaining utility 
records for a house (which would be exempt from Fourth Amendment 
protection518) showing consumption of unusual amounts of water and 
electricity.  Indeed, any marijuana discovered in a search under a warrant 
issued on that basis would seem to be admissible under the Leon blame-the-
magistrate exception, because the warrant would not be “so lacking in 
indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely 
unreasonable.”519  So Kyllo also seems to have been much ado about 
nothing. 
The practical significance of the 2009 ruling of the Roberts Court in 
Arizona v. Gant520 is also unclear.  In Belton, the Burger Court had 
announced a bright-line rule that automatically permitted police to search 
the passenger compartment and any containers found there of an auto in 
which an arrestee had been present.521  In Thornton, the Rehnquist Court 
had extended that rule to a car the arrestee had recently occupied, even 
though the arrest took place some distance from the car.522  However, in the 
complex ruling in Gant, Justice Stevens’s opinion for a five-justice majority 
disapproved of the automatic search authority provided by Belton.  Instead, 
Justice Stevens’s opinion ruled that a search of the passenger compartment 
was permissible only (1) if the arrestee was not yet handcuffed and still in 
close proximity to the car (thus creating the potential that the arrestee might 
reach into the car for a weapon or to destroy evidence), or (2) if there was 
“reason to believe,” based on the nature of the charged offense, that 
evidence of the offense might be found in the car.523 
It is possible that Gant might limit the potential for auto searches that 
could be based on the enlargement of arrest authority for minor offenses 
 
516 Id. at 40 (referring in the holding of the case to the government’s use of “a device that 
is not in general public use”). 
517 See supra note 406 and accompanying text. 
518 See supra notes 368-370 and accompanying text. 
519 See supra note 420 and accompanying text. 
520 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009). 
521 See supra note 365 and accompanying text. 
522 See supra note 489 and accompanying text. 
523 Gant, 129 S. Ct at 1723.  Justice Scalia concurred in the ruling in Gant.  He had 
previously called for limiting the automobile search incident to arrest doctrine to instances in 
which it was “reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found 
in the vehicle.”  Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring).  
That proposal would seem to accord with Justice Scalia’s endorsement of a “generalized 
reasonableness” approach to the Fourth Amendment in other cases.  See supra note 455 and 
accompanying text. 
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announced in Atwater and Moore.524  However, it is also the case that the 
police often have other grounds by which they often can justify a search of 
an arrested driver’s car.  For example, police can still search on the basis of 
the arrestee’s consent;525 and they also often have the option of impounding 
the car and conducting an intensive inventory search, including an 
inventory search at the scene.526  Indeed, even if police actually search a car 
on the scene in violation of Gant, any evidence they find may still be 
admissible under a Williams “inevitable discovery” analysis provided their 
department has the requisite written regulations to permit inventory 
searches.527  Moreover, police may be inclined to rely on these alternative 
justifications in any event because they permit a more thorough search of 
the entire car, including the trunk, than would the search incident to arrest 
doctrine, which is limited to a search of the passenger compartment. 
Will Gant significantly reduce the incidence of police searches of 
autos?  That seems unlikely.  Given the web of overlapping alternative 
justifications that are now available for car searches, there are not many 
situations where the police would actually encounter significant legal 
constraints.  Hence, it seems likely that Gant, like most of the other 
seemingly pro-defendant rulings in the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, will 
turn out to hold relatively little practical significance. 
G. THE RENEWED ATTACK ON EXCLUSION BY THE ROBERTS COURT 
MAJORITY 
As the Supreme Court recognized as far back as Marbury v. Madison, 
a right without a remedy is a fictional nullity.528  Thus, even if the justices 
of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts had been inclined to embrace 
substantial Fourth Amendment standards, those standards would hold 
practical significance only if there were effective means by which they 
 
524 See supra notes 484-487, 492-495. 
525 The concept of an arrested person giving “voluntary consent” to a search is strained, 
but the Burger Court upheld an arrestee’s consent to search a car in Watson, 423 U.S. 411 
(1976). 
526 See supra notes 350-351 and accompanying text.  The Rehnquist Court did uphold 
the requirement that inventory searches of impounded cars must be conducted according to 
written regulations in Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990).  However, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s opinion in Wells stated that the regulations could provide that an officer can 
open and search any container whose contents cannot be determined from the outside.  Id. at 
4.  Hence, the regulations can authorize an unlimited search of the car and any containers in 
it.  Here, too, the Rehnquist Court imposed only a meaningless “requirement.” 
527 See supra notes 429, 526 and accompanying text. 
528 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (stating that there must be a remedy for every 
violation of a legal right). 
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could be enforced.  However like the Burger Court majority before them,529 
the majorities on the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have shown consistent 
hostility toward enforcement of even the rather weak Fourth Amendment 
standards that remain. 
As described above, the Burger Court majority effectively barred use 
of injunctions to enforce Fourth Amendment restraints.530  The Rehnquist 
Court majority also effectively barred enforcement through damage 
lawsuits brought against state or local officers under § 1983531 or against 
federal officers under the parallel Bivens doctrine.532  In particular, Justice 
Scalia’s 1987 majority opinion in Anderson v. Creighton533 made it 
virtually impossible for a plaintiff to overcome the qualified immunity 
defense available to officers (a doctrine which the Burger Court had 
invented534) if issues involving flexible standards or fact-based issues such 
as probable cause or reasonableness were involved—as they typically are in 
search and seizure cases.535  Two years later a four-justice plurality of the 
Rehnquist Court also severely limited the potential for obtaining damages 
for unconstitutional searches or seizures from municipal entities in City of 
 
529 See supra, notes 340-345 and accompanying text (discussing the limitation of the 
exclusionary rule to the prosecutor’s case-in-chief at trial); supra notes 415-424 and 
accompanying text (discussing the Leon blame-the-magistrate exception and its progeny). 
530 See supra notes 379-380 and accompanying text. 
531 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
532 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971).  The doctrines that define the qualified immunity of state officers in § 1983 lawsuits 
also generally apply to the qualified immunity of federal officers in lawsuits brought under 
the authority of Bivens.  See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999). 
533 483 U.S. 635 (1987). 
534 See supra note 390 (identifying the cases in which the Burger Court invented and 
expanded the qualified immunity defense).  
535 See, e.g., Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001).  Saucier endorsed the rule that courts 
deciding § 1983 or Bivens lawsuits should determine whether the alleged conduct constituted 
a constitutional violation before deciding the issue of whether the officers had qualified 
immunity.  Under that approach, lawsuits under § 1983 or Bivens cases could sometimes be 
used to establish a clear constitutional standard which then could be used to overcome 
qualified immunity if the same violation was committed in the future.  See, e.g., Wilson, 526 
U.S. 603 (holding that federal marshals violated the Fourth Amendment by taking media 
reporters along when they executed a search warrant in a house, but that the marshals were 
protected by qualified immunity in the instant case because that violation was not “clearly 
established” at the time of their conduct).  However, in Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 
(2009), the Roberts Court has recently ruled that a court need not decide whether a 
constitutional violation occurred prior to finding that officers enjoyed qualified immunity, 
and thus allowing the lawsuit to be dismissed on that ground.  Hence, lower courts may now 
simply conclude that officer-defendants are entitled to qualified immunity without ruling on 
whether the officer’s conduct violated the Fourth Amendment, in which case there will be no 
clearly established law upon which qualified immunity could be overcome in future cases. 
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St. Louis v. Praprotnik.536  Taken together, Anderson and Praprotnik ended 
any significant possibility that Fourth Amendment search and arrest 
standards could be enforced through constitutional tort litigation. 
As noted above, the Burger Court also effectively withdrew the 
exclusionary rule from all procedural settings except the prosecutor’s case-
in-chief in a criminal trial, and also minimized the potential that exclusion 
would result from a search pursuant to an unconstitutional warrant by 
adopting the so-called good faith exception in Leon.  Thus, exclusion of 
unconstitutionally seized evidence had been thoroughly marginalized by the 
end of the Rehnquist Court.  (Indeed, as an empirical matter, exclusion 
never exerted anywhere near the effect on arrest dispositions as its critics 
routinely claimed.537) 
Given that marginalization (and the apparent collapse of Congressional 
attacks on exclusion538), one might have expected that the majority justices 
 
536 485 U.S. 112 (1988).  Municipalities are not liable for acts of their officers in § 1983 
lawsuits under the theory of respondeat superior.  However, in the fragmented 1986 decision 
in Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986), the Burger Court had found 
municipal liability for a warrantless police intrusion that violated the Steagald search warrant 
rule (see supra notes 360-361 and accompanying text), when the intrusion was ordered by 
the city prosecutor.  The Court changed direction in the 1988 ruling in Praprotnik, however, 
in which Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion for the four conservatives (Justice Kennedy, 
just appointed, did not participate) effectively nullified Pembaur by announcing that an 
“isolated decision[] by municipal officials” generally could not be a basis for municipal 
liability.  Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 114.  Because municipalities (a term that includes any local 
or lower than state level government agency) rarely adopt formal policies directing their 
police officers to violate constitutional standards, Praprotnik sets a threshold for municipal 
liability that effectively insulates municipalities against § 1983 liability for Fourth 
Amendment violations. 
 The Rehnquist Court majority also erected a high threshold of municipal liability based 
on a “failure to train” claim in a five-to-four ruling in City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 
(1989), and did likewise regarding a “failure to screen” hires claim in the five to four ruling 
in Board of the County Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997). 
537 For an example of the typical claim by critics of exclusion, see Bivens, 403 U.S. at 
416 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (asserting that “countless guilty criminals” were released 
because of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule).  In contrast, the available empirical 
data from the 1970s and early 1980s indicated that exclusion had only a very marginal effect 
on arrest dispositions and accounted for the loss of roughly 1% of arrests, primarily 
involving less serious drug cases.  See Davies, supra note 398, at 679-80 (summarizing the 
existing studies).  The data also revealed that violent crime prosecutions were rarely lost 
because of exclusion of evidence.  Id.  Because Fourth Amendment standards have been 
further relaxed and additional exceptions to exclusion have been created since the period 
when those studies were done, it seems highly likely that the effects of exclusion on arrest 
dispositions are now even lower. 
538 The most recent round of attacks on exclusion in Congress occurred in 1995.  House 
Republicans had included a pledge to abolish the exclusionary rule in their “Contract with 
America” during the 1994 elections, and—after winning control of the House—introduced 
legislation that would have at least created a broad good faith mistake exception to 
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would have been content to leave the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule 
as a vestige of earlier doctrine.  Indeed, the Rehnquist Court had pretty 
much taken that stance with regard to the remnants of Miranda and the 
Fifth Amendment right in the 2000 ruling in Dickerson v. United States.539  
However, that has not been the case. 
As noted above, even after Leon, there was still a potential for the 
exclusionary rule to be applied to an unconstitutional warrantless police 
search because the Leon blame-the-magistrate rationale was limited to 
instances in which someone other than the police could be blamed for a 
 
exclusion.  Meanwhile, the Republican-controlled Senate considered an alternative bill to 
create a sort of liquidated damages approach under which the federal government or states 
could pay a set amount of damages as an alternative “remedy” while the unconstitutionally 
seized evidence would be admissible.  Both efforts eventually broke down.  Apparently the 
National Rifle Association (NRA) was unwilling to see the exclusionary rule abolished with 
regard to searches by Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms (ATF) agents and, when the NRA was 
unsuccessful in promoting a plan to keep exclusion only for ATF searches, it flexed its 
political muscle against any legislative curtailment of exclusion.  See LONG, supra note 240, 
at 191-93. 
 I testified against the Senate Bill during the 1995 hearings and also followed some of the 
House debates at that time.  I was struck by the degree to which proponents of the legislative 
good faith exception invoked instances in which police had made factual errors and wrongly 
assumed that such errors would cause a search to be illegal and subject to exclusion.  
However, as the Court had plainly ruled on a number of occasions, that was not the case.  
See, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriquez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990) (holding that factual mistake as to 
whether person was co-inhabitant does not void consent to enter residence); Maryland v. 
Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987) (holding that factual mistake that there was one apartment 
when there actually were two does not make entry under search warrant illegal); Hill v. 
California 401 U.S. 797 (1971) (holding that mistaken identity does not make arrest or 
subsequent search incident to arrest illegal).  Hence, Congress was largely engaged in 
providing a “good faith exception” for searches that the Court already deemed to be 
constitutional. 
539 530 U.S. 428 (2000).  Although several Burger and Rehnquist Court decisions had 
characterized the warnings and waiver required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), 
as being only a prophylactic policy rather than constitutionally required, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s opinion in Dickerson reversed course and asserted that Miranda was 
constitutionally required and thus could not be overruled by Congress.  I think there is a 
pragmatic explanation for that shift: by the time Dickerson was decided, the Court had 
already created so many limitations and exceptions to Miranda that that doctrine had only 
marginal practical significance; thus, overruling Miranda would have undone all of the 
limitations and exceptions and returned the problem of involuntary or coerced confessions 
back to square one.  Notably, the conservative majority subsequently ignored their 
confirmation of the constitutional status of Miranda in Dickerson when they proceeded to 
announce further ways for police to deliberately evade Miranda in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 
U.S. 600 (2004).  An accurate appraisal of Seibert requires counting noses: Justice 
Kennedy’s concurring opinion combined with the dissenting opinion of Justice O’Connor, 
which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas joined, provided five votes 
for the proposition that deliberate violations of Miranda could be readily cured by 
subsequent police conduct. 
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Fourth Amendment violation.  The Roberts Court majority, however, has 
invented two new and somewhat differently based exceptions to exclusion 
in the 2006 ruling in Hudson v. Michigan540 and the 2009 ruling in Herring 
v. United States.541 
1. Hudson 
In Hudson, a five-to-four majority of the Roberts Court ruled that a 
violation of the Wilson knock and announce requirement for executing 
warrants would no longer result in exclusion of evidence seized in the 
ensuing search.  The specific ruling was of little consequence because the 
Wilson rule was itself of little consequence.  However, the rationale Justice 
Scalia offered for the new exception—that the violation was too causally 
“attenuated” from the finding and seizure of the evidence542—was so 
amorphously abstract that its outer boundary is not obvious.543 
Moreover, writing for himself, Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
O’Connor and Thomas (but not Justice Kennedy), Justice Scalia also 
asserted in Hudson that the exclusionary rule was no longer necessary 
because § 1983 lawsuits now provided an alternative remedy544—a rather 
brazen claim considering that Justice Scalia, as the author of Anderson and 
as a member of the plurality in Praprotnik, had personally participated in 
crippling § 1983 enforcement.545  Thus, Hudson strongly implied that these 
four justices are inclined to abolish the Weeks exclusionary rule. 
2. Herring 
The conservative assault on exclusion was renewed in the 2009 
Herring decision.  Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the five-justice majority 
(with Justice Alito having replaced the retiring Justice O’Connor, and this 
time including Justice Kennedy as well as Justices Scalia and Thomas).  
 
540 547 U.S. 586 (2006). 
541 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009). 
542 Hudson, 547 U.S. at 592-93 (stating that “the constitutional violation of an illegal 
manner of entry was not a but-for cause of obtaining the evidence [because w]hether that 
preliminary misstep had occurred or not, the police would have executed the warrant they 
had obtained, and would have discovered the [evidence] inside the house” and also stating 
that “[a]ttenuation . . . occurs when, even given a direct causal connection, the interest 
protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by 
suppression of the evidence obtained”). 
543 See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Exclusionary Rule and Causation: Hudson v. 
Michigan and Its Ancestors, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1741, 1779 (2008) (noting that the logic of the 
attenuation rationale in Hudson would seem to also apply to instances in which the police 
could have obtained a warrant but did not). 
544 Hudson, 547 U.S. at 597-98. 
545 See supra notes 533-536 and accompanying text. 
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Chief Justice Roberts announced that the exclusionary rule would no longer 
be applied to instances in which an unconstitutional search incident to arrest 
was conducted “as the result of isolated negligence attenuated from the 
arrest.”546  Additionally, Chief Justice Roberts announced that the 
appropriateness of exclusion should “var[y] with the culpability of the law 
enforcement conduct.”547  The creation of the novel “negligence” exception 
in Herring was a significant departure from earlier proposals for a good 
faith exception to the rule.  In fact, Justice Rehnquist had distinguished 
between police negligence and excusable mistakes in his initial proposal of 
a good faith mistake exception in Peltier.548 
It seems likely that the continuing majority will look for further 
opportunities to extend these new attenuation or negligence based 
exceptions to exclusion to additional settings.  The open question is whether 
the Roberts Court majority will stop there (per the treatment of Miranda in 
Dickerson), or whether they will pursue ideological purity and abolish the 
exclusionary rule outright.  One suspects that Justice Kennedy will provide 
the answer to that question, at least to the extent that it is decided in the near 
future.  Whether criminal search and seizure will be enforced at all now 
turns merely on the preference of the fifth vote.  
H. “SPECIAL NEEDS” 
A final set of rulings demonstrates the conservative majority’s 
reluctance to impose Fourth Amendment limits even on government 
activity that falls outside of criminal law enforcement per se.  The liberal 
Warren Court majority had attempted to formulate an administrative 
version of the warrant process for regulatory inspections.549  However, the 
Burger Court changed direction by ruling that the Fourth Amendment need 
not apply to all government regulatory inspections,550 by confirming the 
 
546 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 698. 
547 Id. at 701.   
548 See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 538-39 (1975); see also supra note 389 and 
accompanying text. 
549 In a five to four ruling in Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), the conservative 
members of the Warren Court ruled that warrantless city health inspections of dwellings did 
not violate the Fourth Amendment.  However, in 1967 in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 
U.S. 523 (1967), and See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), the liberal majority 
overruled Frank and instead ruled that regulatory inspections must comply with an 
administrative warrant procedure.   
550 See, e.g., Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (ruling that mandatory home visits of 
AFDC recipients by caseworkers do not constitute searches subject to Fourth Amendment). 
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broad powers of the government at the national border,551 and especially by 
adopting a permissive approach to non-criminal justice government 
searches under the “special needs” doctrine formulated in the 1985 ruling in 
New Jersey v. T.L.O.552  Under that doctrine, government institutions such 
as public schools are given considerable leeway to make suspicionless 
searches that would be unconstitutional if made in the course of criminal 
law enforcement.  The Rehnquist Court further developed this doctrine by 
permitting a government employer to search the office of an employee,553 
by permitting supervising officers to make warrantless searches of 
probationers554 and parolees,555 by permitting drug testing of certain public 
employees,556 and by even permitting random (that is, suspicionless) drug 
testing of any high school students who engage in extracurricular 
activities.557   
However, the justices have identified some outer limits on the special 
needs doctrine.  In 1997, the justices (eight to one) invalidated a state 
statute that required drug testing of candidates for elective office;558 in 
2001, they disapproved (five to four) of a procedure for drug testing 
pregnant women that was closely tied to law enforcement;559 and most 
recently, the justices (eight to one) invalidated a strip search of a public 
school student suspected of possessing over-the-counter medications.560  
Even so, the special needs doctrine means that the Fourth Amendment 
imposes only the weakest of restrictions on government intrusions outside 
of traditional criminal law enforcement. 
Although some may be tempted to regard this line of cases as being of 
lesser significance than the criminal procedure rulings themselves, that 
would be a mistake.  As government expands into more and more aspects of 
 
551 See, e.g., United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004); United States v. 
Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002); United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985); 
United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977). 
552 469 U.S. 325 (1985).  The ”special needs” terminology for this doctrinal approach 
initially appeared in Justice Blackmun’s concurring opinion in T.L.O.  See id. at 351 
(referring to “special needs beyond the normal need for law enforcement”). 
553 O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987). 
554 United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001). 
555 Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987); see also Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 
843 (2006). 
556 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); Nat’l Treasury 
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989). 
557 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. 
Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002).  
558 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997). 
559 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001). 
560 Safford United Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009). 
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life, citizens are as likely to experience arbitrary and demeaning intrusions 
by bureaucrats as by police.  Moreover, the school search cases are 
particularly troubling for the message they convey to young people about 
subservience to authority.  The “special needs” of the nanny state seem 
likely to become exorbitant. 
IX. CONCLUSION: FOURTH AMENDMENT REMNANTS 
So, where do things stand at the end of the century of Fourth 
Amendment search and seizure doctrine?  That depends on precisely what 
question one asks. 
The course of Fourth Amendment search and seizure doctrine during 
the Journal’s century certainly confirms the basic tenets of legal realism.  
Search and arrest issues present an archetypal ideological contest between 
those who lean toward accommodating and empowering institutions of 
social control such as the police, and those who lean toward holding those 
institutions accountable for excesses.  As recounted above, the direction of 
search rulings has shifted as the ideological outlook of the swing vote 
justice has shifted. 
How strong are Fourth Amendment protections today?  How 
significant are the remains of Fourth Amendment doctrine?  There is 
certainly a large edifice of precedent—that is what occurs when court 
rulings create a web of exceptions and limitations to a set of purported 
principles.  But there is little that could be characterized as a substantial 
legal constraint on police arrest and search power.  Indeed, the exceptions 
that have been announced regarding the supposed principles now apply so 
frequently to the routine situations in which police interact with the 
populace that the doctrinal “exceptions” are the functional rules, and the 
instances when the supposed principles apply are now the genuine 
exceptions.  Although it might be said that the recent Courts did not always 
cut back as severely as they might have,561 it is nevertheless the case that 
they have left little of substance behind.  Indeed, during the most recent 
term of the Court, prosecutors filed only six certiorari petitions regarding 
search and seizure issues, and those were mostly over mundane disputes 
such as whether there was reasonable suspicion in a particular situation.  
Since prosecutors plainly could have expected a friendly reception by the 
 
561 See Craig M. Bradley, The Fourth Amendment: Be Reasonable, in THE REHNQUIST 
LEGACY 81, 105 (Craig Bradley ed., 2006) (noting that Chief Justice Rehnquist “would have 
gone considerably further in limiting the rights of defendants” if the other justices would 
have gone along). 
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justices, the only apparent explanation for the small number of filings is that 
law enforcement has little left to complain about.562 
The last four decades of search and seizure rulings have also 
demonstrated the gross inadequacy of “reasonableness” as a supposed 
standard for regulating government arrest and search authority.  The 
Framers thought they were preserving rules for arrests and searches when 
they adopted the Fifth Amendment “due process of law” clause and the 
Fourth Amendment.  But modern “Fourth Amendment reasonableness” is 
merely a creation of judges who sought a rubric for announcing their 
personal predilections as law.  If government arrests and searches are to be 
brought under legal standards again, “Fourth Amendment reasonableness” 
has to be rejected.  But there is so little left for a doctrinal foundation that it 
seems quite unlikely that search and seizure law can be revived. 
That is not to say that the little that is left does not matter.  Current 
doctrine sometimes still requires processes that likely inhibit hasty police 
intrusions.  For example, even though the operative standard for issuing a 
valid warrant is now rather minimal, obtaining a warrant is still often 
required for a house search, and the warrant process causes investigating 
officers to consult with superiors and prosecutors who may be more likely 
to be thoughtful and in touch with community sentiments.  But the restraint 
induced by the warrant process is now largely political and sociological in 
nature, not legal. 
Likewise, even the now weakened exclusionary rule does one thing 
much better that any alternative remedy possibly could—although it rarely 
leads to suppression of evidence, it does make police arrest and search 
conduct visible to other actors through motion to suppress hearings.  By 
requiring officers to explain their conduct, motions to suppress provide an 
important training function.563  Such motions also give local judges an 
 
562 A review of the certiorari petitions indentified in United States Law Week, 
Proceedings of the Supreme Court, Cases Docketed, reveals that prosecutors filed only six 
petitions relating to any aspect of search and seizure issues during the period July 7, 2009 
through August 17, 2010.  These included: Virginia v. Harris (No. 09-3068) (anonymous tip 
insufficient for reasonable suspicion of drunk driving); Michigan v. Dorsey (No. 09-3084) 
(search of purse of visitor merely present during execution of search warrant invalid); 
Virginia v. Rudolph (No. 09-3304) (insufficient reasonable suspicion for Terry detention); 
Minnesota v. Russell (No. 09-3456) (identification invalid as fruit of illegal detention 
without reasonable suspicion); Ohio v. Smith (No. 09-3719) (warrantless search of call log 
on cell phone not valid search incident to arrest); Kentucky v. King (No. 09-3733) 
(warrantless entry of apartment on basis of odor of marijuana not justified by exigent 
circumstances). 
563 See Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Comment, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An 
Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1016, 1033-41 (1987) 
(reporting the results of an interview study of the experiences of Chicago police officers 
during motion to suppress hearings).  
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overview of police conduct.  Of course, there is no way to quantify the 
“benefits” resulting from that exposure.  That, however, does not mean they 
are insubstantial. 
In addition, the conclusion that little substance remains in Fourth 
Amendment doctrine as this is written in 2010 does not mean that the prior 
rulings that gave substance to Fourth Amendment protections made no 
difference.  One never comes out of a century of history at the same point 
one went in.  The development of Fourth Amendment doctrine during the 
first six decades of the century, and the continuation of some strands of that 
doctrine during some or all of the final four decades, has surely had broader 
systemic effects on law enforcement.  It has prompted increased police 
training and has been a catalyst for increasing professionalism in law 
enforcement.  It has also caused the media to become more attuned to such 
issues.  It has also inhibited (though certainly not eliminated) the use of 
criminal justice to oppress minority communities and, at least indirectly, it 
has supported greater inclusiveness in local political systems. 
The pressing question, as a practical matter, is whether the remaining 
search and seizure standards have essentially served their purpose and can 
now be dispensed with altogether.  The conservative majority on the Court 
seems to have concluded that crime is a real problem, but the potential for 
police and government oppression is not.  Thus, they have wagered that 
legal constraints on police are now unnecessary564 and law enforcement can 
be trusted to be a benign force.565  In effect, the justices have now dispensed 
with the concept that arrest and search authority should be limited by 
distinct constitutional rights and have instead folded search and seizure into 
the larger category of administrative law, in which social problems are 
turned over the supposed expert agencies and the courts stay out of the way 
so long as the agency conduct is not egregious or patently arbitrary.  Thus, 
police and prosecutors are to be left alone to do their work—at least so long 
as abuses are only “isolated,” or at least do not become “epidemic.”566 
I suspect the justices are not at variance with the weight of public 
opinion in these judgments.  In the current climate, there is little likelihood 
 
564 Of course, there is an alternative explanation: the majority justices are simply 
unconcerned with controlling excessive zeal on the part of the police because they perceive 
that aggressive police intrusions fall most heavily on particular segments of the community, 
especially minorities, with whom the justices do not empathize.  Cf. Bradley, supra note 561, 
at 103 (“[B]eing stopped or searched by police would not seem to be a personal concern of 
[Chief Justice] Rehnquist’s.  Nor does he empathize with those people for whom it is a more 
realistic possibility.”). 
565 See, e.g., Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 812 (1984) (“We are unwilling to 
believe that officers will routinely and purposely violate the law as a matter of course.”). 
566 See supra note 487 and accompanying text. 
2010] CENTURY OF “SEARCH AND SEIZURE” DOCTRINE 1039 
that elected officials will endorse either a regime of rules for criminal 
arrests and searches or enforcement of such rules through the exclusion of 
unconstitutionally seized evidence.  Indeed, there is little likelihood that a 
president would nominate a justice who has been an outspoken supporter of 
Fourth Amendment rights and enforcement.  And that is especially so in the 
age of terrorism.  As this is written, media commentary is filled with 
denunciations of giving 9/11 suspects constitutional rights such as Miranda 
warnings.567  Hence, there does not seem to be any realistic potential that 
the destruction of the civil right against unwarranted arrest or search will be 
reversed. 
So, as we reach the end of the century of search and seizure doctrine, 
one can only hope that the optimistic views expressed by the majority 
justices regarding benign policing will be proved right—albeit while fearing 
that they will not.568 
 
567 The expressions of concern by the punditry indicate that the pundits are ignorant of 
how little content remains in Miranda doctrine.  However, that is a subject for another time. 
568 Another question is pertinent for legal academics.  How should legal academics deal 
with the destruction of Fourth Amendment standards and enforcement during the last four 
decades?  As an academic who has spent much of my career researching and teaching about 
search and seizure, I empathize with colleagues who may be tempted to minimize the degree 
to which search and seizure doctrine has been stripped of substance so as to continue to treat 
it as though it remains an important body of constitutional doctrine.  But I question whether 
that stance misleads law students, and I seriously doubt that the strained and often patently 
disingenuous rationales that appear in recent search and seizure opinions are worthwhile 
models for professional study.  More broadly, I fear that the pretense that Fourth 
Amendment rights still have content distorts the broader public discourse about criminal 
justice.  Indeed, that pretense now props up a mere illusion of rights in what seems to be an 
increasingly collectivist society and an increasingly statist regime. 
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Table 1 





















1959 1      1 1 
1960 1 3     1 4 
1961  2  1   0 3 
1962       0 0 
1963 2 1 1 2   3 6 
1964 1 1  1   1 3 
1965 1   1   1 2 
1966    1   0 1 
1967 4 1 3 3   7 11 
1968  3 2 2   2 7 
1969 3 4  5   3 12 
1970  1  1 1  1 3 
1971 3  1 1  1 4 6 
1972 1  1  1  3 3 
1973 2   1 3 1 5 7 
1974 4  1  1  6 6 
1975 2 1     2 3 
1976 4  1  1  6 6 
1977 1 1  1   1 3 
1978 1  1 3   2 5 
1979 3  2 6   5 11 
1980 5 1 1 3   6 10 
1981 1 1 2 1   3 5 
1982 1  2    3 3 
1983 2 1 5 1   7 9 
1984 5  4 1   9 10 
1985 4  4 2  1 8 11 
1986   3 1   3 4 
1987 1  5 1   6 7 
1988 1  2    3 3 
1989 1  1    2 2 
 
























1990 1  5 4   6 10 
1991   4    4 4 
1992       0 0 
1993 1   1   1 2 
1994    1   0 1 
1995   2    2 2 
1996 1  1    2 2 
1997   3    3 3 
1998 1      1 1 
1999   4 1   4 5 
2000  1 1 2   1 4 
2001  1 2 1   2 4 
2002 3  1    4 4 
2003    1   0 1 
2004 3  3    6 6 
2005   1    1 1 
2006 1  4 1   5 6 
2007    1   0 1 
2008   1    1 1 
2009 1  1 1   2 3 
 
* The statistics in this table are derived from the annual summary of Supreme Court 
decisions by opinion reported in the Harvard Law Review.  See supra notes 254-256 and 
accompanying text. 
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